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ABSTRACT
This essay argues that irony is a necessary and central part of the
spirit that animates principled speech.
The notion that irony is negative, especially as expressed "by Kierke¬
gaard, is examined from within "by re-presenting the negative ironist
in dialogue. This presentation has as its purpose the discovery and
elucidation of the crisis of negative irony. The crisis is then
developed as initiating reflection on the problems of temperance and
justice.
The problem of temperance is raised through the negative ironists
experience of anger. Anger raises the problem of speech's relation¬
ship to nature. Temperance as self-mastery in our relation to nature
is developed through the notion of the mastery of anger. Through an
examination of ^lato's Charmides the argument is advanced that the
development of justice depends upon temperance, since, ironically,
justice tends to originate in a type of intemperance. Temperance
educates justice by nurturing its Desire for value. It enables jus¬
tice to mature through the work of re-enlivening and re-valuing inher¬
itance. Temperate justice is the positive development of resource
towards the realization of value. It is embodied in Socrates' ironic
relation to nature.
The problem of justice is raised through the negative ironist's rejec¬
tion of awe. Awe raises the problem of speech's relationship to the
polis. Justice as the demand for satisfaction in the midst of names
is developed through the notion of the consummation of Desire. Through
further examination of Plato's Gharmides, the argument is advanced
that the development of temperance depends upon justice, since,
ironically, temperance tends to originate in a type of injustice.
Justice educates temperance by giving to it a grasp of what is neces¬
sary to it. The work of justice is to develop the ideal speaker's
conviction, that is, his capacity to maintain the motion of develop¬
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INTRODUCTION
THE IRONIST AS MORAL ACTOR
1. In Book Six of the Republic, Socrates, having laid out the
qualities of the philosopher, is called on by Adeimantos to address
the popular view that in actual fact philosophers are "utterly worth¬
less" and "useless to society".^ We can treat Socrates' reply in a
philosophical way by developing a sense of its worth and usefulness.
Socrates' reply turns out to be worthwhile and useful as a way of
initiating reflection on the nature of irony.
When Adeimantos asks for Socrates' opinion of the popular view,
Socrates gives the surprising and initially disturbing answer that he
thinks it is true (487d). The surprising character of Socrates'
answer seems to resonate with some notion of it as ironic. It is
ironic for Socrates, who has been praising the philosopher as the
worthiest one in the community, to suddenly turn around and agree with
the polis' view of him as worthless and uselesa. So far, then, irony
has the character of a surprising event: irony is the occurrence of
some noteworthy incongruence either in a situation or in a speech.
Irony as surprise, then, treats as central what will turn out to be
its most preliminary feature: for the surprise emerges through the
fact that not only situations, but speeches too, are events. They
are material phenomena that may exhibit irony, that is some incon¬
gruity between their parts that is noteworthy and surprising. Yet
even when we go beyond this notion, the surprise does not become simply
1. Plato, The Republic, translated by F.M.Cornford (19^1), ^87c-d.
Subsequent quotations from this and other Platonic dialogues are
cited within my text through the use in regular fashion of the
Estienne (Stephanus)pagination.
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irrelevant. At present, we, along with Adeimantos, are merely surprised.
Our problem is, not how to do away with the surprise, but rather, how to
transform it. What is the good of the surprises how is it worthwhile and
useful?
We begin to transform the surprise by calling to mind Socrates'
being oriented to it. If Socrates had been artless in his practices,
then the surprise might remain imprisoned at the level of an event. The
surprise would remain simply a dumb feature of an oversight. But Socrates,
of course, knows that his response is surprising. Socrates is himself
oriented to giving Adeimantos a surprise. Socrates is telling us, in
effect, that the true way of transforming the surprise of his answer is
to treat it as oriented rather than accidental. This might involve some
trouble for us: certainly it does for Adeimantos. Our work in this dis¬
sertation is to face up to this trouble and to transform it into a moment
within theorizing. Our work, that is, is exactly the work of Adeimantos
in facing up to the initial surprise generated by Socrates' reply. To
say this differently: our work is to generate a stronger sense of irony.
Adeimantos' trouble at this point - the disturbance he experiences -
is that he is unqualified to enjoy the playfulness of Socrates' reply. He
experiences the remark as tantalizing rather than playful. Adeimantos
reacts by demanding of Socrates,
"Then (if the popular opinion is true) how can
it be right to say that there will be no rest
from trouble until states are ruled by these
philosophers whom we are now admitting to be
of no use to them?" (487e).
When Socrates replies that this needs to be answered by a parable,
the unfortunate Adeimantos is driven to exlaim: "Whereas you,
of course, never talk in parables!" (487e). Adeimantos becomes
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sarcastic (rather than ironic) because he resents the easy play with
which Socrates tantalizes his understanding. Notice how closely this
corresponds to the "popular view" of Socrates (the philosopher) as one
who distracts the understanding and renders it distraught in confusion:
i.e. as a destructive influence on the polis. And if Adeimantos sounds
like the polis, then Socrates sounds like he is teasing the polis,
"playing" with it by tantalizing it.
Yet, on the other hand, although we sense how difficult Adei¬
mantos finds it to resist the popular view, when Socrates actually
asks him if he thinks it is true, something in him does resist. He
replies: "I do not know; I should like to hear your opinion" (487d).
And he is honest enough not to pretend to a knowledge he lacks: admit¬
ting that he does not know implies very strongly the strength of
temptation he experiences towards the popular view. So this shows
us that Adeimantos, in asking his question, is facing up to a part
of himself that he is dissatisfied with. It would not be hard, in
fact, for Socrates to abuse Adeimantos' vulnerability at this point.
Adeimantos' sarcasm is not born of meanness but rather of the desire
to protect himself. Socrates' playing might merely tantalize Adeiman¬
tos. The ironist must know the difference between being playful and
tantalizing the other.
Socrates must remember that irony, deeply, is an offer to the
other. Socrates really wants to offer Adeimantos the opportunity of
transforming surprise into something deeper. Adeimantos, that is,
does not personify the polis: rather, he is tempted by the polis.
Socrates, shortly afterwards, speaks disparagingly of the polis to
Adeimantos. He says of the multitude that it "can never be philo-
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sophical" and "is bound to disapprove of all who pursue wisdom"(494a).
Being ironic towards the polis then, given this view, might amount to
tantalizing it, driving it to distraction, re-enacting the superiority
of the philosopher. Perhaps irony is merely the philosopher's way
of dealing (politically) with the polis?
Yet Adeimantos does not personify the polis, and Socrates, in
keeping with what he says about the philosopher (494e), is "sensitive"
to this. Perhaps, indeed, nobody really, or merely, personifies the
polis? Socrates tells Adeimantos that "the public itself (is) the
greatest of all sophists" (492a), yet even the sophist does not merely
personify the city. Rather, as Strauss says of Thrasymachos, the
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sophist "imitates" or "plays" the city. The sophist is oriented
towards the polis not only as the source of his inspiration but also
as the arbiter of his right. The sophist, although he does not
personify the polis, is opportunist towards the city. Thus, he plays
in the weak sense of "playing at" wisdom. Adeimantos knows that the
sophist is a dissemblers Socrates and Glaucon, indeed, had just
succeeded in distinguishing the philosopher (the lover of wisdom)
from the lover of appearances (the dissembler of wisdom). Adeimantos
is in between the sophist and the philosopher by virtue of his rejec¬
tion of semblance or "playing at": that is, by virtue of his honesty.
Being "in between" means that Adeimantos tends to be indecisive: yet
he is dissatisfied with this indecisiveness (the sway of the polis
over him). He is indecisive because of his fear that the philosopher's
irony is mere dissembling: i.e. that it is dishonest, (it would be
dishonest if it were merely the reverse of the sophist's dissembling:
that is, if the philosopher was not really a lover of wisdom but only
one who tantalizes the ignorant). He is dissatisfied with his inde-
2. L.Strauss (1964), p.78.
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cision because he knows how obscure his understanding of it is, and
also how the obscurity of indecision tends (by its nature) to per¬
petuate itself. Adeimantos is really asking Socrates: what is the
good of irony, play, dissembling? Adeimantos is asking Socrates to
demonstrate to him the worth and usefulness of the philosopher's
orientation to irony, play, and dissembling.
Adeimantos knows that something is holding him back but he
does not know what it is: so he is dissatisfied with himself. He
needs to be shown the good of philosophy's irony, and this he demon¬
strates in his own lack of irony towards the polis. It emerges from
Socrates' response that Adeimantos' problem is that he takes the polis
literally. . Adeimantos' problem is that he agrees to call philosophers
those whom the polis calls philosophers. Yet he also wants to agree
with Socrates that the philosopher is the best in the community. It
is his implicit agreement with the polis - an agreement he is uncon¬
scious of - that is holding him back. Adeimantos will turn the
surprise of Socrates' reply into a positive development when he
realizes that what made the surprise possible was his tacit agree¬
ment with (his lack of irony towards) the polis.
Because Adeimantos takes the polis literally, he is prey to
the polis. He is hinted down and cornered by whatever the polis
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says. Hence Adeimantos is worried about the polis. It is difficult
for him to deal in a satisfactory way with what the polis says. Given
that those whom the polis calls philosophers ( and who call themselves
philosophers) are philosophers, then how can we escape the popular
view? It seems undeniable that philosphers are "worthless and useless".
3. Adeimantos uses this metaphor himself (48?b-c): the polis, he
says, feels itself to be cornered by Socrates' arguments. Now
we can see that ironically, it is he who is cornered - though
not by Socrates. Yet, for us, the problem of the theorist who
feels cornered by the polis is both lively and troublesome. This
essay is our attempt to demonstrate this liveliness and trouble.
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The polis says things that are undeniable yet dissatisfactory. The
polis makes one dissatisfied.
Adeimantos is dissatisfied: with the polis, which refutes his
desire to agree with Socrates, with Socrates, who seems to tantalize
him, and above all, with himself, for allowing the polis to refute
him. Adeimantos allows the polis to refute him, and hence to persuade
and influence him, by taking the words of the polis literally. When
Socrates says that the public itself is the greatest of all sophists,
Adeimantos agrees with a certain poignancy that its influences on
youthful promise "must be irresistible" (^92d). So Adeimantos wants
Socrates to help him to resist the polis. Adeimantos wants to hear
an account of justice (the rule of the philosopher) that will be
strong enough to resist the polis. Adeimantos wants to hear a devel¬
opment of justice that is strong and positive.
Yet this brings us back to the surprise of Socrates' reply.
We can ask: why is the reply so surprising? As we have already seen,
it is surprising because of our implicit agreement with the polis.
But it is also surprising for another reason: because it contradicts
what we expect and hope of Socrates. We (Adeimantos) expect and hope
that Socrates will refute the polis, because we secretly (in ways we
do not grasp) agree with the polis. Instead, Socrates ironically
agrees with the polis because he does not really agree with the polis
(i.e. take it literally). Socrates' strength is his knowledge that
those whom the polis calls "worthless" and "useless" are either falsely
undervalued or else not genuine philosophers. Although the polis may
call the philosopher worthless, Socrates achieves a sense of irony
towards the polis because he knows (has the deep conviction) that both
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names cannot be true of the same person at the same time. Those who
appear to be philosophers may well be worthless, and those who are
philosophers may well appear to be worthless. Socrates' ironic agree¬
ment (with both of these propositions) would be tantalizing if the
irony simply cancelled out any positive content, i.e. if the substance
of the agreement were merely ironized for the sake of nothingness. Yet
Socrates ironically agrees with the "popular view" because what is
unshakable for him is the justice of the genuine philospher.
Adeimantos wants to refute the polis because he is unironic
towards the polis. He wants to defeat the polis because he suffers
the very real fear that it could defeat him. And, of course, as
should already be obvious, the polis jus defeating Adeimantos right
now. Yet Socrates is showing that there is no real need to refute
the polis. What is necessary in relation to the polis, is to be
ironic. Somehow, to want to refute the polis (to be dissatisfied
with it and with oneself) is already to have been "refuted" or defea¬
ted by it. The one who suffers this feels a dissatisfaction towards
the polis that risks becoming something worse. Adeimantos nurtures
the impulse to avenge himself for the injustice of the polis (towards
the philosophic desire in him). His problem is his beginning in the
weakness of literalness (which makes him defensive) rather than in
the strength of positive irony (which would enable him to be just).
Defensive literalness breeds, out of its initial dissatisfac¬
tion, hatred and resentment towards the polis. In response to this,
we can begin by saying that the theorist is one who is just. Justice
(rather than hatred) towards the polis, we shall seek to demonstrate,
requires positive irony.
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2. So far, we have listened, step by step, to the philosopher's
development of irony. At this point, however, we can imagine the
return of Adeimantos to the conversation. And in a very real sense,
his original rejoinder still stands. He feels trapped in a corner,
perhaps, by our argument, but we have not genuinely convinced him,
because we have merely ignored the polis' claim that the ironist (the
philosopher who dissembles and thus tantalizes) is "worthless and use¬
less" . Is it not possible, Adeimantos would ask, that the polis is
justified in its view of irony? Must we not at least take seriously
this possibility, instead of merely ignoring it?
If we reflect on Adeimantos' question, it emerges not only
that the question is justified, but also that, in a certain sense,
the polis is justified too. Irony risks becoming unjust towards the
polis and hence justifying the polis' charges against it.
To discover how this is so, we must consider the temptation
that the polis poses for the ironist, and in this way, find out about
the corruptibility of irony and the particular form it takes. The
ironist knows that the polis is the greatest sophist. The polis dis¬
sembles the truth, whereas the ironist dissembles in order to enliven
reflection and encourage the pursuit of the truth. The ironist must
live strongly with the polis (which is everywhere, including within him¬
self) : he must enliven reflection and philosophy whatever the polis does
to discourage him. Yet the greatest temptation of all for the ironist is
to fall into a sense of rancour towards the polis. Irony lives and flou¬
rishes when it remembers that the polis as Socrates tells Grito can do
"neither the greatest evil nor the greatest good" (Plato.The Crito.44d).
Irony suffers and becomes negative when it is driven to seek personi¬
fications of the polis. This is precisely the activity
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that will foster the growth of its rancour. Whenever the ironist
succumbs to this temptation the corruption of his practices not only
"justified1 the charges of the polis, but actually gives rise to those
charges in the first place. The corruption of irony is simultane¬
ously the child of the polis and the justification of the polis. The
child of the polis fathers the self-justification of the polis - if
only because it is worse than its father. We are reminded here of the
regression towards tyranny in Book Eight of the Republic. The corrup¬
tion of irony is the corruption of justice, because it is a kind of
injustice towards others. Corrupt irony treats others as personifi¬
cations of the polis.
We see an example of irony* s corruption in the work of Jane
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Austen . In his essay on Pride and Prejudice, Conrad suggests that
the premise for Austen's irony is the notion of society as a contrac¬
tual hypocrisy, and the social contract as an armed truce^. What is
most striking in this notion is the relationship between the contract
and the truce. A truce is a kind of contract: a contract designed,
not to further an active pursuit in common, but rather, to draw a
limit to the actions that would result from hostility. A truce pre¬
supposes conflict between its participants. Yet Austen's irony goes
further than this: it says that the social contract itself (indeed
any contract) presupposes at least the mild type of conflict refer¬
enced by "hypocrisy". A contract is premised on the lack of a genuine
bonding between its participants. We might say that Austen sees what
Rousseau does not: that the "general will" that requires a contract
between its members can only be something estranged and antagonistic
to them as individuals. The ironist stands out from the many as the
4. See especially Pride and Prejudice (l9?8). P.Conrad's Introduc¬
tion to this edition has been the starting point for our
discussion here.
5- P.Conrad, Introduction to Austen (1978), p.vii.
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"true individual", that is, as the one whose sensitivity forces upon
him the realization that the general will is crude and vulgar, and
that nothing but hypocrisy (the social contract) holds it together.
Rousseau and Austen both formulate a people without spirit, without
a genuine grasp of what they can therefore only pretend to share:
yet it is Austen not Rousseau who grasps the far from Utopian conse¬
quences of this contractually based society.
To begin with, here, we see that Austen agrees with Socrates
in saying that the polis is the greatest of sophists. Yet Austen
grasps this in a very different way: from the interest in the
individual rather than in the theorist. So, whereas for Socrates
the polis is innocent of its own ignorance, for Austen the opposite
is the case. Now innocence is the opposite of both knowledge and
guilt. The polis is both knowledgeable and guilty because the sophism
on which it is founded is the "contractual hypocrisy" of the truce.
This turns the polis into an actor subject to moral evaluation. More
pointedly, it has the tendency to turn actors into personifications
of the polis. To the extent that anyone is "like" the polis, they
automatically, by dint of the contractual hypocrisy on which it is
founded, become participants in its knowledge and in its guilt. Indeed,
although the actor in a sense arrives after the contract has already
been established (by "everybody else", as it were), it is he, through
his collusion in polite and empty talk, who helps to maintain that
contract. Hence, the actor - in this contractual scheme - to the
extent that he is "like" the polis (i.e. unironic towards it), personi¬
fies the polis.
Now we must ask: what is the basis, at the notional level, for
this hatred of the polis and its supposed contract? We should first
11
note that hatred of the polis generates an irony designed to protect
one from the contract by mocking it. This shows us that the self-
protective ironist regards the contract as lamentable but irremediable.
But why is the contract deemed necessary by the polis? Conrad's
Introduction can help us here. He says that the second premise of
Austen's irony is the family. We are bound to our family by duty:
the family is tyrannical, in Austen, because it is both accidental
and inescapable. Thus,Conrad writes that
"the individual is dually the prisoner
of the false ciyilities of society and
the embarrassing accidents of nature,
which afflicts Elizabeth with unworthy
parents". 6
In Austen, the family stands as a mere icon of nature.
Yet duty does not belong to the realm of nature: it is social,
and above all, contractual. If the family is merely natural, duty to¬
wards it is not. It is duty, or contract, that "elevates" the family
above the realm of nature. Contract, says the polis, rescues men from
the "state of nature": contract, enacted through duty, rescues us from
original conflict and makes human life possible. Protective irony
agrees with the polis insofar as it sees the origin of the social
contract in the state of nature. It parts company with the polis in
that, for it, the contract is a completely ridiculous attempt to over¬
come the unthinking vulgarity and conflict of the state of nature.
What is truly hateful to the protective ironist is not the
polis, nor the contract, but the basically irremediable state of
nature that gives rise to them. Only the ironist genuinely escapes
the clutches of nature: only he has become more than merely acciden¬
tal, merely natural. The only true orientation, for the protective
6.P.Conrad, Introduction to Austen (1978), p.vii.
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ironist, is the struggle to evade nature, both without and within. This
struggle can only be waged from outside the polis - because those
inside the polis (the contract) have forgotten the horrors of nature.
Better: orienting to nature via a contract shows a lack of proper
awareness of the horrors of nature, (family, hubris, village idiot, or
whatever) in the first place. Those who assent to the social contract
do so because they fail to see its hypocricy: that is, they underesti¬
mate nature. They imagine that something as hollow as a contract can
overcome the claims of nature. They are dimly aware that nature can
sometimes run wild, but not aware enough - for the simple reason that
they are still dominated by it. The polis says we must control (the
excesses of) nature. The ironist - the sensitive one - hates the hubris
of (human) nature and hates the polis for simply establishing a truce
with it when what is necessary is to overcome or transcend it.
Hearing all of this, we can begin to grasp the case for the
polis. The first point, which the polis itself might make, is that it
is surely more moderate to modify nature - which is, after all, the
point of making a treaty with it - than in effect to wage war against
it, as self-protective irony does. Secondly, and much more importantly,
the negative ironist's very notions of contract, hypocrisy, armed truce,
and so on, derive from and are animated by a hatred of nature. So the
protective ironist's whole project is premised on a notion of the
polis that is unjust to begin with. The polis can see that protective,
7
or what we will call negative,irony, is based on hatred.
The polis rejects protective irony as worthless and useless
because it is based on hatred of the state of nature, which is simul-
7- In passing we may say that at least the protective ironist hates
the social contract he invents, and is hence more "natural" than
he realizes. Only a very bland passion could find the idea of a
social contract appealing. We will need to explore this "natural¬
ness" of self-protective irony more fully, but for now, we can
notice simply that it is not as removed from nature as it thinks.
taneously hatred of ignorance. For self-protective irony, the ignorant
person is the person who lives in the state of nature: that is, merely
accidentally, subject to the whims of vanity and hubris. Ignorance,
in this view, is nature's invasion of self-consciousness. Hence
ignorance is indiscriminate. The differences it makes between things
are centred around the gratification of its natural pleasures rather
than genuine value. Ignorance calls good those speakers or things that
gratify its natural whims and desires. And, above all, ignorance is
epitomized in the polis' treaty with nature. The polis shows its
ignorance in its underestimation of nature. Underestimating nature
pre-supposes being under its sway: that is, it pre-supposes ignorance.
For self-protective irony, the social contract is merely the ratifica¬
tion of ignorance. For it, not to be ironic is to be ignorant.
Irony now seeks to transcend nature and the polis in order to
prevent the possible invasion of its soul by them. This establishes
why we have been calling it self-protective irony. To protect one¬
self from nature and the polis by seeking to transcend them is an
activity grounded in antagonism. Thus self-protective irony posits,
if nothing else, an original war, even more original than the war of
all against all: the war of nature against man and man against nature.
The ironist will presume to win this war at a purely abstract level:
nature is transcended. The status of nature and the polis as insis¬
tent claims on self-conscious thought is cancelled and abolished.
The negative ironist is one whose whole life is animated by,
and given over to, his desire to transcend nature and the polis. He
wants to transcend what is accidental and tyrannic for the sake of
essence. That is, he wants to transcend substance through irony.
Negative irony treats as the most important thing the difference
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between nature and essence. To grasp the essential or the necessary
is to overcome (i.e. transcend) our bondage to the accidental. The
negative ironist's interest in difference is his paramount interest.
For Kierkegaard, as we shall see, it was Socrates, with his method of
questioning and dissolving opinions and coming to the aporia or nega¬
tive conclusion, who epitomized this interest.
Negative irony is thus seen as the source of all transcendental
philosophy and religion: it is in negative irony that the impulse to
create another world, over and above this one, is seen to originate.
Yet whereas philosophy and religion let mundane reality be (or merely
put it in brackets), the negative ironist devotes his energy to tan¬
talizing and mocking it. The charge against negative irony is that
whereas philosophy and religion "console" us, it taunts our worldly
position from a "superior" vantage point.
Because the ironist's first and last interest is in the differ¬
ence between the essential and the accidental, he effectively disposes
of everything substantial in favour of the most abstract notion:
Being, the One, or the Idea. For Kierkegaard, the Socratic Idea
references nothing more or less than Socrates' indifference to what
is substantial (nature and the polis). Socrates is portrayed by
Kierkegaard as the genuine forerunner of those "romantic ironists"
of his own century, Schlegel and Tieck. Of them he writes that where-
as "Fichte would construct the world Schlegel and Tieck, on the
g
other hand would dispose of a world". The romantic or negative
9
ironist wants to "poetically produce himself" : in order to do this
he reduces the substance of nature and polis to emptiness. His irony
8. S.Kierkegaard (1968), p.292.
9. Loc. cit. p.297*
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serves to cancel it out and utterly detach himself from it. And yet -
precisely because of this - his interest (in the essential, the Idea,
and so on) is really an interest in nothing. What the negative
ironist calls the Idea, the One, and so on, is really Nothingness.
This is the negativity of the ironist, for Kierkegaard: that he
reduces to nothing everything substantial for the sake of a perverse,
cerebral, passion for Nothingness or Difference.
3. Now we ask: what is our problem in relation to this? With
what must our dissertation contend if we are to demonstrate convin¬
cingly the worth and usefulness of irony? Our task is this: we must
transform negative irony so as to realize irony's full development.
It is immediately clear that this is not the same as transcending
negative irony. To "transcend" negative irony would, in fact, be to
merely repeat what negative irony already practices. Our disserta¬
tion must be a transformation of negative irony that re-presents the
real depth and spirit of irony. We need to consider what this will
actually involve in the positive sense.
We propose to examine the dialectical movement through which
negative irony is transformed. And since we want to re-present trans¬
formation rather than transcendence we will attempt to show it as a
motion from within negative irony itself. The irony of negative
irony is that it has the potential to become positive, i.e. to realize
the true spirit and depth of irony. It is necessary to ask - how will
this be? Here we return to a point we made in passing earlier: that
negative irony is not as removed from nature as it tends to think.
Hatred, even of nature, is an attitude that sustains an attachment to
nature, even, in this instance, in spite of itself. Somehow, it must
be possible for negative irony to experience its attachment to nature:
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that is, to re-experience nature under the auspices of a new and alter¬
native possibility. The real problem for irony now emerges as the
problem of nature, just as the failure of negative irony is its fail¬
ure to resolve this problem. Our claim is that the spirit of irony
is the strength of man's relation to nature. Of course, we do not
know yet what this means - but what we can grasp, as our beginning, is
our need for a strong relation to nature. We can grasp this as a strong
need. The relation to nature we need must be stronger than the treaty
(the polis' relation) - but also, crucially, stronger than transcen¬
dence and abstractness (the negative ironist's relation).
If we began with the problem of justice (in the ironist's rela¬
tion to the polis) we see emerge here the problem of temperance (in the
ironist's relation to nature). Justice and temperance are both at
stake in our inquiry. The example of the negative ironist shows us
that somehow, justice and temperance seem to be bound up together in
intrinsic ways which as yet remain unclear to us. We will use the
example of irony, in this essay, as a way of developing and resolving
the relationship between the two virtues. To initiate this, we propose
to develop the ironist's relation to nature through a phenomenological
account of the development of negative into positive irony. This
account requires the exercise of positive irony in order to develop
negative irony beyond itself. Yet this development is one that occurs
from within negative irony itself. This is so because on the one hand
negative irony cannot develop without the influence of the positive.
Without this influence it simply remains as it is. Yet on the other
hand this influence can never merely come from outside of itself.
Negative irony can only transform itself when it grasps the dissatis¬
faction of its life and its need to develop beyond itself. That is,
negative irony must encounter its aporia, and then seek (for itself)
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to make use of this encounter for the sake of development. The negative
must come to see itself as a moment on the path towards the positive and
the spirited. It must come to experience the absolute necessity of de¬
veloping into the positive. This takes place when, in the words of
Hegel, it grasps "the conscious insight into the untruth of (its) pheno¬
menal knowledge"^, i.e. the untruth of negative irony itself.
Negative irony is "untrue" because it impedes the development of
knowledge of the in-itself. Negative irony is consumed by its hatred of
nature and the polis, so it impedes the grasp of what is good and desi¬
rable in itself. The negative ironist does not achieve the strong and
spirited life of realization: what is good and desirable in itself is
not integrated into the for-itself of spirit.
Since it is our desire, since, indeed, it is necessary, to expli¬
cate the development of negative irony from within, we must now ask:
how is negative irony to first experience and then overcome (through
dialectical movement) its dissatisfaction with itself? How does it even
reach, let alone enact, the "conscious insight" into its own "untruth"?
This is the question of (self) education that has been central to phil¬
osophy since Meno asked Socrates his question and before. When Socrates
proposes to carry out an investigation into virtue, Meno objects:
"But how will you look for something when
you don't in the least know what it is? How
on earth are you going to set up something
you don't know as the object of your search?
To put it another way, even if you come right
up against it, how will you know that what you
have found is the thing you didn't know?" 11
Meno is asking: how can any self reflect on itself and do more than
merely repeat itself - i.e.
To; G.W.F.Hegel, (199-9), p.136.
11. Plato, The Meno, translated by W.K.C.Guthrie (1956) (80d).
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educate, transform, or develop itself? We know from familiar exper¬
ience how serious and problematic a question this is. Common sense
(the polis) tells us that "people never change", and we all have
innumerable little reasons, drawn from our knowledge both of others
and of ourselves, not to dismiss this view very easily. As Adeimantos
would say, the many little reasons soon add up to one big reason, and
we find ourselves almost without knowing it, believing in the truth
of the "popular view". Our need for the strength of positive irony
is our need for a convincing demonstration of an answer to Meno's
question, such that the "popular view" that "people never change" is
not simply dismissed as untrue but rather, revealed as a kind of lazy
half-truth. Because the polis speaks half-truths, it must be treated
ironically, rather than literally, or merely negatively.
Our question is: how can negative irony learn? How can it
develop the practice of self-education? As we have already begun to
suggest, negative irony experiences its dissatisfaction with itself
when it experiences - to its own surprise - the extent to which it is
grounded in animosity, or hatred of the polis. This surprise returns
us to the most basic conception of irony. Negative irony faces the
task of transforming and strengthening its surprise at itself. Its
own untruth (its hatred or animosity) will drive it into a corner
where it cannot move: and initially it will want to imagine that
the polis has driven it into this corner. The corner into which
negative irony gets driven is this: that despite its desire to tran¬
scend nature and the polis, it becomes consumed by its own antagonism
to nature and the polis. The "conscious insight" that negative irony
must grasp and which will initially surprise it is that it is its own
project that has driven it into its corner. Far from having an ideal
relationship to conditions, negative irony experiences its "bewitchment
by conditions It is held fast as if put under a spell by conditions,
so that it remains caught and cannot develop. It experiences its
subjection to its own unmediated natural reactions of hatred and
animosity. Negative irony thus encounters the nemesis of nature, as
it were, on those who would simply transcend it. It discovers from
within this experience the need to revolutionize its relationship to
conditions (the natural and accidental). It discovers, to its horror
and despair, but also to its everlasting benefit, its own intemper¬
ance and its own injustice.
Yet this discovery in itself is insufficient. With it, we
reach the stage of perplexity rather than development. As yet, that
is, we have reached the point indicated by Meno when he says he feels
like the paralized victim of a sting-ray (Socrates) (80a-b). We are
at the point of the "horror and despair" of negative irony's self-
discovery. We must ask Meno's question: how are we to develop
beyond this point, to self-education?
Socrates answers Meno's question by telling him that knowledge
is a kind of re-collection (8la-e). What is Socrates telling Meno
here about education? How can his reply really educate us? Now one
of the problems of Socrates' reply is that it rests on what is, at
best, only a "likely story": the immortality of the soul. We have
to accept as true what is merely likely. To moderns especially -
much more than to Socrates' fellow Greeks - this is a very trouble¬
some point. So we must listen to some account (logos) of the reason
for accepting as true what is merely likely. Socrates proceeds here
to give just such an account. He says to Meno:
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"We ought not then to be led astray by the
contentious argument you quoted (viz.above).
It would make us lazy, and is music in the
ears of weaklings. The other doctrine (i.e.
the doctrine of re-collection) produces ener¬
getic seekers after knowledge; and being con¬
vinced of its truth, I am ready, with your help,
to inquire into the nature of virtue" (8ld-e): my emphasis.
The importance of this argument is that Socrates is telling us
that all inquiry and all investigation needs the use of a resource.
It needs this, because without a resource to use, it will wither: we
become "lazy and weak". Inquiry must begin with the free use of the
very resources that foster inquiry itself. This is absolutely neces¬
sary because without this use inquiry would wither and die. There is
no point in doubting or "questioning" this necessity: instead, the
inquirer must grasp it and strengthen his bond of friendship with it.
The ideal speaker or true inquirer is the one who freely accepts the
absolute requirement of using the resources of inquiry.
Socrates' resource, in many of his conversations besides the
one with Meno, is the doctrine of re-collection. Our resource, in
this essay, will be positive irony. Our resource is also the central
topic of our inquiry.
Our claim is that positive irony is that which makes self-
education possible. Our inquiry will seek to demonstrate this by
using the resources of positive irony to develop our grasp of what it
is. Self-education is nothing else but this: the use of educational
resources by those who, as they begin, do not really know what educa¬
tion is. Positive irony will be our resource in transforming negative
irony. We can introduce this notion here by saying that already we
have grasped negative irony in an ironic way. Ironically, negative
irony is not as removed from nature as it imagines. Even more to the
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point, it is the very nature of its own project that gives rise to its
subjection to nature. Grasping this is the first stage of negative
irony's self-education. In order to develop beyond this stage, we
need positive irony. We need the kind of irony that is oriented to
development.
Irony teaches negative irony how it has failed to be fully
conscious of itself. Although it wanted to transcend nature, in
reality it was subjected by nature. Irony, then, brings phenomenal
knowledge (in this case, negative irony) to self-consciousness and
reveals its own "untruth" to it. It is the use of resource (i.e.
being positive) that transforms negative irony beyond this point.
The use of the resource leads negative irony to work with itself by
learning to find within its very self the matters it needs to take
up and develop. That is, negative irony does not merely discover
that its self is "inadequate" and hence commit a kind of theoretic
suicide. Instead it goes through a birth: it dies out of itself by
being born into its positive self. It inherits for itself the positive.
The use of the resource teaches the negative ironist of the need to be
strongly oriented to what is desirable rather than merely disenchanted
with its own history, since this attitude is itself part of the
requirement of education. The use of the resource is thus the process
of education itself.
4. The positive ironist is, in a very significant sense, an author.
Positive irony, as we have seen, authorizes / authors itself. It does
not invent itself (treat itself as its own originator) but rather
achieves consciousness of itself as the resource for inquiry. That is,
it achieves its own authority: it develops a mature grasp of its rela¬
tion to its source.
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At the opposite extreme to positive irony is the sophist. The
sophist dissembles the truth. Sophistry pretends to be conscious of
itself as the resource for inquiry, but it never achieves the genuine
authority of the inquirer. Although it may speak forcefully, it does
not speak authoritatively. The (political) sophist par excellence is
the tyrant. The tyrant corrupts the polis in the way the sophist
corrupts speech: he severs rule from authority and turns it into
mere enforcement and domination. The tyrant, in his appeal to mere
necessity, the requirements of the situation, is analogous to the
sophist in his appeal to what is apparent to all or mer ely persuasive.
The tyrant and the sophist elevate as the principle of their accounts
what is most forceful and coercive. To the extent that the "popular
view" invites and generates the elevation of this principle, it is
the greatest sophist. Sophistry sustains the segregation of rule
from authority and lives off this segregation. A sophist is one who
considers it unnedessary or even inadvisable to achieve authorship,
since he sees it as preferable to enforce the rule of the persuasive
and apparent.
Within the polis, then, it is possible to recognize several
styles or modes of discourse. The sophist and the tyrant appeal to
expediency ("necessity"), whether of argument or of action. Since
"man is the measure", whatever is found to be expedient to (particu¬
lar ) men becomes the measure. Thus it becomes "necessary" to subject
12
the Melians since not to do so would be seen by others as weakness
It becomes 'hecessary" to deter the Russians,since not to do so would
be seen by them as weakness. Examples of this kind of talk in modern
political discourse are, of course, innumerable. This style - the
style of the sophist- corrupts discourse by segregating authorship
12. See the account given by Thucydides, The Bslopennesian War
(195*0 Book 5, 84-116.
23
and rule. Discourse is reduced effectively to a mere expression of
interests: discourse becomes ideological.
Against the tyrant, many oppose the polis by seeking to strip
away even the last vestiges of authorial justification, the fig-
leaves, as it were, with which the tyrant (in his morally bankrupt
state) attempts to clothe himself. Often, these discourses set out
with the creditable intentions of exposing the tyrant to public
visibility, yet their weakness is that they usually do this by treat¬
ing speech itself as if it were inherently or incipiently tyrannical.
For example, the notion of authority gets treated as if it were merely
a veil used to cloak coercive power - when it is only the case that
countless corrupt rulers have abused the notion in this way. In order
to protect from the possibility of corruption, an unacceptable price
is paid: discourse is itself weakened and corrupted. At its extreme,
this corruption (set in train, if we like, by the tyrant) leads to
the nihilistic gestures of sheer style discussed with such passion
by Camus: gestures wanting to be moral, in the end sunk into the
amoral*
Another opponent of the tyrant, and especially the tyranny of
the polis itself, is the negative'ironist. If the political critic
claims to discover a preferable version of what is necessary, and
tends to forget its moral or authoritative basis, the negative ironist
chooses the opposite option. The negative ironist has a bad reputa¬
tion with both the polis and its political critics, and not without
reason: he is the "moralist" in the abstract sense. The negative
ironist renounces all interest in the polis. He says, in his own
defence, that he has renounced nothing more than the whims and foibles
13. See especially, of course, A.Camus, The Rebel (1962).
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of the poliss but, in reality, he has renounced all interest in con¬
vincing others of what is (rather than what appears) worthy or excel¬
lent. Conrad (1978, p.ix) says of the ironic novelist that "(she) has
less power than her most timorous character". This is because the
negative ironist also agrees to segregate rule from authority. It
is only possible, he says, to author speech - to speak self-consciously
rather than ignorantly - by renouncing all interest (save a negative
one) in substance, and hence in rule or power. The negative ironist,
in placing himself aloof from all matters of substance, places him¬
self also outside the power of discourse. His concern for worth
construes itself as necessitating an indifference to power. The
negative ironist forgets the spirited and substantial nature (i.e.
the power) of what is best. Above all, he forgets the need that "the
best" has to become spirited and substantial.
Our claim is this: that positive irony belongs, deeply woven,
in the fabric of the polis because of the calling it answers to keep
alive and develop moral discourse. Negative irony purifies moral
discourse by segregating it from life. By repeatedly emphasizing
the Difference between life and the Idea, the negative ironist lets
sink into oblivion the need for the theorist's calling to be the best
life. The positive ironist, within the polis, belongs within the
tradition that integrates rule and speech. Rule he treats as a matter
of discourse rather than naked power. The positive ironist seeks to
reveal to the minds of his listeners the deeply traditional composure
of style and authorship that genuinely rules. However frequent, since
Thrasymaches, since Hobbes, since yesterday, the segregation within
speech of speech and rule, we always have the deep need to re-address




THE NEGATIVE IRONIST IN DIALOGUE
Persons of the Dialogue:
The Theorist, who also narrates to the reader or listener
The Negative Ironist, who defends Socrates
Soren Kierkegaard, who accuses Socrates
The scene is set for an attempt towards self-education. We
must now invite the negative ironist to reveal himself in conversation.
We must do this, not simply in order to see him more clearly - for, in
a way, we have already seen him clearly. Clarity alone is not enough
here. Instead, we invite the negative ironist to speak (rather than
be spoken about) so that he can re-experience the passion of his
interest and thus develop it. The negative ironist can never learn
if he remains our passive listener, or even an actor in our play:
for it would still be our play. That is, as long as he feels he is
ultimately controlled by us, he will remain outside of the action.
He may even resolve to change, in response to what he hears - but he
will not genuinely resolve the issue, that is, learn or develop. So
we must set the scene for a dialogue.
This will not be a simple matter. The problem for the negative
ironist is that usually he does not get (or especially seek) the oppor¬
tunity to speak. His notion of the city is that it does not provide
the opportunity for him to speak. Of course, I mean: to speak freely.
The negative ironist speaks, but since his speech is oriented to the
complacency of the city, in effect he speaks in accusation of the city
or in defence against the city's accusation of him. That is, although
his speech is subtle, it is subtle defence or subtle attack. First
and last, he is consumed by the antagonism between the polis and him¬
self. So in this sense, his subtlety is not genuine. Because it is
aimed at sugaring the pill of polemic and contention, his subtlety
is more akin to obscurantism than suggestiveness. His notion is that
since the city is easy to see through and understand, to be unlike
the city requires being difficult to see through and understand. So
although everything he says is animated by his attitude towards the
city, yet he is not interested in being heard by his omnipresent
interlocutor. We are, in fact, beginning to grasp that although the
negative ironist thinks the city does not provide him the place to
speak, what is more deeply true is that it is he who fails to gener¬
ate an interest in speaking freely. His negativity towards the city
provides him with a powerful motive for not speaking his mind. We
are so accustomed to this that we are inclined to think of the ironist
simply as - someone who does not speak his mind. We forget to ask:
what principle does (or must) the ironist follow in not speaking his
mind?
Now here we are, on the threshold of a dialogue, asking the
negative ironist to speak his mind! Certainly he seems to have turned
it into a matter of principle not to do this. He might suspect us of
asking him to go against his principles - which, incidentally, means
that we will have to put him off his guard, somehow. As for his
principles: the strange thing about him is that, because he never
(or rarely) speaks his mind, he does not really know his own mind!
Now surely this is the strangest thing of all about the negative ironist
And, given this, how can he be principled? For, how is it possible to
genuinely not speak his mind if he has only a weak sense of what it
would involve to speak his mind? The truth is that our friend, the
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negative ironist, does not really know himself at all: he has not be¬
friended even himself. Strictly speaking, he is unable, at this point,
either to speak his mind or to not speak his mind. He does not succeed
in not speaking his mind: he simply fails to speak his mind. I main¬
tain, then, that the strong sense of not speaking one's mind requires
as strong a sense of speaking freely and enjoyably. The ironist must
be more than merely or habitually indirect: when he decides to be
indirect, this decision must itself have reason or direction. This
gives us a grasp of the place for not speaking our mind. The ironist
is not one who always shuns speaking his mind (as if that item of
behaviour were worthy of being called a principle) but rather, one
who is able to serve his direction by deciding to speak or not to
speak his mind. The ironist must be oriented to the problem of when
it is best not to speak his mind: this requires that he know what
his mind is.
Come then, Negative Ironist, and hear what I want to suggest to
you. I want to introduce someone to you whom you will, I think, be
very interested in meeting. His name is Soren: Soren Kierkegaard.
Soren, in fact, is already very anxious to talk with you: he seems
to be very concerned about who you are and above all, what you have to
say (or not say!) And there is every opportunity for you to get to
know one another well enough to justify a little informality here.
But, my friend, let me tell you a little more about Soren.
NEGATIVE IRONIST: Thank you very much. I only wish everyone
took as much interest in these matters as yourself,my theorist friend!
Then the world would be a rose-coloured place to live in
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THEORIST: Well, now, listen, what I'm suggesting in fact is
that it isn't only me who is interested in conversing with you. That's
exactly why I want you to meet Soren - so that you can see this for
yourself. But please don't frown - I'm not trying to put you on the
spot. It's just that I am genuinely interested in your "story".After
all, your style shows that you don't simply take the world as it comes,
do you?
NEGATIVE IRONIST: Well I suppose not in some way.
THEORIST: (Laughingly) No two ways about it! Anyhow, what was
I saying? I was telling you about Soren. As it happens, he has just
written a dissertation about - I don't want to intimidate you, or
anything - well, it is about you, or at least, someone he thinks is
very like you.
NEGATIVE IRONIST: Who do you mean?
THEORIST: Soren's work is about Socrates. He considers
Socrates to be the epitome of negative irony. -
NEGATIVE IRONIST: That's interesting! So do I! And you needn't
worry about intimidating me. I'm not afraid of whatever he's written-
who knows, it might be helpful. Did you say he was coming to see you
today?
THEORIST: You would like to meet him, then?
NEGATIVE IRONIST: Certainly - why not?
THEORIST: Good. He's due any minute now, in fact. I'll intro¬
duce you. I think it will be a rare opportunity for you to really test
yourself. But hush! I think I hear him now. Hello Soren! I'm glad
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you could come. I'd like you to meet a friend of mine, the Negative
Ironist.
KIERKEGAARD: Pleased to meet you. Our theorist friend here
mentioned you to me. I've been looking forward to meeting you. It
isn't every day I run into a Negative Ironist!
NEGATIVE IRONIST: No, that's true enough. I'm told you have
a special interest in the subject. Can I ask you - what is your view
of irony - I mean, in its overall significance?
I must break into the conversation here, to relate what
happened next. Soren - whom I still didn't know very well, in fact,
he was little more than a name to me - settled back into his chair and
proceeded to discourse at length about the different versions of Socrates
we have. I checked later and discovered to my amusement that he was
more or less quoting from memory lengthy chunks of his dissertation,
called The Concept of Irony^. There was much explanation of the
differences between Xenophon, Plato and Aristophanes, and the difficulty
of arbitrating between them, and my friend and I started feeling uncer¬
tain what we were doing there. We were giving each other glances,
shuffling our feet, when suddenly, Soren came to the point. We returned
our attention to the conversation. Soren continued:
KIERKEGAARD: Socrates' dialogues do not simply end without a
result, they end with a negative result. They do not simply break off
before a result is attained, they actually negate some result that has
been attained./''A negative result always presupposes there is a result,
and a negative result in its purest and most undiluted form can only
be provided by irony. Whereas even scepticism always posits something,
irony, like the old witch, constantly makes the tantalizing attempt
1.S.Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony (1968). In the following
dialogue, direct quotations from this work are indicated by a
double oblique stroke, amended quotations by a single stroke.
30
first to devour everything in sight, then to devour itself too.// (p.92)
NEGATIVE IRONIST: I hear an objection in what you are saying
to Socratic conversation itself, that is, the questioning of conven¬
tions or opinions which shows them to be thoughtless. Yet your objec¬
tion is only possible given your failure to understand that this
questioning of the familiar is itself the point of Socratic conver¬
sation - rather than, as you imply should be the case, the generation
of "solutions", or yet further "positive" results. God knows there are
enough of those in the world as it is. The Socratic task is to ques¬
tion these "positive" results. Alright if it "presupposes" the
existence of these results. That's not the fault of negative irony:
that's simply how it finds the world.
KIERKEGAARD: On the contrary, that's how it finds itself.
Because it is always negating, negative irony has nothing to grasp.
Everything disappears. Hegel was right when he said that // for irony
nothing is serious//. /For the ironist is not at all serious about
the virtues he practices, since true seriousness is only possible in
a totality/, (p.25*0 •
NEGATIVE IRONIST: That's absolutely true: true seriousness
is only possible in a totality. But this totality can never be
completely grasped or spoken. I agree that the ironist does not take
anything, especially himself, seriously - if by that you mean that he
does not imagine himself able to constitute, in his speech, this
totality. But surely it is wrong to say that this is unserious? In
fact, it seems to indicate a belief on your part that true seriousness
would mean attempting precisely to bespeak the totality, to say every¬
thing, as it were. Irony, however, depends for its force on a concep-
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tion of essential difference, the difference between speech and what
is Other to speech. This "totality" you speak of sounds more and more
like the obliteration of this difference.
KIERKEGAARD: You are sounding very like Socrates, my friend.
There is a disjuncture between speech and this abstract "Other" you
refer to. /With Socrates too there is a disjuncture. The outer and
the inner do not form a harmonious unity/.
NEGATIVE IRONIST: I wouldn't deny that. It is your notion of
harmony that needs re-examining. It is premised on a notion of speech
as a report or reproduction of something present to the speaker, some
thing that is possessed with certainty.
KIERKEGAARD: Let's hold it for a moment here. You are missing
the point. You said earlier that the Socratic task was to question.
//Hence we must inquire further into what it means to ask questions//
(p.7l).//One may ask a question for the purpose of obtaining an answer
containing the desired content, so that the more one questions, the
deeper and more meaningful becomes the answer; or one may ask a
question, not in the interest of obtaining an answer, but to suck out
the apparent content with a question and leave only an emptiness re¬
maining. The first method is the speculative (i.e. positive),
the second the ironic. Now it was the latter method which was
especially practiced by Socrates// (p.73).
NEGATIVE IRONIST: But look, your discomfort with the "lack of
content" of Socrates' speech really only shows all the more your
desire that speech must appropriate some "real" thing. You have
succumbed to the temptation to place speech first, as that which
appropriates or even constitutes, rather than second to that Other
that appropriates even it: the Logos. Your commitment to answers in
response to questions reveals your search for the speech that brings
everything - the totality you spoke of earlier - to presence. You
want to overcome what is essential to man - his dependency on what
is Other, on what grants speech - by refusing to acknowledge what is
Other. But this "overcoming" of what is essential is the impossible
ambition of hubris: nothing else.
KIERKEGAARD: I suppose it's "hubris" as well to have any attach¬
ments whatsoever. That's what it sounds like. This is the most basic
thing about negative irony. It is so free-floating and detached, it
doesn't actually love anything in any genuine sense. Listen to how
Socrates spoke about love, in The Symposium, j/ Love is emancipated
more and more from the accidental concretion in which it appeared in
the preceding discourses (of theguests) and reduced to its most abstract
determination. It exhibits itself not as the love of this or that, for
this or that, but as the love of something which it has not, i.e., as
desire, longing.// What Socrates does not address is the positive
side of love. //When we speak of abiding in love, we are speaking of
participation in a fullness. This is the substantial aspect of love.
Desire, longing, on the other hand, is (merely) the negative aspect of
love// (pp.82-3).
NEGATIVE IRONIST: You talk of "abiding and participating in
a fullness", but that implies cancelling out the Otherness of what is
desired. The philosopher is a lover (of wisdom) because of his desire
for what is lacking, i.e. for what is Other. He does not want to
appropriate it, but rather to re-collect it. Other is lacking: that
is, not simply accidentally missing, but essentially absent through
not being locatable in any particular place or time. Yet although it
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is absent, it is real or essential: it is what grants and supports
speech. So the speech that loves - the philosopher's speech - wants
to turn towards what is Other rather than away from it into the
exigencies of production and usage. Love inhabits the world of
exigencies (since of course, it lacks what is Other), but it is not
limited to being an exigency, since it is oriented to what it lacks
through its desire. This is the meaning of Diotima's lesson.
KIERKEGAARD: /All of this, however, is utterly void of content/.
// The result arrived at is actually the indeterminate determination of
pure being: love is; for to add: it is longing, desire, is no deter¬
mination at all but merely a relation to something not givep/.(p.83)•
NEGATIVE IRONIST: So your idea of a "determination", then,
is that it is a relation to something given? Speech as the making of
determinations relates given things to other given things. Yes. Speech
is designed to give us things. But The Symposium, we recall, shows us
that love is the re-collection of what cannot be given (of what gives
speech). So speech that gives us things cannot be a speech that loves,
a philosopher's speech. Perhaps it is you who doesn't truly love, but
merely pretends to?
KIERKEGAARD: Perhaps I'm not making myself plain. At any rate,
you are still missing my fundamental point about irony. I'll try to
set it out more clearly. The basic problem is this, //irony in the
eminent sense directs itself not against this or that particular
existence, but against the whole given actuality of a certain time and
situation. It has, therefore, an apriority in itself, and it is not
by successively destroying one segment of actuality after the other
that it arrives at its total view, but by virtue of this that it des¬
troys in the particular. It is not this or that phenomenon, but the
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totality of existence which it considers sub specie ironiae//(p.271)
NEGATIVE IRONIST: There is something very strange lurking
around somewhere in what you are saying, though I'm uncertain what
it is. What you say seems to make sense enough, but there is some¬
thing odd. Yes! It's hit me now! It's to do with what you said
about the "given actuality". Listen! On the one hand, you say that
Socrates' irony is directed against the given actuality around him -
as a whole. Yet at the same time, you also say that irony does not
direct itself "against this or that particular existence". Clearly,
then. you do not regard the "whole given actuality" of a certain time
and place - for example, fifth century Athens - as a particular exis¬
tence. But if not, then you show that you are oblivious to the diff¬
erence between what is a thing (e.g. the "actuality" of fifth-century
Athens) and what is not a thing (what is Other than the many things it
makes possible). What is so special about the "whole given actuality"?
It may be larger than the particular things within it, but (as a whole)
it is no different in kind from them. You are like Woody Allen, appealing
to the same reality as Hobbes, only bigger - except that he was joking
whereas you are actually serious!
KIERKEGAARD: It is you, not me, who is quibbling in a ridiculous
way about the size (!) of reality. I never intended anything to do with
that. The point I am actually driving at is that thought needs to
appeal to something real rather than abstract: it needs something to
grasp hold of. The negative ironist denies this. For example, consider
Socrates' attitude towards death. Socrates says that he is not afraid
of death because he does not know what it will bring him: it may well
result in a much better state of being. Now how is it possible to
actually find pleasure in this way in ironic uncertainty?
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NEGATIVE IRONIST: Do you think it would be better not to
speak about what we are uncertain of? What Socrates is attempting to
teach here is that this is actually the greatest test for thought. To
remain silent about what is uncertain - and death is the most uncertain
thing - makes way for fear to establish itself. Socrates is saying:
the uncertainty of death is taken by most people to justify fear of
death, but not by me. I will talk openly about death: uncertainty
does not stop us from talking about something. In order to be courag¬
eous, we must be strong enough not to allow uncertainty to rob us of
the faculty of speech.
KIERKEGAARD: I certainly was not recommending silence or fear
towards death: what you say about these things is of course right.
But equally certainly, we need to do more than simply bask in the
uncertainty of death. This requires of us a negativity that is not
good for us. // One must be accustomed to being edified by the reas¬
surances residing in nothingness in order to find repose in this
(view of death) // (p.118)
NEGATIVE IRONIST: Now I fear for you. Given what you say, you
will always be afraid of death. You are only reassured by the posses¬
sion of knowledge or worse still, belief. Since knowledge of death
is impossible, you admit belief: we need faith, you say. Yet belief,
even more than the kind of knowledge you mean, is predicated on the
notion of being shared. You seek your security in sharing rather than
take the plunge and commit yourself to the work of re-collecting the
difference between what can be shared and what is Other. It is impos¬
sible to share what is Other since it is that which makes the very
notion of sharing possible. Only things can be shared, because sharing
is as much an appropriation as private ownership is. What is Other
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cannot be shared because it cannot be appropriated. So it is up to
each of us to re-collect the grounds of our speech and our lives: we
cannot rely on others to do this for us. Your would-be reliance on
knowledge and belief is a reliance on sharing: that is, a reliance
on the polis rather than on the strength of principle. Principle is
the re-collection of what is Other.
KIERKEGAARD: /Every time I present a positive complaint, you
think it is a simple matter to refute it by means of your ignorance/.
(p.195).
NEGATIVE IRONIST: Which ignorance is that?
KIERKEGAARD: Why, the ignorance of your whole standpoint -
the Socratic ignorance itself! Negative irony, as is becoming increa¬
singly clear with every word you utter, banishes all knowledge: it
dissolves knowledge in irony, so as to celebrate the aporia, our
glorious ignorance! We've seen plenty of examples already, but
perhaps the best one of all we have not mentioned yet. When the
Delphic oracle tells Socrates he is the wisest of all men, yes, even
then, when knowledge seems to be inescapable, Socrates manages to
escape. His negativity comes to his rescue. Around he goes, ironizing
everybody until he convinces himself that he is indeed the wisest of
all - but simply because the only thing he knows is that he knows
nothing! This, then, is the ignorance through which Socrates, and
you too, slide away from everything. Socrates managed to evade (at
least from his own point of view) every complaint made by his accusers
by simply protesting ignorance. Glorious ! The accusers missed the
only solution,// (They) ought to have accused him of this very ignorance
which especially in the Greek state, must be regarded as a felony.//
(p.195).
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NEGATIVE IRONIST: You are finally revealing yourself in your
true light. Like the accusers, you treat Socratic ignorance as a
crime against the polis. You are a partizan of the polis: you
represent the speech of the polisI
KIERKEGAARD: And. your reaction is no better than that of
Socrates. It is full of empty indignation! Just like the Apology -
where //there appears, usually after the most passionate outbursts,
an argumentation which blows away the lather of eloquence and reveals
nothing underneath// (p.117).
NEGATIVE IRONIST: How strikingly you re-produce the speech of
Socrates' accusers! Even more strikingly, your speech is as open to
theirs to the rejoinder made by Socrates. The accusers, just like
you, warned others to be on guard against Socrates' eloquence. He
replies: "To say this, when they were certain to be detected as
soon as I opened my lips and proved myself to be anything but a great
speaker, did indeed appear to me most shameless". (Apology 17 b-c).
Shameless: yes indeed.
KIERKEGAARD: The irony of Socrates' situation repeats itself.
Are you really uninterested in responding to the point I have been
making all along about irony, or are you so wrapped up in it that you
can only rail against me? I see no indications of a response so far.
It's the same as the irony of the Apology itself. //There is absolutely
no point of connection between the attack and the defence// (p.122).
Instead of taking up his accusers' charges and addressing them in
their particularity, Socrates simply reverts to his ignorance: "since
I am ignorant", he says, in effect, "how could I have introduced new
doctrines?" This was precisely the new doctrine he was introducing!
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NEGATIVE IRONIST: There is only an absence of connection if
you conceive "connection" to mean: explicit reference to the same
topic. That you do mean this comes as no surprise at all, given your
notion of shared knowledge and belief. Making a connection, for you,
means, sharing knowledge or belief: agreeing to talk about the same
things, or not to talk about the same things. It is the rule of
polite convention. Certainly, in this sense, there is no connection
between Socrates' defence and the accusation. So much the better for
Socrates! Yet, is it not amazing that the Athenian polis could react
so strongly to something that supposedly had no connection? Why, if
there is no connection, did the polis go to such lengths to curb
Socrates? We see, in fact, that it is sheer nonsense to say there is
"no connection". The connection, on the contrary, is very strong
indeed: Socrates' life, in its exemplary character, goes to the very
heart of the polis, in all its sleepiness and dissoluteness - and the
polis reacts defensively. Only an accuser, blinded in his determina¬
tion not to be challenged by Socrates, could imagine that Socrates'
speech has no connection, and yet at the same time experience such
discomfort, and react so vehemently, towards the Socratic commitment.
Outrage is always blind. You are outraged at Socrates' so-called
"unsociability" towards the polis: and in your complete blindness,
you are unwilling to actually consider the alternative being offered
by Socrates. As a matter of fact, there is no point of contact between
your attack and Socrates' speech, Your attack, from the beginning, has
been grounded unstintingly in the polis: Socrates demands at least an
initial willingness to let go of this.
KIERKEGAARD: Well, it seems there is little point in my saying
any more to try to convince you. But it is you who needs to question
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your attitude. Something, I don't know what, has prevented you from
giving me a proper hearing. I hope we can meet again and find some
basis for a better rapport. Farewell.
NEGATIVE IRONIST: Well, there he goes - leaving when it gets
too tough for him. I've never met such fervent hostility and sheer
blind bloody-mindedness in my whole life!
THEORIST: And I'll surmise that you've never spoken so directly
in your whole life. Perhaps you would like to continue in the same
vein, by explaining a few things to me. You see, I'd like to hear
more about this notion of yours that Soren relies on " sharing" -
and also your charge that he is somehow looking for a "bigger reality"
to appeal to as his ground. What did you mean?
NEGATIVE IRONIST: It's going to take some time to explain.
But, in fact, I'm glad of the chance to try to work out what was wrong
with him, and the kind of commitment it is that completely stops people
from listening. I always end up explaining what I wanted to explain
after the other has gone away!
THEORIST: There's a poignancy to that that you should think
about. But anyhow, I'm still here, and I have time enough, so please
continue.
NEGATIVE IRONIST: Right. Let me see then. Clearly, Kierkegaard
was totally rejecting irony and accusing it of somethings so we need
to explain that. What was the basis for his rejection and accusation?
The basic thing, it seems clear, about Kierkegaard's talk was
his unswerving faith in some "totality" that could actually be known,
or even stated in discourse. It is an ideal of total self-transparency,
total self-knowledge: and the problem with it is, not merely that
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it is impossible, but that the pursuit of it makes men forget the real
reason why it is impossible. The reason it is impossible is because
speech is necessarily grounded in what is Other to speech. The ideal
of realized totality - otherwise known to us in the guise of "the end
of history" - denies this Otherness. It reduces what is necessarily
(and irreducibly) Other by attempting to somehow incorporate it within
speech, familiarize it, or in effect simply to deny it.
So it is Kierkegaard who does not genuinely take irony seriously.
I will attempt to show that■irony must ultimately disappear within the
"totality" of discourse he posits. After all, if irony is the re¬
collection of the dependence of speech on what is Other, then to deny
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what is Other is really to deny irony.
Now then: for Kierkegaard, irony is merely a transitory moment
within a development from which it disappears. We heard Kierkegaard
a while ago draw on Hegel: to me he seems to be of one mind with Hegel
on the problem of irony. It is Hegel, of course, who develops the
metaphor of History as the progressive totalizing of discourse. The
end of History is the complete speech. History is now the metaphor
for the "totality" that would make us oblivious to what is Other.
Yet there is, supposedly, a place for irony in the midst of all
this. This is because the totality (complete speech) needs to develop.
It develops through the process of history, understood now in the more
concrete sense. Through the apparent vicissitudes of history, the
cunning of Reason is at work. And this cunning of Reason is very akin
to irony. Yet, at a particular time in history, irony took on a much
more specific role than this. This turns out to be none other than the
role embodied and personified by Socrates himself. It was through
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Socrates that irony - as we see in retrospect - effected an important
and particular historical change, within the grand framework of History
with a capital "H".
Hegel's edifying story, modified "but not fundamentally
altered by Kierkegaard,is about the change from the ancient to the
modern world: a change reflected in all areas of social life and
thought. The ancient world is that which is ruled by the substantial
character of tradition. Truth is held by everyone to reside in the
community, its customs, and its laws. Morality is accepted as given:
it is not the subject of inquiry or question. The self is constituted
through its acceptance of the substantial beliefs and values of the
community. In contrast, in the modern world, morality is re-achieved
within the self. The self now becomes a subject: it decides within
itself the rightness of its actions. This change has occurred over
a great period of time. In philosophy, we see this development epito¬
mized in Descartes. Parmenides, the ancient, was interested in Being -
whereas Descartes wants to provide an absolute basis for knowledge in
what is certain, i.e. self-evident, to the knower. From Being (subs¬
tance) to knowledge (subject): this is how the story has it.
Socrates is seen as a catalyst in this change. His life was
devoted to questioning the values and moral decisions of his contem¬
poraries - who belonged to our "ancient world". Socrates was the first
to introduce the question "why" into the realm of substantive activity.
Socrates, that is, began to transform activity from a mere substance
to self-conscious, accountable, decision. The story, then, tells how
Socrates gave birth to the subject (rather than tradition, or the com¬
munity) as the author of discourse. All of the old, taken for granted
ways must be questioned in toto from this new standpoint. The subject
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certain only of what is self-evident, no longer relying on communal
dictates: this is who is being brought to birth through the maieutics
of Socrates' irony.
Socrates, then, plays the historical role of inaugurating the
site of the subject, as it is called by some. Kierkegaard was relying
on some notion such as this: in addressing the practices and ideas
that his interlocutors take for granted, Socrates is insisting on
the necessity that the self become the subject or author of discourse.
The substantive, concrete, and dogmatic imperatives of action that
have hitherto been accepted,nust now be re-processed, submitted to
a complete reworking from a new vantage point, that of the individual
subject certain of itself and its self-evident precepts. Only what
can be discovered in this way will count as knowledge.
It is Socratic irony that shows others the falsity or the
limited character of their opinions. Socratic irony brings out the
difference between action that is merely habitual and practical and
action that is oriented and self-reflective. Socrates begins with
particular actions, concerns, or speeches, but he always moves beyond
what is merely particular to what is higher: the idea that collects
and gathers the particular thing with its kind. So Kierkegaard seems
to be on the brink of understanding, in this version, that Socrates'
irony is not directed against this or that particular that he chances
upon, but rather against the mistake of resting with this or any par¬
ticular. Socrates' irony shows the barrenness of the merely practical
life. We are on the brink - of what? We have here the outline of an
acceptance of the difference between what is concrete (the thing) and
what is Other or higher (the Idea). Concrete things could always be
otherwise: that is, they are contingent. The Idea is always itself
and cannot be otherwise: it is essential.
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My hopes for a fruitful development of this were dashed once
and for all by what Kierkegaard had to say about "the whole given
actuality". Here his commitment came through loud and clear: you
heard it too. He exempted the whole given actuality of a particular
time and place from being a particular existence. This is absolutely
decisive. If we can formulate why he makes this exemption, our under¬
standing of Kierkegaard will be much strengthened. First, though,
this much is clear: to make this exemption is to lose the distinction
between things and the Idea that Kierkegaard had seemed to be on the
point of respecting a moment ago. It is to turn a particular historical
situation, which is actually in the realm of things (it is merely a
list, if you like, of things) into something higher: and this is
deeply wrong and false.
So I'm asking: what commitment makes Kierkegaard exempt the
total historical situation, or as he calls it, "the whole given actuality"
from its qualification as a thing (or perhaps, many things)? Isn't this
only intelligible within the project of essentializing history? The
concrete "processes" or things that make up"history" get turned into
a grand scheme called "History" that somehow collects them all. This
is in tune with the attempt to turn Socrates into a disappearing moment
within the great process - a moment necessary and important when it
occurred but no longer relevant, in any significant sense, to the
modern world. Irony is the complete emptiness, or lack of substantive
content, necessary for the birth of the subject. However, it is momen¬
tary, according to this view, since once the subject is brought into
being, it needs to appropriate a new history for itself. It will no
longer listen like a child to the stories that are handed down to it:
for a moment (at the high point of irony) it is bereft of all stories,
but henceforth, it tells its own story and appropriates it for itself.
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The epic Homer develops through the ironic Socrates into the specula¬
tive and wise Hegel. Within the process, Socratic irony has a signifi¬
cant role, hut also one that is self-liquidating.
Irony captures the work of the Hegelian "antithesis" in histori¬
cal development. Irony makes room for development by exposing the
untenability of the current opinion. Irony carries out its work by
driving untenable opinions into a corner from which they cannot escape.
Yet if irony allows for the emergence of what is new, it is itself,
in this scheme, decisively less than the new development. Irony alone
cannot suffice, for it is seen as predatory. Instead, a new phase
develops: nothing more or less than a new attempt to give a complete
account of everything.
Now, as we know, Hegel does not ironize the attempt (in itself)
on the part of opinion towards its self-completion. On the contrary,
he subscribes to this very notion, as is shown by the idea of Absolute
Knowledge. The telos of irony is its own disappearance in the Abso¬
lute Truth that is beyond irony: the good of irony is the merely
instrumental good of moving us, through history, from "ignorance" to
"knowledge". Irony is not enough for Hegel, because the very fact
that it is still needed dissatisfies him. In the fully developed
science of logic, irony will not be necessary.
Irony, essentially, is the re-collection of the difference
between the concrete and what is Other (the essential). To treat this
difference as one that disappears at "the end of history" is one and
the same thing as to treat irony as a dissappearing necessity. Irony
is reduced to the functional: it becomes the functionary serving
History. Mathematically it might be expressed: irony is a function
of History. In this notion, the difference between concrete and
essential (the incomplete and the complete) is treated like an agenda:
once it is worked through, it ceases to be operative. The agenda
is closed. The "irony" merely lies in not knowing at the beginning
how the discussion will proceed. At the time, however, we are con¬
cerned with the discussion: it is only afterwards, like Wordsworth's
"emotion re-collected in tranquility", that the irony can surface.
Irony turns out retrospectively to have been a then unapprehended
feature of an experience that is now passed: the very availability
of the irony depends on its having disappeared. It is absent in that
it is merely present to memory. Most radically, then, Hegel might be
saying: irony can only be recalled, not enacted. Socrates, somehow,
was stepping ahead of himself by seeking to practice irony. An irony
practiced can only be negative (because it has not yet achieved any
substantial insight of its own): Socratic irony is thus a kind of
hubris. The practice of irony is always unwarranted: it is only
the recollection of it that we are entitled to.
Knowledge of irony, then, is also a transcendence of it: so
its disappearance is a basic requirement for the development of know¬
ledge .
Now, I maintain that if we consider this "story of irony", or
more particularly, what it makes of Socrates, we will see that it is
a reductionist gloss on the true development of the Idea. The Idea
develops in conversation. Our Kierkegaard or our Hegel would probably
agree with this, at least in some sense: well and good. But what do
they make of the Socratic conversation? They treat it as a monolithic
conflict between "subjectivity" and "the substantive community". Each
of the conversations is merely epiphenomenal upon this theme. Now this
is to forget utterly the diversity of things within the unity of the
Logos. Socrates discourses with the many and different temptations
to forget the real difference: the difference between what is diverse
and what is One or Other. To put it very baldly, we could say that by
treating the diversity of Athens as "the whole given actuality", Kierke¬
gaard is barking up the wrong tree. He wants to treat things (which
are contingent and diverse) as One. Only that which is not a thing,
that which is Other than things, is One. Socrates himself would never
dream of speaking of an existing community in this way.
However, this reflection on misplaced totality in Kierkegaard
and Hegel isn't really the point. What is more important is the ques¬
tion it prompts: what motivates it? What commitment does it show?
My contention is that it betrays a commitment to a concretely unified
community: that is, an interest in re-presenting social order in
speech. The problem of community gets reduced to a problem of social
order because of the story's adherence to History. Hegel says we are
now prepared to appropriate Absolute Knowledge: and this is something
communal, shared, common. At the most significant level, there is
consensus - whatever concrete disagreements there might be. It's as
if, somehow, the whole of western civilization has reached a stage
where each of us is universal: all is resolvable into the consensus
of the universal, and will be so resolved. The story, then, in all
its magnitude, depends on our mutual consent to the consensus - to our
common sharing of knowledge.
The community, rather than the difference between things (e.g.
the community) and what is Other, is made to serve as the limit that
will be respected. In this forgetting of what is Other, this produc-
tion of speech as first, speakers' commitments are turned towards the
sharing of what can be accounted as common. The community - what can
be common or shared - sets the limits of the appropriable. Thus
respect for community as what limits speech, and the notion of know¬
ledge as a cumulative appropriation, go hand in hand. Speakers now
become owners of ideas by their development through dialectic: speakers
accumulate and appropriate their experiences as a stable, substantive,
"body of knowledge".
The commitment to social order and the commitment to History
are the same. Any given (unified) social order is but a crystallized
moment in the progression of History. Every subsequent stage looks
back on the preceding ones with a detachment that is a travesty of
irony. The work of predecessors becomes a mere moment in the develop¬
ment of an aloof maturity. Nothing of the actual struggle itself
remains to inspire the later achievement - if "achievement" is what
it is. For a moment is a necessary part of a dialectic, and in that
sense shapes irrevocably what follows: yet it is only a moment, and
since it has supposedly been surpassed, it cannot be exemplary for
what follows. That is truly objectionable. Socrates, for example,
has nothing to teach us! We have all wonderfully progressed so as
not to need him! There is a casualness - no, almost a callousness -
towards history here: somehow it has caused the present, yet it can¬
not teach the present. History is taken very seriously in this view -
if we agree to call "serious" a submission to history only in its
consequences and not in its own speeches. It seems we are like the
latest model at the car show: superior to the last even if shaped
by it.
There is nothing exemplary in the past for the present because
although History connects them, it does so from outside of them. Par¬
ticular historical events are ultimately judged by History: thus His¬
tory is above both past and present. Now what if the particular his¬
torical event we just happen to be interested in is irony (Socrates).
Irony is judged by History: yet History, Hegel says, is none other
than the cunning of Reason, It is itself an Irony: Irony judges
irony! Clearly, two ironies are being talked about here: a small
irony, as a practice carried out in a particular time and place, and
a grand irony, called History, carried on by Reason at all times and
in all places. The latter, in its ubiquity, is placed in judgement
on the former. Thus to assert the necessity of Socratic irony as a
phase of transformation is to speak on behalf of History. For has not
History, in retrospect, clearly shown the justification of Socrates'
anticipatory irony in the subsequent development of the subject? How
else to understand the development of our civilization? This is the
sort of bland gloss I imagine our Kierkegaard would make, anyhow.
In the grand scheme, everything dies quietly and without a
murmur, it seems. At least it seems so to our transcendental Historian,
waving his hand cheerily over the pyres of the past, and graciously
distributing the obiter dicta that stand him for obituaries. Maybe
even Socrates will be successfully consigned into the mush of dying
for the sake of the dialectic. In hindsight, it is clear to us that
the Athenian state's treatment of Socrates was against the historical
grain, and thus futile: from the standpoint of the grand irony of
History, it can thus be treated as in insignificant episode. It can
be viewed in a detached way, as merely another instance of "the univer¬
sal irony of the world". So long as we speak from the viewpoint of
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History, then, Socrates too dies quietly. Let's wish him goodbye and
all the best!
Kierkegaard's indifference towards the past and its work is
oriented to the difference - decisive, as they think, incidental,
as I maintain - between the past and the present. History as the
accumulation of knowledge is the progressive expansion by the collec¬
tivity of its limits. To respect the present limits of knowledge,
then, it is necessary to be indifferent to those limits oriented to
by earlier stages of the dialectic. Like Weber's bureaucrat, our
attitude to the past ought to be sine ira ac studio, neither condem¬
ning it, since it respected the limits of its own time, nor advocating
it, since it does not address the limits of ours.
But there is trouble looming. Socrates will not lie down so
quietly after all, perhaps. Socrates and his death create deep
problems for the transcendental Historical perspective. For once,
as we saw earlier, the veneer breaks down and some passion or even
vehemence surfaces. Now it is by reflecting on the disparity between
the apparently normal detachment and this sudden turbulence that we
can grasp the true axis around which the whole standpoint revolves.
We can get at this by asking: why is it Socrates who frustrates both
Hegel and Kierkegaard to the point where their carefully constructed
detachment breaks down? Why is the transcendentalist driven to say
that Socratic irony "must be regarded as a felony"?
A felony is a crime that seriously offends the community. The
criminal is one whose actions or speeches give offence to the community.
By contrast, legitimate speech is the speech that respects and maintains
the limits of the polis. Speech achieves legitimacy by its acceptance
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of communal limits - that is, by its commitment to the sharing of know¬
ledge. To question rather than to share or collude in knowledge, then,
is to run the risk of offending the polis - the greater, the more
deeply the questioning is pursued. Now this fact in itself hardly
surprises us: it is precisely what we expect. But what is truly
objectionable is the exoneration of the polis by those who claim to
legislate on its behalf. For this is what Hegel and Kierkegaard do.
The transcendental discourse of History sets out the limits of communal
speech from a higher position. Speech is to achieve legitimacy by
respecting the dialectical stage (the "limit") already reached by the
community. Perhaps more is in fact legitimate, however: but this
"more" is simply to push movement towards the next historical phase.
We are back to the agenda, as it were. Someone will be needed to move
the discussion on to the next item: this requires, admittedly, a good
sense of timing, but nothing more. What is definitely illegitimate is
to question the very idea of the agenda, with all that it implies. In
fact, Kierkegaard put it more strongly; to do this is actually criminal.
If we want to understand the sense of this charge against Socra¬
tes, we need to examine what this view intends by legitimate or law-
abiding speech. What kind of law is in question here? What is the
problem facing the law-maker, according to Hegel and Kierkegaard?
As we have seen, it is a problem of consensus or social order.
Since the goal of all progress - what a terrible idol that has proved
to be to the West I - is the achievement of a substantive, concrete
completion or unity, then the question of speech becomes a question
of order. The complete or unified speech requires the achievement
of order; the orderly relationship of the totality of
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parts. The science of logic is the paradigm for the orderly society.
And, just to emphasise this point, and give it its proper weight: this
is no accident. The reason for this equation is to be found in the
two pillars on which it rests: speech or knowledge strives towards
substantive fullness or completeness, concretely appropriated as such,
and society is the collection of speeches. Society is itself a con¬
crete, substantive, unity or orderly relationship of parts. Society
is a manifest articulation of speeches (which more recently came to
be called institutions). Hence a crucial requirement for the striving
of knowledge, so conceived, is the integration of society: the accep¬
tance by all of a common law governing the many individual speeches.
Otherwise individual and society would remain sundered. Thus the
standards governing the speaker's speech must be the same standards
that govern the requirements of the polis. If the speaker pursues
different standards, then he becomes again a mere individual, vainly
seeking the heroic, in truth not surpassing the anarchic.
What kind of law can achieve the integration of society so
necessary for the development of knowledge into a totality? A law
that defines the credentials of knowledge in terms of its shareable,
exchangeable character. In order to be shareable, knowledge must
first of all be of such a nature that it can be owned. It must be
possible to appropriate knowledge before it can be appropriated in
common. In short, knowledge must be a thing. The basic commandment
of this law we can now state: treat knowledge as a thing. Only then
will it have a stable, objective, character, involving description,
attribution, listing of features, and so on: that is, only this will
permit ownership and accumulation of knowledge. And only in this way
will social progress be guaranteed.
In this bland and unquestioning process, the subject is treated
as the agency that appropriates demonstrable knowledge and makes it
evident to the community of listeners by displaying how anybody else
could have produced, and, through discourse, can share, this knowledge.
It was Socrates' refusal to orient to the standard of the polis
that led to his condemnation by the Athenian assembly. In other words,
the assembly constituted its membership and gave expression to it
through its insistence upon respect for the firstness of community
as the very criterion for lawful membership of it. Its members con¬
cretized the notion of community: they treated community as the
exchange of things, and Socratic ignorance as criminal.
Kierkegaard too speaks from the basis of his acceptance of
the firstness of community. His speech about Socrates consequently
takes on, as we saw, all the violence of the accusers' speeches. The
detachment of the perspective of History is revealed as a veneer. What
we have done is to scratch the surface of this detachment to expose
the passionate rejection of (Socratic) inquiry that lies beneath it.
In practice, as we have seen, the perspective of History concedes all
responsibility to the "given totality": this is because the criterion
of judgement it accepts is identical to the concretized community's
criterion. "Treat knowledge as a thing". At the particular stage of
history, the community, seeing itself concretely, deems this to be
required. At the level of History, the complete speech, seeing itself
concretely, deems it to be required in exactly equal measure. For the
community, knowledge as a thing is necessary for order: for History,
it is necessary for progress (or so-called "dialectic").
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Socrates defends his ironic ignorance against the charges of
the polis by questioning the difference between inquiring and merely
sharing. This is the point of his story of how he acts in response to
the Delphic oracle's advice that he is the wisest of men. Genuine
inquiry requires re-collection of the difference between speech and
the Logos that rules it, whereas sharing, as we have now conclusively
seen, obscures this difference. Although the polis wants to subject
the Logos, it can at most only pretend to succeed. The Logos cannot
be subjected, for it is that to which all speech is subject. So the
accusations made against Socrates do not touch him, not, as Kierkegaard
thinks, because of Socrates' adept avoidance of them, but because they
are insensitive to the Logos. The accusers' speech cannot begin to
address the life of the speaker who is sensitive to the Logos. By
contrast, however, the polis is always within the Logos - although it
pretends otherwise. The violence of the accusers' onslaught is the
resistance of the polis against being sensitive to the Logos. The
polis is lazy and indifferent: it has buried deep in obscurity all
distant recollections of the nature of speech and the Logos. It has
banished into oblivion the resonant life of speech: the life granted
to speech by what is Other. The violence of the polis against Socrates
(its desire to banish him) is the violence of keeping in oblivion the
ironic sense of Other that goes beyond sharing.
Socrates does not plead with the polis: instead, his defence
aims at addressing in a principled way the very grounds on which its
charges are based. To have pleaded might have enabled Socrates to be
acquitted - by the polis. Socrates, however, wants to genuireLy acquit
himself. Socrates acquits himself by not simply denying or rejecting
the charges, but by raising as a matter for reflection the very com-
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mitment to those charges and the concretized notion of community
from vhich it springs. Socrates, even under pressure from the com¬
munity, will test the community rather than plead (share) with it.
Socrates will inquire rather than agree to treat knowledge as a thing:
and he will do this at whatever risk to his own survival. That, my
friend, is his real excellence and strength of commitment. We could
ask for no more powerful vindication than the one provided here by
Socrates - in response to the stubborn and recalcitrant modern per¬
sonifications of the polis.
THEORIST: There has been a great deal to reflect on in what
you say. First, let me say that it has been good to hear such forth¬
right and strongly developed self-expression. Perhaps the fact
(forgive me for saying this) that it is unusual for you can provide
us with a question or two: we shall see. At any rate, as you imply,
it is always good to hear a vindication of what is the best speech.
The question I suggest we address ourselves to, as the best way of
taking up what you have said, is: what would a true vindication of
Socrates and his irony be? What would such a vindication amount to,
and what would it require of us? Above all, with what rewards would
it provide us? Everything, as it were, remains for us to enact and
achieve.
We can agree, I'm sure, that to vindicate Socrates requires
more than taking his side. It could never be enough simply to refute
the other: for that treats the other's ignorance as the main point
of focus. Consider Socrates himself in this respect: refutation is
always, for him, an initial requirement for education and not an end
in itself. You remember where he says, late in The Republic, that he
and Thrasymachos have recently become friends! So, in hearing your
refutation of Kierkegaard, and reflecting on it, we must ask - what
interest sustains it, and what does that interest require for develop¬
ment?
The real objection I hear in your talk against Hegel and Kier¬
kegaard is that they seek to concretize the universal. You are pre¬
pared to admit, it seems to me, that they are not mere empiricists.
They have an image of the whole: they do not restrict their view to
the parts. The empiricist is interested in part or parts. At most
he is interested in various combinations of parts or relationships
between parts. We also must say: he is interested only in describing
parts, not in addressing the good of the part. Such a concern, of
course, requires a passion for the whole, and a particular kind of
passion at that. But we will come to this shortly. As you will ack¬
nowledge, then, Hegel and Kierkegaard represent an interest in the
whole. And in this, strangely enough, you see the basis of their
promise. What you reject in them is that they insult the whole by
speaking of it as - in Kierkegaard's case - "the whole given actuality
Negative irony, says Kierkegaard, is directed, not against this or
that particular, but "the whole given actuality", or the spirit of
the age, the Zeitgeist in its current manifestation. Precisely, you
reply triumphantly: because what they treat as the whole (i.e. the
given actuality) is only every thing. It is the collection of particu
larities that make up all things. Kierkegaard's offence is to pretend
to be stronger than the empiricist while actually being no more than
a pan-empiricist. He is interested in everything rather than the
whole. His commitment to everything is like that of a cosmopolitan:
this is his great superiority to the practical empiricist, you say.
Instead of stirring the empiricist to question his opinions, as
Socrates does, all that Hegel and Kierkegaard do is fit him neatly and
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snugly into the pattern of History. For you, transcendentalism is
a sham because secretly it is exceedingly interested in particular
things■ It does not remind us in the least of what is Other than the
thing: instead,by freeing us from our bondage to this or that (the
empiricist's bondage), it simply completes our enslavement to the
thing, or rather, to every thing. With the transcendentalist, we
all, whether we know it or not, belong to things as a whole. Hidden
beneath our particular veneer we are all universal: the end of history
is the common grasp of this. Universalism is achieved when in common
we reject all "fanaticisms" of the particular.
You have, and show, a remarkable strength: a strength that must
become a way of life rather than a corrective (to the universalism of
every thing). The vigour of your reminder that the Whole is Other than
every thing shows us your strength. As of yet, however, it remains a
kind of brute strength, a mere strength of will, the strength that is
driven rather than inspired by what it desires. What we need to express
is the freeing of this strength such that it becomes genuinely ironic:
such that it expresses this through its own interest rather than its
relentless reminder.
As of yet, then, irony is a reminder but not a practice. It has
reminded us of the Otherness of the whole: that the standard for our
speech is not every thing. Now the negative ironist needs to be reminded -
in a way that goes beyond mere reminding. He must be invited to practice.
He has turned re-collecting the whole into stipulating its Otherness.
He "reminds" others of this. Yet what does this achieve that a knot
tied around a finger would not? The strength of the reminder (the one
who reminds) must become the strength of the actor. For this is pre¬
cisely what the negative ironist has forgotten. In the chasm the
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negative ironist opens up between the thing and what is Other (the
whole), any interest in particularity or practice vanishes. All things
are really the same: different to what is Other. In a sense, then,
it is a matter of indifference (for every thing, or event, is indif¬
ferent to any other) whether the Other is re-collected in speech. Even
the speech that re-collects ("reminds"of) it is only another thing!
This shows us something very important: that the negative ironist
feels a deep insecurity. More: the negative ironist, although he
wants others to treat him very seriously, deeply feels superfluous.
His life is a matter of indifference to the Other. He can continue to
respect what is Other (the source), but he cannot develop his love for
it through a practice.
The negative ironist has a high estimation of his own worth -
but only by default. His sense of his own worth lives off his sense
of the lack of excellence in most others - in the polis or the community
as a whole. Hence, since* he begins with the absence of generosity
towards the community, he ends resenting its self-regard. Every self-
regard of the community he dismisses as mere pretence. He dismisses
the community for its alleged blindness to what is Other. In the end,
he dismisses practice.
Thus whereas the universalist is bland towards practice, the
negative ironist is dismissive of it. The lack of generosity here
derives from his failure to grasp Otherness's need to be bespoken.
But not only this: in addition, he mistakes this failure for a special
insight. It places him "above" the realm of the community and the
realm of nature. He remains disinterested in community as an icon
for the conversation of practices,and nature as an icon for the
necessity that can be used. He remains dismissive rather than ironic
(that is, just) towards communal practices and nature's necessities.
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What is Other - the source of value - needs the work of giving
value a life. Value can be given a life through practices: otherwise
it remains, at most, at the level of a reminder. The grasp and enjoy¬
ment by us of what is valuable requires the generously engaged practice
rather than the renunciation of it. To alienate what is Other leads
to a souring or curdling of what is valuable: it is soured through
the neglect of practices and curdled by the incessant "reminders" of
Other.
We want the negative ironist to listen to our dissertation. For
it is of him that the story is told. More to the point, it is of his
work of coming to befriend Other's need for discourse. We begin to
befriend this need when we treat things as inspirations rather than
occasions to remind: that is, when we allow ourselves to be moved to
formulate what is valuable.
Kierkegaard was moved but his motion gave offence to the nega¬
tive ironist. As we saw, what gave offence was that Kierkegaard put
community first. What moved Kierkegaard to speak was his notion of
the absolute firstness of community. He rejected Socratic ignorance
because of its refusal to accept this. So we can ask: what interest
does Kierkegaard represent? What generates Kierkegaard's speech is his
sense of awe towards the community. The community silences him in
that he takes as given (i.e. unquestionable) the need for speech to
treat community as first. Whenever Kierkegaard experiences his
difference from the community, he is silent. He is awed by what he
takes to be the source of all possible experience. In order to speak,
Kierkegaard must limit the speakable (or knowable) to the sharable.
Awe is the knowledge that it is the (awesome) power of community that
underlies the knowable. The negative ironist did not formulate the
problem of awe, but instead sought to vindicate Socrates by merely
refuting its representative. Instead, we need to teach awe by showing
it the ironic speaker's relationship to community. We seek to teach
awe by demonstrating the positive nature of that relationship, rather
than merely confirm awe in its opinion of irony's negativity.
The negative ironist, too. was moved: and his motion gave
equal offence to Kierkegaard (or, as we now want to say, awe). But
the negative ironist has begun to make a discovery: that, as things
are, his anger is alien to him. It is alien and self-destructive to
him in that all along he wanted to imagine transcending it, and yet
it surfaces as the force animating his relationship to the community.
Far from transcending the community, the negative ironist is angry
at the community and what he sees as its obstinate and ignorant clin¬
ging to particularity. The negative ironist is beginning to experience
his true relation to nature (via anger) and, more deeply, the need to
reflect upon this problem if he is to free himself to exemplify rather




1. Anger's risk and anger's Desire.
The desire to appeal to what is Other as if it were self-
evident is an eternal temptation for the ideal speaker. The negative
ironist makes this appeal repeatedly in the face of the deafness of
the polis. And the appeal itself conveniently facilitates the by¬
passing of usage and practice - increasingly seen by the negative
ironist as matters of the polis. So the "deafness of the polis"
confirms the negative ironist in his abstraction, and the negative
ironist's abstraction confirms for him the "deafness of the polis".
There is a degeneration of spirit which drags down the negative
ironist into his abstraction and his hatred of ignorance. The nega¬
tive ironist becomes trapped; trapped within his own anger towards
the polis. His anger towards the polis makes him forget who he is ,
or what his interests could be. His interest is increasingly defined
through opposition, until he is finally interested in nothing but
the Otherness of what is Other. And the recurrent experience of
anger seems only to sustain this abysmal relationship. We know how,
when anger swells up in us, we find it difficult to speak justly, to
provide grounds for our affirmations, or to care about inviting any¬
thing other than anger in return. Anger involves the seemingly
irresistable urge to appeal to self-evidence, and to become a mere
polemicist. In the present chapter, we seek to address this problem
as it has already emerged.
However, if anger could weaken the ironist by making him consume
himself in denial, then this is the very time when we need to remember
that anger could also, somehow, help to confirm the ideal speaker in
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what he is. Our risk here would be simply to undermine anger itself,
repeat the action of negativity under some fresh guise. In the
face of this, let us remember that anger also has the possibility of
being a good beginning. Anger's Desire (if not always achieved) is
to affirm itself against injustice: it surges up against human actions
that are in violation of what we deeply feel to be Desirable. So we
can say: anger's real Desire is for justice. It is hard to imagine
being angry with the weather, or with the colour of one's eyes, or
with the mess a baby makes, in any meaningful way. At most we could
be irritated or frustrated, but not angry, in these instances. But
it is a significant matter to be angry at a speech or action that
violates our notion of justice. Anger recognizes the need for judge¬
ment, and if it does take the downward course of retribution and
vengeance through which ideal speaking is forgotten, then this is
subsequent to the strong possibilities that anger opens up. It is
anger's degeneration, rather than anger itself, that has to be guarded
against.
Anger as such belongs to the realm of possibility. It offers
one possibility of commitment, of an alternative to indifference. But
as yet this is itself morally indifferent in that it is neither good
nor bad: we need a stronger version of (anger as) possibility. Because
anger's moral significance lies in its potential, in its desire to
achieve justice, in its desire to be significant rather than indiffer¬
ent, we ask: what is (anger's) potential? The work that anger re¬
quires is the work of developing its potential, so that it becomes a
1
principle of regeneration rather than degeneration . We need to do
justice to the significance of anger's Desire for what is significant
by transforming the possibility it offers into something good: notice
1. R.Fagles and W.B.Stanford, 1977, p.23«
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that this is very different from sublimating anger into something that
is aloof from it. The question of the risks and temptations of anger
must at the same time be the question of its regenerative potential.
The anger towards Kierkegaard that occasioned the negative ironist's
speech needs now to be transformed into a force for the regeneration
of justice. As we shall see, this requires of anger the work of
resolving its own tendency to intemperance.
What does anger give us to transform? We are all familiar with
the irresistability of anger, with the way .in which we experience it
as a force that is always potentially, and sometimes actually, over¬
whelming. Anger seems liable, at any time, to become self-consuming,
obsessional, compulsively oriented to what is worst, and repetitive.
It could become monotonous and bore not only alter, but eventually
even the angry person himself. All this is to say is that anger has
an inescapably physiological character: it is something we experience
in, or better, with, our bodies. For Christianity the body is the
temple of the sacred, but what is perhaps more vivid for us is that
the body could be the carrier of what is most nightmarish. Horror
movies are based on this idea that what is closest to us, our own
body, could also be the receptacle for what is most alienating or
horrible. Indeed, it is the very closeness of the body that provides
for its inescapability: if we suffer from disorder of the body, we
cannot go anywhere to get away from it. Sickness is horrible, because
it is insufferably claustrophobic.
In their discussion of Aeschylus' Oresteian Trilogy, Fagles
and Stanford write, of the chain of criminal outrages that the trilogy
depicts, "it is as if crime were contagious - and perhaps it is - the
dead pursued the living for revenge, and revenge could only breed more
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guilt" . The transmission of the curse that lies upon the house of
Atreus is carried out through physiology, through the contagion of
crime, which turns the lives of its sons into "an inherited disease....
(that) forces them, relentlessly, to commit their fathers' crimes".^
If anger succumbs to its physiological origin, it breeds a chain of
retribution that degenerates inescapably like the degeneration of the
sick body: anger becomes trapped in the cycle of corruption, by be¬
coming its agent. Anger's temptation to reciprocate, if acted upon,
follows it relentlessly and becomes continually more difficult to
cast off. We can imagine this to be the worst part of "the tradition
of the dead generations" spoken of by Marx as weighing "like a night-
4
mare on the minds of the living".
Anger begins as a reaction against what is unjust. Even anger
that has degenerated into retribution (i.e. anger that has become
dominated by the physiological) orients itself against what is unde¬
sirable for some notion of the just life. Anger, then, is born out
of a vivid experience of injustice. It is the presence of injustice
in the world that brings about the birth of anger. Yet anger's
problem, as we have seen, is that it is itself somehow prey to injus¬
tice. It is liable to sink into a repetitive chain of vengefulness
if it does not emerge from the physiological level with which it
begins. We would not want simply to stay angry, but somehow to say
or do what is necessary to resolve the anger, i.e. to make use of its
potential. Even revenge imagines that it is going to resolve the anger
that fuels it by killing or hurting its object.
Revenge forgets, however, that retribution makes no movement
away from the physiological. Retribution is imprisoned in the physio-
2. Loc. cit, p.17.
3- Loc. cit, p.17.
4. K.Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, in Marx and
Engels, 1968, p.96.
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logical because it is not oriented to improvement, either of alter (upon
whom it simply wants to inflict suffering), or, more significantly, of
itself. It is through an orientation to improvement that anger over¬
comes its physiological beginnings. It is in this way that it resolves
the choice it must make between regeneration and degeneration, in favour
of the just life. If anger fails to choose the just life, then it
suffers deterioration at the hands of the physiological, it becomes
an inescapable disease. Since anger needs something other than the
body - namely speech that develops an account - in order to become what
it really is, in order to live up to its potential, it needs to resist
the temptation posed by its impulse to be self-sufficient, to be all-
consuming in its wrath.
2. Self-imprisonment and self-development in anger.
If anger, then, is an instance of possibility rather than reali¬
zation, it needs to avoid the twin extremes of self-love and self-
hatred. Neither of these orientations respects anger's potential:
instead, both treat anger solely in terms of what (they think) it is.
The first problem that has to be resolved in anger's progressive trans¬
formation of its physiological beginnings is that of its relationship
to injustice. Anger is tempted to imagine that in relation to injustice,
anything is justified: hence its tendency to excessive fervour. Anger
then repeats injustice. Yet this is challenging since as we have seen,
anger is the Desire for justice. Our question is: how is it that the
Desire for justice is prone to injustice?
Anger was mythically represented by the Greeks in the shape of
the Furies"'. According to the myth, the Furies sprang to life from
the blood of Uranus's genitals when his son Cronos flung them into
5« In the Oresteian trilogy, Aeschylus portrays their progression
from vengeance to helpers of justice.
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the sea. So the myth tells us that the parents of anger are violence
and. potency: the Furies are "the spirits of the avenging dead that
can also bring regeneration".^
The potency of anger is unintelligible without its violence,
its physiological roots: the creativity inherent within it is depen¬
dent on the vigour with which it initiates its response to injustice ,
and this energy necessarily swells up with all the violence of the
very injustice it reacts against. Yet anger's creativity is endan¬
gered by this same violence, as we have seen. The danger for anger is
its engulfment in the quicksand of the physiological. And sheer physio¬
logy kills anger's potential. In short, anger's real adversary is
sloth (the slothfulness of the body): passivity towards the body
turns into physiology merely by default. Anger, then, needs a strong
notion of what it is at best, otherwise it becomes its own worst
version of itself.
We can consider anger's assertiveness here. Anger strongly
wants to say something: it has something to say. Deeply, it is
assertive, even if, the anger does not get expressed en a particular
occasion. Now asserting the positive is a central issue for this essay,
and we recall how it arose in our opening chapter in the context of
negative irony. We will deepen Kierkegaard's challenge at this point
if we say: what he wants to point out is that negative irony's
problem is that it has no notion of assertiveness. Kierkegaard can
help us to reconstruct a strong relation to what is Other than speech
by reminding us that the denial of assertiveness ("absolute infinite
negativity") could only be an abstract relation to Other, a relation
that evades saying anything positive, or from developing ways of re¬
presenting its own value. It is abstract because it is unassertive:
o. Fagles and Stanford, p.23•
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that is, it has no notion of the good of assertiveness.
Anger is crucial to us for our developing account of the posi¬
tive. We see that assertiveness is essential to anger because the
best anger is affirmative. Anger is affirmative when it is (truly)
provoked by its idea of alter's failure to speak or act well. Alter's
speech fails to show genuine Desire not because of what it affirms
but because of what it neglects to affirm: that is, we do not fear it
as an unwelcome assertion, but we attempt to turn it towards what it
needs (truly to affirm). The best anger is the anger that remembers
to grasp positive requirements in the midst of its negation. To do
this, it is necessary for it to orient not to alter's action, but
through alter's action to the stropg interest that action conceals
yet requires in order to become just. To say that an action conceals
its own requirements from itself is also to say that these requirements
remain deeply part of the action: the best anger seeks to return action
to its requirements.
This can provide for our (common) sense that only the affirma¬
tive speaker can experience a healthy, cathartic, anger, whereas the
negative speaker is prone to bitterness, contempt, or arrogance towards
his interlocutors. Strongly, one who is angry wants to speak, to speak
forward towards resolution. His anger is directed against neglect,
failure: against a kind of betrayal of trust - and it is for this
reason that only a speaker who trusts can be productively angry. Anger
is a demand for trust. This is why analytically anger is so far apart
from suspicion, because where anger wants the life of trust (i.e. wants
a notion of life as something worth trusting), suspicion is the betrayal
of trust (the undermining of any good notion of trust). Anger's own
failure, as we shall be developing, would be its forgetting of its
strength (what its demand, is for), its loss of its purpose, its
dissipation into the suspicion it is opposed to.
Anger could forget that it is the offspring of "both violence
and potential. Its potential is bound up with its concern, not with
the arbitrary violence of chance or circumstance, but with the specific
violence of neglect or betrayal. Anger as a strong notion of betrayal
is a demand to re-affirm that which is betrayed.
How if the speaker forgets anger's potency by treating violence
conditionally (as a condition to be violently opposed, i.e. to be
"remedied" by new conditions) then he becomes limited to being what-
he-is at the beginning. As a result, anger comes to hate opposing
conditions: it turns into the imposition of conditions (i.e. sheer
violence or rage). Instead, the ideal speaker works to keep anger's
potential alive, by remembering, in the face of anger's initial surge
of emergence, that anger seeks resolution. Its energy is generated
out of its unwillingness to acquiesce in the oriented neglect that
gave rise to it in the first place. The first thing the theorist
must recollect is that the source of anger's energy is its Desire
for the re-affirmation of positive requirements. Anger's paradox
is that it has its source in its Desire for what is betrayed (or
neglected) rather than in its mere rejection of what is present (affir¬
med) . Its violence Is moderated by its interest in replenishing what
is neglected rather than in reciprocating what is perpetrated.
So anger needs to remember the grounds on which its judgemental
character rests. That anger is judgemental is only possible given that,
deeply, it is a desire for the affirmative. Anger is the desire for
the good of trust in the face of its betrayal or neglect.
It is commonly said that anger is either heated, or, more
ominously, cold. Heated anger is taken to be a truer expression of
what anger is. Now we can develop this notion by noting that the heat
of anger is more genuine because it resonates with a notion of warmth.
Sheer heat (the violence of adverse circumstance) would burn us up:
we would be consumed by it. Yet the warmth that allows anger to be
heated rather than cold is friendly: it is the sheer violence of
physiology transformed into the force of the strong speaker's interest.
Anger, we can say, echoing Socrates, is a human sort of violence: the
human potential for tempering violence not through reciprocal violence,
but through the expression and force of Desire. We must give anger
its just place, because the ideal speaker cannot merely ignore violence
(for this would be metaphysical), nor reciprocate it (for this would
be bestial or murderous). Anger is passionate because it shows us
that ideally, man (the speaker) is the one who mediates violence.
7
Anger, then, is an expression of our need to mediate violence .
If anger orients to what alter does (rather than, through what alter
does, towards what alter neglects), it degenerates into violence or
hatred of alter (as a condition or circumstance). Anger forgets its
own difference from violence. Anger is other than the gratuitous
violence that is circumstance or the oriented neglect (betrayal) that
is injustice. Anger's principle (passion) is other than the occasions
which call it forth as an activity. The ideal speaker develops anger
as something that can become authoritative.
Anger that hates alter - rage or self-indulgent anger - kills
what is best about anger (its latency) by identifying with only one of
its parents, violence. It remembers the violence but not the potential
?. Later, we will formulate the violence of anger as a particular
mediation. See Section Five below.
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of its birth. The violence of anger's birth carries the risk that, at
the moment of its birth, it will be consumed by the apparent omnipres¬
ence of violence. That is: it could forget its own potential for
authority. Self-indulgence is one consequence of the failure to
accept the need to re-integrate the potential and the force of anger.
Anger's force becomes merely physiological, merely unjust. Anger's
potential grounds its judgemental character: it begins with the
strong desire, not simply to make a judgement on the betrayal that
forced its birth upon it, but, more deeply, to actually make affirma¬
tion of what has been neglected. Anger wants to affirm some notion
of our deep need. When anger equates itself with violence, it turns
into rage. Rage kills the potential of anger's judgement: rage merely
judges speakers in a repetitive way, for it cannot move beyond its
initial identification of itself as a thing that is "just-so", with
these particular attributes. Rage is a degeneration of anger: it is
a failure to treat anger's beginning dialectically. It is restricted
to the eternal repetition of its beginning, rather than developing
its beginning towards resolution.
At the other extreme, if anger forgets force by treating poten¬
tial abstractly (i.e. if it starts seeking to abrogate or cancel violence
altogether), the power of anger's potential is lost. Potency is turned
into abstract possibility (the absence of violence). Heraclitus addres¬
ses this problem when he says:
"Homer was wrong in saying "would that strife
might perish from amongst gods and men". For
if that were to occur, then all things would
cease to exist". 8
Heraclitus is reminding us here of our need for a strong notion of strife as
passion. Nothing would exist - no difference would be possible, no relation
8. Heraclitus, Fragment 27, in P.Wheelwright, 1959, P-29-
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between same and other could exist - without strife. Heraclitus coun¬
sels us to locate ourselves inside rather than outside strife, in striv¬
ing rather than in laziness or abstraction.
The ideal speaker is oriented positively towards the force or
power of his interest. He is powerfully gripped within the life of
re-constructing his relation to language. That is, he does not simply
fear or repudiate power on the basis that "power corrupts". Power is
corrupt when it is ungrounded, when it references only what it happens
to be as an unregulated quantity of energy. So the ideal speaker
seeks to restore power to its grounds, that is, to provide for what is
truly authoritative.
Anger references our need to place violence, to transform it
rather than to repeat it . Yet anger's violence is needed in order to
place the speaker as one who mediates violence (who turns violence
into passion). To mediate violence is to sustain one's desire for
conversation as the re-achievement of our place between mere violence
(conditions) on the one hand, and complacent indifference on the other.
Our place _is mediated violence (the force of justice): the ideal speaker
is the one who neither treats violence in a conditional way nor avoids
taking the risk of mediating violence. If the first of these alter¬
natives references rage or self-indulgent anger, the second resonates
with abstractness, resistance to living in the world of usage, condi¬
tions, and circumstance.
Abstract or remorseful anger holds itself away from the world
for fear that the world could turn one into a lotus-eater who forgets
his home. In this version of the story, the lotus-eater is the one
who forgets his origin or source. The speaker's problem is seen as
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his need to remember where he came from by aiming to return to it in
the midst of anything other than this source. The speaker, in this
account, has to avoid interacting in a lively way with what is other
than his source, or listening to the seductive world of variability.
Instead this speaker (mathematical anger, anger against the particular)
to the extent that he feels himself "compelled" to live in the mundane
world, uses convention as his merely abstract mediation with life or
Desire. What is most lively is the Desire that grounds interaction as
the strong and sustained relation between particulars; yet interaction
grounded in Desire always needs a positive relation to convention.
Convention is different from (yet required by) Desire. Now the remor¬
seful speaker orients exclusively to the difference. He treats the
difference between convention and life as his means of avoidance.
Now we can take up again and develop our notion of the negative iron¬
ist. Since convention is not something towards which the remorseful
speaker has a positive relation, but is merely treated as a way of
keeping the world at arm's length, his relation to it is one of nega¬
tive irony. He is ironic towards convention in that he accepts a need
for it while having reserve towards it, yet he is negative in that his
relation to it is constructed for the sake of avoidance, disdain, or
the preservation of an abstract notion of origin as Other.
For the ideal speaker the lotus-eater is, indeed, one who has
forgotten everything but the particular pleasures he happens to find.
The lotus-eater is the one who is arbitrary, who knows no value beyond
chance pleasure: he mirrors the arbitrariness of conditions. Yet if
this is the risk of all interaction, the ideal speaker seeks to avoid,
not the risk, but instead the deadly avoidance itself that is abstract
(remorseful, patriarchal) anger. The ideal speaker does not fear the
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loss of his source, but rather the failure to make something good of
9
our relation to our source. He constructs rather than turns back .
He is resourceful in his relation to source (language) rather than
immobile in wanting to stay at the source.
In his relation to convention, the ideal speaker seeks to be
positively ironic. Convention is accidental in that it could be
otherwise: yet it is constructed accident ( as distinct from the
randomness of the weather). That is to say, convention has to be
(it would be impossible to imagine otherwise) something more than
mere accident in that it references and expresses a constructive
relationship between the ideal and the circumstantial. Not to be
ironic towards convention is to treat what is constructed as if it
were essential: yet not to be positive towards it is to forget that
life _is a construction, that is, the construction of a positive rela¬
tion to what limits us. Positive irony is the motion from the acci¬
dent of birth or circumstance to the constructive movement of the
oriented life. Hence it is a movement, not towards the origin (as if
we sought to be original) but within a resourcefulness or construc-
tiveness towards language as the source of value. Motion is not
teleological, but is our way of making another difference through
which we continuously re-vivify the same telos, i.e. the difference
between the conditional and the valuable.
Language is Other than speech in that whereas speech could
always be otherwise, i.e. it is constructed, hence conventional, lan¬
guage (the ground, the Idea) could not be otherwise than What It Is*,
it is the same as itself. Speech's potential is to be unlike the
9- In mythology, those who turn back (towards where they have come
from) suffer the punishment of immobilization; viz.Orpheus, or
Lot's wife.
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things that are indifferent to value (i.e. conditions) yet it is like
these insofar as it could be this or that. So speech can never encap¬
sulate or embody language since language is always itself (it could
not be merely "this or that"). Yet language needs speech to re-collect
its value. What the ideal speaker seeks to limit his speech by is
speech's need for language, i.e. the worthlessness of speech without
language - and language's need for speech i.e. the abstractness of
language without speech. That is, he wants to strive for the re¬
presentation in speech of what is valuable.
Anger towards manyness, the "this or that" of the world of be¬
coming, the polis, is a form of misplacement. It is a misplacement of
violence in that it has forgotten that anger needs violence for good
reason, not for bad. Anger need not fear its own violence, hold back
from speaking, censor and restrain itself, because its deep desire is
to do good and to enforce the good on alter. To enforce the good on
one's interlocutor is not to tyrannize him into doing things against
his will, but to have (develop) the force one needs to really convince
him of what is desirable.
Mathematical anger treats abstract potential (the desire to
coincide with one's source) as the good speech. Like its opposite,
remorseful anger forgets one of its parents. It remembers our recom¬
mendation earlier, that anger has to heed how it is other than mere
violence: yet it treats this as a sufficient mandate for what it is.
Abstract anger sees its potential as a possession to be celebrated -
as, for example, talent is tempted to see itself. It forgets that
the potential of anger for being creative (being significant, making
a difference) lies in the possibility of transforming mere force (in¬
justice) into reasonable force (justice): that is, in its potential
7^
for re-integrating passion and reason.
Self-recrimination is blinded by fear of its own guilt. It is
constantly pained by its sense of guilt because of its notion of
original sin: it understands its very birth as irretrievably bound
up with the guilt of its traffic with violence, its having been
generated out of accident. Its desire to re-unite with the origin
is a desire to live in a state prior to birth, a preference for
innocence or purity over life.
Remorse treats man's relationship to what could not be other¬
wise as if it incriminated him. What could not be otherwise for
man is that he has a body ( his life is mixed with accident): while
the ideal speaker treats this as a beginning requiring the work of
collecting, and resisting the possible dispersion of man through
his body, remorse treats it as a sin in need of redemption.
Where remorse is cosmopolitan in that it could equally be
anywhere, rage is parochial in its attachment to its own particular
place. Remorse ( as a modern phenomenon) has to do with a prevailing
sense of rootlessness, whereas rage is ancient and is related to a
strong identification with the familiar^ Both of these versions
of anger fail because they treat the problem of anger as merely
interactional. Rage "succeeds" in defending its place by turning
its anger outwards and being destructive of alter. Remorse "fails"
to assuage its guilt, because it turns its anger inwards and
becomes self-destructive. Both treat anger mechanically, so it be-
10. Revolution is more difficult to make in the more developed (univer¬
salis!) countries, because the popular rage based on strong solidarity
that is possible in places with a sense of locale is difficult to
sustain given the defeat of place. Inasmuch as revolution requires
a quantum of rage to fuel it, the notion of universal revolution
has inherent difficulties, given the relation we have theorized
between rage and particularity.
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comes a means to destruction. They want mere interaction, exchange,
outcome, to tell them what they are: yet they never resolve decisively
the question of what they are, since, in either version of what anger
is (violence or abstraction, identity with or difference from multis),
there is no possibility for movement. Neither has any notion of being
lively with potential. This accounts for their urge to be completely
clear interactionally, to have straightforward judgements on every¬
body. Remorse, at its extremity, secretly hates everybody by hating
(rejecting) itself: rage openly hates everybody by loving (merely
insisting upon) itself. Remorse and rage refuse to live with the
mixed character of interaction ( or with the mixture within the soul):
remorse by retreating from the mixed, rage by submerging itself within
it.
If anger is to resist the temptation of mere interaction, then
it has to remember both its educability (which self-indulgence forgets)
and its need for the passion to learn (which self-recrimination forgets).
Anger needs to make generous affirmation of what is troublesome, the
11
mixture of potential and violence . It has to accept the mixture
that it is, as its way of living with the mixture that interaction is:
for only this acceptance can lead to resolution. Now we can understand
in what sense anger belongs to the ideal speaker's life within the
mixture of justice and injustice. Anger exemplifies the passion of
the ideal speaker's response to his encounter with injustice: it
references the strength of his Desire for justice. Beyond this, we
12
must provide for anger's place within the soul and its order . Anger
has to resist the impulse to dominate the soul, to usurp the place of
reason, so that instead it can temper the soul. Anger can become a
11. Stanley Raffel, in his book Matters of Fact, 1979. has a lively
notion of trouble, see p. 69-
12. As developed by Plato in the Republic.
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temperate part of the soul "by re-achieving the integration of its own
origins (its generativity and its force). By answering to the require¬
ment placed upon it, anger itself "becomes a required part of the
theorist's work of integrating his soul.
So anger's potential as a re-generative force is required to
live up to its ideal. Anger provides a passion for good speech, yet
what does passion need in order to be itself an example of good speech?
The challenge for anger's passion is to remember in the midst of the
physiological, that it is a passion for the good. The work anger needs
to do in re-integrating its origin allows it to be a required part of
good speech, yet anger itself is not the origin of speech. While anger
fuels the demand for justice, it also requires the decisive mediation
of the ideal speaker in order to fulfil this potential. So we are not
interested in describing the "history" of the ideal speaker or the story
of his "emergence" from some "pre-ideal" state. A risk for our thinking
on anger would be to consider it as a kind of therapy, generating
through its cathartic effect a speaker who is freed from repressions,
a speaker who is not hampered by inhibition and can therefore supposedly
"know what he really wants". While this notion can remind us of the
need for the affirmative - the what that it seeks to affirm is simply
the ego and its feelings. It treats feelings as the origin, so that
enacting one's feelings is a direct relation to (and recovery of) what
13
is original . Yet the ideal speaker needs to engage in the work of
inquiring into what is truly desirable as that which is worth wanting.
What the ideal speaker really wants is (to inquire into) what is truly
good.
Anger then is not a "stage" through which the partiality or error
of an earlier tine synthesizes itself into the completeness or secure
13• As such, the "therapy of anger" is an instance of the usage of
awe, to be discussed in Chapter 5-
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truth of the ideal speaker. Anger is not a purgatorial fire on a road
to self-completion: instead we have to use our commitment to the ideal
speaker in order to mediate anger well. This mediating relation is
represented mythically for us by Aeschylus when he deals with the
problem of Orestes' accountability for the murder of his mother, Clyta-
emnestra. Orestes is being pursued from place to place by the vengeful
Furies who are driving him insane. Yet there is justice mixed up with
the horror of matricide in his deed: clearly, since the Furies are
bend on vengeance they are unqualified to make judgement on Orestes.
The Furies represent rage or matriarchal excess. Aeschylus introduces
Athena, the goddess of wisdom and government, as one capable of conduc-
ting the inquiry . Our problem is to construct a notion of Athena's
part in the story, not as an external intervention, but as a recovery
of what is worthiest in anger. Our work is to re-habilitate Fury (as
well as, on the other side, to re-fortify Bemorse).
Another way of putting the problem is to recall again how our
situation is akin to that of Socrates in the face of Meno's challenged
Socrates could be tempted to think that he needs the intervention of
the gods in order to help him here. Instead, Socrates portrays man's
relation to language (the gods) as one that requires man's own inter¬
vention. In telling the story, Socrates practises the intervention
that is needed - i.e. convincing Meno not to give up in the face of
difficulty. Socrates regenerates the question by showing that what
it asks for is not a pure origin/beginning ("how will%you know"), but
an account of the decisiveness of its relation to what is essential to
it. The relation between anger and ideal speaking needs to be resolved
as the question of anger's decisiveness.
14. Aeschylus, The Eumenides, in 1977, p.248.
15* As discussed in the Introduction.
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3« Anger as an instance of speech.
Our task here will be satisfied by addressing ourselves to the
problem of anger's relationship to speech. We take the outcome of anger's
struggle to find its resolution to depend on its establishing its proper
relationship to speech, that is, a relationship that defers to the pos¬
sibility of the ideal speaker's emergence. The ideal speaker, in our
re-construction of' him, is the one who continually justifies his speech
(speaks justly) by making available within it the question of its end
or value. The aim of just speech is to re-integrate us with language
by showing, not only the rule of language, but how the supremacy of
language is good for man (for speakers). Anger, then, is a challenge
because it is tempted to forget itself and thus forget its end or value .
Since anger's value is its demand for the integration of force and po¬
tential as what is valuable, its value falls into abuse when force
and potential are segregated. Anger's need for the work of the ideal
speaker (to sustain a strong notion of its value, of what anger deeply
is) is internal to it. Anger is another instance of the need to re-
achieve the integration of speech with what makes it valuable, and as
such, does not stand "outside" the ideal speaker's experience of lan¬
guage as a "mere emotion" needing to be cleared before real work begins.
The fear of anger upon which this externalization is premised is not
the principle of our work. That is, the fear of anger per se is mis¬
placed, since it is anger's temptation to excess that is to be feared.
Aeschylus again provides the image of what our conversation with anger
is oriented to achieve: our fear of the Furies (vengeful anger) becomes
a celebration of justice, in which the Eumenides (the transformed Furies)
themselves participate.
What, then, id anger's ideal relation to speech? The twin
excesses of self-indulgence and self-recrimination will help us here.
We can begin by recalling that in both instances what is obsessional
about them comes from their respective relationships with their origin.
In each case, memory is partial: sheer immersion in, or abstraction
from, the violence of its origin is predicated on a forgetfulness of
the mixed character of that origin. Anger's problem is the problem
of memory. With rage, this develops into the notion that alter (injus¬
tice) needs to be remedied by mechanical feats of memory. Rage's re¬
petitive character is a feature of its treatment of each new instance
of injustice as the mere forgetting of what it said to the offender
last time. Rather than educate its alter, rage merely wants to impose
a mnemonic upon it, to imprint itself as if alter was only a wax tablet.
Rage is staunchly empirical. It has an imposing stance towards its
interlocutor, generated by its rigid self-differentiation from him:
hence it is unable to do anything but shout and scream at what it sees
as the disorientedness of alter. Rage is only able to differentiate:
that is, it is unable to formulate the oriented character of its inter¬
locutor and to raise the question for its alter of the genuine require¬
ment that his speech conceals. Rage is uninterested in conversing
because, given its love of self (where self means the particular, that
with which it identified) it treats as injustice whatever threatens
the intactness of its relations. Rage reacts against an enduring but
concretized sense of betrayal: it wants loyalty to its own exigency
rather than to the demand for justice. It subjects justice (as we have
already seen) to the rule of interaction. Instead of orienting to a
strong notion of the betrayal of trust or the neglect of what is valuable,
rage is consumed by the interactional. It reacts (i.e. it is reactive)
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to its personal hurt (the betrayal of its own exigency) above any
betrayal of principle. Because of rage's failed memory (its failure
to remember how it is that particularity is desirable) it imposes
itself on alter through harangue rather than conversation. It treats
alter as needing to be supplied with an experience to remember, the
experience of this concrete "good life" with which alter is unfamiliar
through whatever accident of birth or upbringing.Rage wants the impo¬
sition of norms upon speakers.
Self-indulgent anger, being merely interactional, equates inter¬
locutors with injustice. Instead of trying to recover what it is that
their speech has forgotten, self-indulgence only remembers what is
worst about alters - because it treats what is "best" about itself,
its concrete difference, as something to be mechanically remembered.
Here we can formulate rage's commitment to a literal reading of alter
as grounded in its desire to assemble what is worst. Rage remembers
speeches or actions as concrete, particularized, betrayals: sheer
speech, rather than the re-construction of its educability, becomes
paramount. Rage has an empiricist notion of experience as an imprint
upon a tabula rasa. It practises the "art of memory"^, sets out to
notice all the weaknesses of alter's speech, where these weaknesses
are technical features of the speech itself: its inconsistencies,
its failures to do full explication. Such features are taken as
signs of its unwarrantability: rage (e.g. jealousy) is always ready
to hear omission - i.e. the omission of completion - in alter's talk.
Rage wants literal completeness. It is always imagining that the
worst thing (the thing it seeks to remember) is deliberately omitted.
It hears vagueness or shorthand references as terrible betrayals: it
16. See .F.Yates, 1969, for an account of mnemonic techniques.
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cannot live with the essential incompleteness of description, and tries
to "blame alter "by attributing it to him.
Because rage is forgetful of anything but concrete difference,
it is committed to sheer speech or interaction. But since it lacks
any strong notion of what authorizes it, it can only sputter aphoris-
tically and disjointedly. Rage doesn't convince - hence it has to
merely repeat itself - because it has no real conviction. That is,
its version of conviction denies conversation, and so it denies itself
the possibility of finding its conviction. Rage constructs itself on
sheer difference, sheer birthright as a warrior's notion of self-
affirmation.
At the opposite extreme, self-recrimination, because it forgets
its force, elects not to speak. Self-recrimination does not speak
(affirm or assert). It does not recognize anger's need to speak, but
instead seeks to silence the body. Its notion of its own difference
from its source compels it to think of itself as burdened with its own
past-as-guilt: we can recall here notions of tradition as a heavy
weight that restricts us by rendering our spontaneity merely apparent.
Remorse, through its inhibition of speech, pre-empts the development
of an experience of responsible speech as a task that essentially
needs to be borne lightly. Remorse constructs itself on sheer iden¬
tity, sheer negativity towards the self, as a narcissistic desire for
the origin.
In its relations with alter, remorse is austere in its failure
to exemplify a genuinely inviting alternative speech. It provides only
a Name, the Name of self-transcendence, as the sheer Other to what it
is. Remorse becomes self-consuming because it is continually being
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exasperated "by the unwillingness of the polis to treat the Name of
what is Other as anything more than a new phenomenon,(Multis, as the
concern with accident or chance effect, reacts only with outrage when
it is told simply to be "other than multis").
Anger needs neither sheer speech (self-love) nor silence (self-
hatred) , but rather the development of speech as the gaining of con¬
viction for oneself: only in this way can it be transformed into
justice. What is it for anger to gain conviction - and thus to con¬
tribute to the genesis of justice - in the face of mixture? Anger has
to avoid both the degeneration into mere violence and the abstraction
into mere potential. If the good of anger is its strength as a demand
for justice, then its task is to fuel its own potential (to enforce
its own good). Anger has to work towards integrating its possibly
divergent origins rather than having to choose between them. We can
begin to formulate this desire for integration by recalling anger's
characteristic urgency, its dynamism, its insistence on satisfaction.
Anger's need is to gain true satisfaction. Its concern is with (its)
truth, that is, in giving a foreeful reason, giving an account of it¬
self. Anger without reason orients to destruction. Anger that gives
a reason doesn't deny itself (i.e. it gains satisfaction), nor does
it merely repeat itself (i.e. it gains genuine rather than destructive
satisfaction).
The gaining of conviction or satisfaction enables anger to
develop the strong sense of itself that is its essential requirement.
Without this sense, anger becomes merely unjust. Anger becomes the
victim of an ironic reversal as its demand for justice turns into its
opposite. In order to respond justly to injustice, anger needs con¬
viction or satisfaction. That is, anger must be temperate. It must
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develop temperance rather than self-love or self-hatred. Temperance
is the satisfaction or conviction we are enabled to achieve through
our mastery of the physiological.
As an example of anger's need for satisfaction, consider the
anger of a parent at a child who is being very destructive or selfish.
The parent wants neither the child to be destructive, nor to be des¬
tructive of the child. Constructive anger does not wage war with the
child. Instead it tries to make the child strong enough to under¬
stand the difference between temperance and intemperance. Above all,
the anger of the parent has to invite the child to resolve the problem
of anger for himself. Punishment of a child needs to be passionate,
not detached or calculated, occurring after the heat of the anger has
evaporated. Calculative punishment is a mechanical juxtaposition of
rationality and passion (punishment): it does not achieve any binding
togetherness or true integration of the two. Both of the elements have
already, in isolation from each other, become mutually incompatible:
so the mere placing of the two together again, not only fails to re¬
integrate them, but produces a monstrous hybrid instead. The child
who is subject to calculative punishment will experience an anger
against it that, in the overpowering context of calculativeness, will
be unable to resolve itself. The child will become a remorseful
speaker, with a destructive relation towards his own particularity.
In the beginnings of remorse, we see its character as a kind of intem¬
perance. Instead of conviction or satisfaction (i.e. a positive rela¬
tion to the physiological), remorse seeks merely to negate the physio¬
logical. If temperance is the positively ironic relation to nature
then remorse is an instance of intemperance. Remorse fails to achieve
its concealed Desire for justice because it is intemperate.
On the other hand., while punishment needs to be passionate, i.e
immediate, sheer punishment is as bad as its opposite (calculative
punishment). Sheer punishment is like retribution in that it lacks a
reason, it cannot distinguish between just and unjust violence. Sheer
punishment (the rage of the parent) could become simply another part
of family life, i.e. something familiar. If remorse is a protest
against the familiar, an instance of the Germanic and Protestant
intellect, the consequence of a calculative parent's Garfinkelian
experiment within the home, rage is a desire for sheer familiarization,
a manic protest against anything other than the familiar. The calcula¬
tive parent thinks that the home should be a school, that everything,
especially oneself, needs to be objectified: the enraged parent rebels
against whatever threatens to de-familiarize his experience, namely
indirectness, giving reasons, school. Thus rage is another kind of
intemperance. Rage does not mediate the physiological, but instead
subjects itself to it. It is intemperate to treat the body as the
ruler of the soul. It is because of this kind of intemperance that
rage, like remorse, fails to achieve its concealed Desire for justice.
These responses to the problem of anger are grounded as possi¬
bilities in the nature of anger as violence and potential mixed. Self-
recrimination wants posterity to rigidly answer to its notion of the
pure beginning: it is oriented to the Family Line, i.e. it is patriar¬
chal, all-objectifying by the standard of a secweLy held criterion or
title-deed. Remorse neurotically estranges familiarity. By contrast,
rage is a speaker's vehement protest when his immersion in what he
loves reveals its insufficiency, by being subjected to question from
outside itself. Rage is the rebellion against any other example of
the desirable than "this one here": it is matriarchal, oriented to
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the Extended Family (inclusiveness-exclusiveness) without any real
principle of unity (authority). The enraged family indulges its de¬
sire for sheer familiarization by ignoring how its very anger (deeply)
is evidence to the unfamiliar, the not-presently-at-hand, the demanding.
Instead of acknowledging its place in the Whole by working with anger's
demand, the enraged family will abound in recriminations because of
its expectation that the family be self-explicating.
Instead, anger must remember that it already references more
than the family. The anger of the parent is always in need of, and a
demand for, an account. The resolution of anger is its satisfaction of
its demand to re-achieve our confidence in the capacity of speech or the
mind. Both rage and remorse are failures of this confidence, whereas
resolved anger has confided in the capacity of speech or the mind to re-
achieve a strong relation with language, and has given to speech the pas¬
sion to do so. The parent achieves satisfaction by recognizing, not only
the child's need for satisfaction, but also, more deeply, that both par¬
ent's and child's satisfaction are grounded in the interdependence ra¬
ther than the segregation of punishment and the giving of reasons. Remorse
abuses punishment by seeking to rationalize it (as if punishment could be
its own reason). Rage abuses reason by ignoring it (as if punishment did
not need a reason). In order to actualize its Desire (for justice), anger
must become temperate.
k. Anger and the interest in theorizing.
Anger's risk (its failure to live up to what it needs to be) is
that it could become exegetical, passive, oriented to literal readings .
The commitment to exegesis pre-empts the possibility of self's or alter's
improvement: anger forgets its essential educability. Both remorse
and rage identify anger as a certain fixed relation to the world of
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"convention" - either a rejection of or an immersion in this world -
and given this beginning, they both have a technical, literal, interest
in deciphering this world. Remorse feels the weight of its history
(its tradition) bear down upon it, and engages in a Sisyphuslike enter¬
prise of explicating it in the hope of learning something. Its notion
of learning is expiatory: it becomes entangled in the work of dis¬
counting and unravelling the weave of historical distance between it¬
self (the present) and its interlocutor (the past). Remorse's essen¬
tially nostalgic work is the never-ending removal of impediments which
continually spring up again to obstruct the pure apprehension of an
original intention. Remorse rejects familiarity (the non-original)
as what is undesirably present in every appearance and treats all
utterances ("would-be knowledge") as surrounded in a veil of historically-
17
determined and obstructive familiarities
Self-indulgent anger also has an interest in literalness in
that it wants to establish beyond doubt the absolute injustice of its
object, as evidence to its own absolute justice. It wants to pin alter
down, to place a mark upon him by which he will be instantly recogni¬
zable. Because it is continually suspicious of alter's speech, hearing
it as evasive, or deceptive, rage suffers problems concerning its use
of the documentary method. Recall Garfinkel's discussion of this
interpretive method which he says, citing Mannheim, "involves the search
for " an identical homologous pattern underlying a vast variety of
18
totally different realizations of meaning" " . The use of the docu¬
mentary method, Garfinkel wants to show, is dependent on "common sense
1?. Tristram Shandy is a story of this problem. Tristram's problem
was hopeless in that, because it took him a full day to write up
an account of a half-day of his life, it would be impossible for
him ever to finish his autobiography. Indeed, even if he worked
hard at his task, the longer he lived, the further he would be
from the achievement of it.
18. H.Garfinkel, 1967, p.78.
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knowledge of social structures": elsewhere he speaks of trust . For
example, Garfinkel comments that
"correct correspondence (between a reported
observation and the intended occurrence it is
meant to report on) is the product of the work
of investigator and reader as members of a
community of co-believers". 20
The problem for the enraged speaker is his repudiation of mem¬
bership of such a community, and his simultaneous desire to treat
utterances as pointers to certain truth. Rage is deprived of the
shared belief that allows one, through the use of the method, to
recognize "what a person is "talking about" given that he does not
21
say exactly what he means". Whereas the "community of co-believers"
is not compelled to be painstakingly literal because it makes use, in
an easygoing way, of the documentary method, rage becomes obsessive
about documentation in the strict sense. It is constantly adducing,
going behind what is being said, and at the same time blaming the
speaker or even speech itself for the absence of complete revelation.
It construes the necessary indirectness of speech as an oriented
omission on the part of the (unjust) speaker, generated out of the
latter's desire to hide what he is "talking about" (to hidehis in¬
justice) . Rage treats alter as being responsible for its own compul¬
sory need to detect, to document, to decipher. It sees its alter
(injustice) as motivating the indirectness of speech: its notion of
literalness leads it to its abiding concern with signs, traces, material
evidence. Rage finds in every story the same tell-tale residues of the
criminal who has tried to slip away unnoticed: every speech is poten¬
tially treatable as a gloss on its own conditions of existence, its
illusions, its injustice. Ultimately, self-indulgent anger treats
speech itself as unjust, because of its indirectness. It finds that
19. H.Garfinkel, "A Conception of and Experiments with "Trust" as a
Condition of Stable Concerted Actions" in: 0.J.Harvey,ed,1963.
20. Garfinkel,1967, p.96.
21. Loc. cit, p.78.
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it cannot say directly what it wants to say, it cannot speak literally,
but instead can only gesticulate: and blames the inadequacy of speech.
Rage wants speech to be direct, literal, perfectly transparent or fami¬
liar. It is angry at speech itself: it mistrusts speech because it
is not pliable to its sheer violence. Thus, rage is forever fuelling
itself, and is forever provided with fuel for its fire, because even
with the greatest effort in the world (which would be utterly misplaced)
it would be impossible for speech to amount to a mere self-revelation,
a familiarization of its matter. Rage wants speech to be material
rather than ideal: it lives in an energetically vengeful relation
with speech because of its "failure" to be so.
Self-indulgent anger, unmediated outrage, is contagious: it
boomerangs on us like a family curse (the curse of family autocracy,
the rule of the familiar). The curse is re-activated, as portrayed
in the story of Atreus, by each new generation. We take this to re¬
present the notion that rage or sheer generativity can only re-activate
and augment what is cursed. Mere re-activation is a curse. This repet-
itiveness comes about because of the merely physiological character of
rage. Rage does not gain the true satisfaction or conviction of speech,
but only the temporary "satiation" of exhaustion. Sheer physiology is
insatiable; it collapses temporarily from its exertions, but inevitably
rises up again. The ideal of Atreus is to act directly on its anger:
22
rage is attracted by the idea of externalization, free expression
It forgets that crimes, revengeful actions, are contagious: it thinks
"acting out" is an end to the matter, forgetting that this merely re¬
mains at the level of the physiological (i.e. it is not oriented to
improvement). Because rage does not gain true satisfaction, it remains
essentially dissatisfied, since it remains trapped by the profligacy
22. Fagles and Stanford, 197?-
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of the physiological. Rage is profligate (i.e. it mirrors the multi-
tudinousness of conditions) because it has no principle other than what
is familiar.
If remorse represses and segregates, rage reacts against this
by its sheer externalization, its desire to destroy all "barriers" to
directness, even speech itself if necessary. Neither of the two recog¬
nize the commitment of the ideal speaker to distinction shown, for
example, in the distinction he draws between punishment and reason.
The ideal speaker's speech is distinguished by its work, i.e. by its
activity of making more out of the beginning (anger, or the child) -
by giving an account. The ideal speaker wants neither to reject
physiology (like remorse) nor to insist solely on what is familiar
(like rage) but to show the work of preserving a strong relation with
conditions. The theorist accepts the body because he knows he can make
it serve his purposes: the very engagement with the physiological
(e.g. anger's violence) is another occasion on which to become oriented,
to re-achieve his purposes.
Anger's true satisfaction is to work, i.e. to develop distinc¬
tion. For anger, the distinction (needing work is that) between anger
(as the demand for justice) and justice (as what the demand is for).
Anger needs the work of irony towards physiology as answering to its
need for mediation: through temperance, anger becomes capable of re-
achieving its distinction. Ironic or strong anger (the anger that is
mediated by the ideal speaker's interest) offers praise in the midst
of its anger, makes generous jokes, seeks to move and engage alter:
in this way, it becomes "something more", i.e. more than interactional
or exegetic. It becomes just.
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Socrates frequently speaks to his interlocutor as if he were talking
about some reproachable "third man", when really he is formulating
the hearer himself. In this way Socrates invites his alter to orient,
not to the derivative question of who he is, but to the strong question
of what man is. Socrates resists the belaboured or taxing identifi¬
cation of speakers when such a transfixing (exegesis) would imprison
them in their empirical selves and prevent them from making more of
their beginnings. Socrates' irony is not his "deception" of inter¬
locutors, but his interest in turning speaker's interests towards
genuine requirements (rather than in merely naming speakers). Socrates
re-affirms the need to be interested in strong requirements, rather
than,as rage or remorse insist, in self-identification. Socrates
always speaks with his interlocutor about the issue of principle
raised by the putative "third man". Even if the interlocutor begins
to suspect who Socrates is talking about, he need not take offence or
become defensive because he has seen also that Socrates' interest is
not in labelling. What Socrates is interested in is the distinction
between anger and justice. The mare demand for justice (anger) is not
necessarily just unless it has been tempered ironically. Anger involves
our relation to physiology or nature. What anger requires in order to
achieve its end (justice) is: to become temperate.
5• Mastering anger through irony
If irony is the work of mediating anger's violence, we need also
to show that it is the work of developing anger's potential. Anger's
potential strength is that it provides the ideal speaker with an occasion
to re-collect his interest. Anger is the beginning through which, and
from out of which, the theorist re-achieves his interest in justice as
the difference between the authoritative force of ideal speech and the
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arbitrary violence of speech that disowns its authored character
(disowns the need to recover its end or value). Anger's potential
(and the work of developing it) is a required part of the theorist's
life. What is it, then, that the ideal speaker re-collects through
his engagement with anger? Even to ask this question is itself, as
we shall see, an achievement. The ideal speaker remembers that dis¬
tinction cannot be achieved by segregating anger. The failure to
develop distinction (e.g. the possibility of strong anger, the dis¬
tinction between anger and what anger demands ) generajs.es segregated
sueech. The notion of segregation will not be properly grounded until
Chapter Four; we can anticipate here by saying that both remorse and
rage segregate speech from what it needs. At this point we are able
to see how the question of what the ideal speaker re-collects through
his work with anger is itself an achievement. To have segregated
anger (as remorse does by merely abstracting from it, and as rage does
by violating it) would have forbidden that the question "what is re¬
collected by meeting anger's challenge?" be taken seriously at all.
Through the work of developing distinction (engaging anger), the ideal
speaker re-collects and deepens the difference between distinction and
segregation. The interest of irony is in distinction (working with
beginnings) rather than segregation (interaction).
If it is to irony that we entrust the task of mediating anger's
forceful potential, this is because anger is ironic (invites the work
of irony): anger has something to contribute, but doesn't yet know what
it is. The mixed feelings towards anger that might tempt the angry
speaker to self-recrimination can now be more strongly formulated as
the need to be ironic with anger: neither simply accepting it on its
own terms, nor rejecting it on some other terms. The "terms" under
which anger is to be evaluated (rather than merely accepted or rejected)
include the very anger itself, yet it is anger mastered, improved,
and in place. Kierkegaard, we recall, spoke of the need to master
irony, to place it within the whole. We can begin to respect his
Desire by working on the idea of mastery. Kierkegaard wants a notion
23of discipline that is "cherished" by those who know it. Instead of
being accusatory towards Kierkegaard, identifying his attributes,
forcing him to stick like glue to the failed outcomes of his efforts
to generate these notions, we can imaginativelyinvite him (or an alter
in his place) to re-achieve the decisive questions that can re-open
the outcome. Instead of taking Kierkegaard's version of Socrates as
face-value documentary evidence of his underlying injustice, we can
ironize our anger towards him by using it as an occasion to recover
the question of what his desire needs. We can use Kierkegaard to re¬
collect ourselves, by asking, what is his commitment to language such
that he can generate the version of Socrates that he does? Rather
than allowing ourselves, as Adeimantos likely would, to be persuaded
by his version of Socrates, and then reverse the evaluation of it,
as if his "version" was correct and his "evaluation" incorrect, we
can instead respect the desire to speak ideally in every instance by
asking what it is that is required in order to achieve a just version
and a just evaluation that belong together. What is required is a
strong notion of mastery as the discipline that is loved for its own
sake.
Kierkegaard, we recall, saw Socratic irony as self-consuming,
attempting to devour itself in its own negativity. If it were, we
could agree willingly with him in saying that it needs to be mastered.
23• Kierkegaard, p.339•
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However, through our engagement with anger, we can now say that Kier¬
kegaard mistakes anger for irony: it is sheer anger (rage, self-
indulgence) that is self-consuming, it is anger that runs the risk
of being asocial, capricious, purely individualistic. It is anger
that needs to be mastered through irony. We can make Kierkegaard
stronger, make more of his suggestion, by saying that irony needs to
have mastery: for example, it needs to master (mediate) anger. This
simultaneously transforms Kierkegaard's notions of both mastery and
24
irony. Mastered anger is not sublimated anger, "reduced to a moment" ,
lacking all passion. The ideal speaker, rather than repressing anger,
masters it ironically, uses it as a lively occasion for speech, so as
to treat his mastery not as what he needs (i.e. sheer talent or inven¬
tiveness) but as his way of showing or respecting what he needs. The
ideal speaker, unlike the warrior (rage) or the narcissist (remorse),
treats his mastery of the physiological indirectly: that is, he treats
it as the outcome of his desire for ideal speaking rather than as the
origin of value. The warrior acts on his mastery of the body in order
to master others (i.e. he treats the body as decisive, in need of
merely direct speech): the narcissist ruminates on his mastery of
the mind in order to avoid others (i.e. he treats the Logos as' if it
were decisive, in need of merely disembodied speech ). They both treat
mastery as the origin of value. Instead, the ideal speaker recognizes
that his mastery (irony) is not the source of value, but that its real
source is language which grants his mastery as his way of showing his
desire to sustain his need. The ideal speaker recognizes his need as
the need for language: his irony (his mastery of the physiological)
is his recognition of the necessarily indirect, occasioned, character
of speech as the showing of need. Irony is the ideal speaker's rejec-
24. Kierkegaard, p.337•
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tion of the temptation towards sheer direct speech (treating speech
as the tody, as matter) or alternatively towards obscurely complicated
and tortuous speech (treating speech as the Logos, as form). The
ideal speaker treats the indirectness of speech (its always partial
transparency, its need for a method or style) not as a flaw to be
overcome but as essential to it. Speech's relation to the inessential
is strongly instanced through anger. If speech were merely inessential,
anger would always proliferate into self-differentiation, violence,
rage: if it were completely essential, non-accidential, incapable of
making a difference, anger would evaporate into self-identity, impo¬
tence, remorse. Rage and remorse then, are both outcomes of the failure
to recognize the indirect, mediating, nature of speech as our expres¬
sion of interest. Our interest is not identical to the Good (language),
yet it needs to be nurtured as that which draws us to the Good. Rage,
then, has no compassion because it vulgarizes passion into physiology:
remorse has no liveliness because it sublimates potency into abstraction.
As for Kierkegaard's notion of irony, his construal of it as
self-consuming shows that he could only see the anger or polemic of
irony, rather than the irony of anger. In this respect, sheer anger
shares more with Kierkegaard than it wishes (in its anger) to acknow¬
ledge. Kierkegaard treats irony as being dominated by anger unless it
25is "mastered'' by a totalization in which irony is "reduced to a moment" i
the alternative is to recognize anger's need to be ruled (mastered) by
irony in a movement which keeps a place for anger by allowing it to
revive the very movement of speech within which it seeks its place.
Positive irony (as the work of mastery, e.g. mediating anger)
can afford to be generous because it is oriented to what is truly
25' Kierkegaard, p.337-
required * to the creation of luxury as a speaking that is not merely
reactive (enraged or remorseful) but has a positive version of strong
speech as the practice of our desire to theorize. The ideal speaker
seeks to re-integrate, on every occasion, the accidental beginnings
of his speech (his practice) with its deep need to re-achieve distin¬
ction: the distinction between accident and value or end, the dis¬
tinction that ijs valuable for speech.
Our interest in re-constructing Kierkegaard's interest in a
notion of discipline that is "cherished", as an interest that is
decisive for ideal speaking, has brought us to face with a central
problem that we now need to develop throughout the remainder of this
essay. The problem is this: how does the ideal speaker's need for
a strong notion of irony raise as decisive the problem of mastery? To
put this more briefly: what is the problem of mastery, and why is it
decisive?
As we shall see in the following Chapter, the risk of mastery
is intemperance. If rage and remorse demonstrate the need for a
strong notion of mastery or discipline, they also remind us that the
virtue referenced by this strong notion will be temperance . We have
said; if anger is to be the beginning of justice, it will need to be
temperate. Yet mastery (of anger) is a course of action that could
invite intemperance.
Anger tempts speakers towards the sheer affirmation of physio¬
logy (rage) or the sheer denial of it (guilt). The ideal speaker
needs to moderate (i.e. master) anger ironically. So anger raises the
problem of mastery. Kierkegaard as we have seen recommended that irony
needed to be mastered. Yet Kierkegaard's hidden topic was anger, not
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irony: it is anger, not irony, that needs to be mastered. The
following two Chapters, therefore, will be addressed towards the need
to provide an account of ironic mastery such that it enables the ideal
speaker to fulfil his strong relation to language, i.e. we ask: what





1. Temperance: Self-expression and, inquiry.
How can we recommend, the need, for mastery (e.g. the mastery of
anger) without succumbing to the excess of being seduced by mere skill,
technique, and thus being led into an attitude of arrogance? We have
an urgent need for a formulation of the place of mastery. The pre¬
vious chapter has shown that the decision to evade the work of master¬
ing anger leads to its degeneration. The failure to work allows a kind
of entropy to set in, with its resultant disintegrating effect on
social action. Whereas social action is the engagement with circum¬
stance, rage is merely circumstantial and remorse is merely the attempted
negation of circumstance. Yet the acceptance of mastery carries with
it the risk of smugness - i.e. attachment to one's own competence:
instead of a society of beasts (rage) or a society of narcissists
(remorse) we would have a society of egotists, interested only in their
reputations. We would be driven from one atrophy of conversation to
another. So our task in this chapter is to provide an account of the
fruits of mastery in something beyond, and something more compelling,
than mastery itself. This "something" is our essential relation to
language as unity - and it is this relation that we shall be aiming
to recollect within our inquiry.
Let's remind ourselves of why mastery is needed, by way of
seeking its character. Without mastery, the expression of anger is
prone to excess. Anger's risk is that it could become repetitive,
caught in its own trap where it is unable to recollect the idea of
improvement. It would move in a circle within which it merely exem-
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plified the worst faults of its interlocutor - excessive hubris,
unwillingness to listen and so on - thereby ending up as a mere copy
of injustice, dedicated only to the rule of sheer interaction. Anger's
insistence in this respect leads to imperialism: everything else tends
to be treated as an enemy, something to be angry about, or a conspiritor.
something that will help out the polemic.
The excess of anger, then, would result whenever its interest
is subjected to the rule of sheer assertiveness. Kierkegaard writes:
"When subjectivity asserts itself, irony appears" ^ . He can be seen
to address our problem if we recall that his version of irony resonates
with the idea of anger. When subjectivity asserts itself, anger appears.
So, the assertiveness of anger might only (at worst) be that of the
subject: it might fail to become something stronger than the solipsism
of the egotist.
In the face of violence, the accidental violence of conditions,
or the oriented violence of betrayal, it is tempting to respond to the
threat against self-identity by re-affirming self with greater intensity.
The attraction of anger lies in the self-possessed vitality it is capa¬
ble of generating through its very expression: anger achieves something -
a heightened sense of self - without the further need for anything extra.
Anger seems to be complete, as the solution to the threat against self.
Anger in this instance fuels the maintenance of self-identity. This
temptation, to be attracted to what anger provides without further ado,
needs to be resisted because it is oriented to nothing more than survival,
that is, the survival of the self. It is oblivious to the question of
what is valuable, since value could never be questioned merely by orien¬
ting to survival. The difference between survival and demise is other
than the distinction between value and its opposite. The difference
1. Kierkegaard, 1968, p.280.
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between survival and demise is not a truly valuable difference. To
orient to this difference as decisive is to turn away from value: to
treat anger as a means to survival (of the self) leads to the denial
of value practised in the rule of physiology.
Our question is: what does anger require in order to be mast¬
ered? This question will be answered by a reflection that sustains
inquiry into the value of mastering anger. And this.requires that we
provide a formulation of the decisive character of the course of action
we are calling "mastering anger", or in other words, the decisiveness
of its particular orientation to language.
Let us turn now to an example of one who seeks justice yet is
tempted by an egotistic version of mastery. We will examine how mastery
becomes egotistic (or intemperate) when it degenerates into competence.
Then we will ask what it is that competence references: the Desire for
justice. To conclude this chapter, we will develop the notion that
genuine rule or justice (rather than intelligence) requires the influence
of temperance.^
Socrates' main interlocutors in Gharmides or Temperance are
Charmides himself and his older cousin Critias. Since, well before
Plato came to write the dialogue, the two youthful interlocutors had
moved along from the role of participants in a conversation with Socrates
written by Plato, to becoming two of the Thirty Tyrants who briefly held
sway over Athens near the end of the Peloponnesian War, we can use the
dialogue as a vehicle for reflection on a number of important relation¬
ships. We shall be considering the opposition between temperance and
tyranny, and more deeply its relation to justice. Our attention will
also dwell on the problem of knowing the self and in what sense temper¬
s'Chapter Four will then develop more fully what justice (influenced
by temperance) is.
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ance involves knowing the self. It will emerge that Critias' Desire
for justice (which occasionally involves anger) founders because of his
deep-rooted intemperance. This will allow us to develop the problem
of the origins of justice. We can begin here by examining the relation¬
ship between Charmides and Critias as it is revealed to us in their
conversation with Socrates.
Our story is the story of two cousins, one of whom because of
his great beauty attracts much attention and turns many heads. Amaze¬
ment and confusion reign when he enters a room; he is forever accom¬
panied by a troop of admirers; old and young alike gaze at him as if
he were a statue. Charmides creates mystique and awe around him: his
interlocutors, through some silent compulsion, become his admirers,
his observers, his wonder-stricken devotees. Although Charmides'
beauty bespeaks a harmony of proportion, he will, we can predict, have
a hard time achieving true temperance when most of those who come within
his orb lapse into a state of sheer rapture. In whatever place Charmides
finds himself, inquiry and the pursuit of genuinely truthful (worth¬
while) speech will be hard-pressed to establish its claim. Our initial
and most basic piece of advice to any teacher taking on responsibility
for Charmides would be to be especially mindful of this risk attendant
on the beauty of his pupil. Socrates will want to see whether Critias,
as Charmides' guardian, is dealing well or badly with this risk: and
already his first question, prior to any mention or sight of Charmides,
addresses the problem that the latter will come to embody. "I asked
whether any of (the youth) were remarkable for sophrosyne or beauty,
or both" (Plato 1970, 153b). Socrates wants to know what Critias
3
thinks of the relationship between sophrosyne and beauty.
3» The word sophrosyne means temperance, health of soul or self-
composure. Jowett translates it sometimes as "temperance",
sometimes as "wisdom", sometimes as both: see Introduction to
Charmides in Plato, 1970, p.35- We keep the word sophrosyne in
all quotations.
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Gritias' opening words seem to show clearly enough that Gritias
is really more interested in beauty than in temperance: in other words,
that he too is in awe of Gharmides.
"Of the beauties", he says, "I fancy that you
will soon be able to form a judgement. For
those who are just entering are the advanced
guard and lovers of the great beauty of the day,
as he is thought to be, and he is likely to be
not far off himself" (l5^a).
Gharmides is about to make his entrance. Perhaps it is asking too much
of Critias to remember temperance before beauty when he is, after all,
provoked to speak as he does because of the circumstance that he has
just seen some of Gharmides' admirers enter. Gritias speaks as a wit¬
ness to those who are themselves witness to Charmides' beauty. Yet it
is precisely because beauty has the tendency to turn speakers into awed
witnesses that there is a need for them to collect themselves in the
face of its risk.
More is going on in Gritias' talk however, than a simple decla¬
ration of his preference for beauty over wisdom: unlike most of the
others around Charmides, Critias is no mere worshipper of beauty.
Critias has a self-awareness that the worshipper lacks. If he has
already shown his inability to remember temperance in the face of
the aura of beauty, he nevertheless makes a show of doing so in his
invitation to Socrates to "form a judgement". On the matter of beauty,
first judgements when favourable are generally last judgements: not
only in the sense of not changing one's mind about the beauty of the
object, but more deeply, because the desire to evaluate, to inquire,
to genuinely converse, usually becomes submerged in one's waxing
enthusiasm. So Gritias is inviting Socrates to make his last judge¬
ment, to stop being a philosopher (lover of virtue) and to become
instead merely a lover of beauty (a forgetter of virtue). Critias
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hopes that "the great beauty of the day" will elicit the same awe and
amazement and confusion from Socrates as from all the others. Critias
seems to have some stake in the enforcable character of Charmides' beauty,
its capacity to short-circuit our judgement and make us forget our reason.
And somehow this seems to be a vulgarization of beauty, a use of beauty
for corrupt ends, a celebration of all that is worst about beauty and
a wilful neglect of all that is best. Gritias, instead of re-collecting
the good of beauty, will use the fact that it appears good as a way of
banishing judgement and reason - i.e. precisely the capacity to inquire
into what is good. Gritias is interested in what appears good not in
what is good.
Now as well as tempting others to become awed. Gritias also,
at the other extreme, tempts the philosopher who resists him into
austerity. It would be austere to think that what appears good is
(necessarily) bad,simply because it can be corruptly used to kill the
interest in what is good. Socrates has to resist the excesses of
sheer enthusiasm and austerity: he must resist either the worship or
the hatred of what appears good: he must avoid excessive emotion in
the face of appearance. Interestingly avoiding excessive emotion is
often taken to reflect austerity: but now we can see that austerity
is actually a kind of excess (of hatred) rather than an avoidance of
excess. Austerity is the hatred of what appears good. Perhaps our
task now is to address those who think that "avoiding excess emotion"
is austere, by re-formulating it in strong terms rather than as
"avoidance". In this chapter we seek to re-formulate it as the interest
in temperance, and to re-collect the passion of this interest.
Gritias soon shows that his interest is in reputation. He
prefers his listeners, like himself, to orient to reputation (what
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appears good) rather than to worth (what is good). Reputations are
dependent on advance notices and revues, praise without foundation,
in short, the artful creation of a whole web of beliefs about their
subjects. The man with a reputation relies, in order to confirm
and augment it, on being able to trade on and gloss the faithfully
held pre-conceptions, beliefs - taken - for - knowledge, and enthusias¬
tic hopes that people have. Thus Gritias, after informing Socrates that
Charmides is of the same family as he is, gives his response to Socrates'
request that he should reveal his soul rather than his body. He says:
'1 can tell you that he is indeed a philosopher already, and also a con¬
siderable poet, not in his own opinion only, but in that of others"(155a).
For Gritias the fact that there are others who corroborate the opinion
is telling: Gritias is more interested in the reputation Charmides has
as a philosopher than in the nature of philosophy itself. Notice in
both of the utterances we have quoted, that Gritias wants to appear
modest: rather than state his own opinion and answer to that, he is
careful to make his statements rest on the opinion of others. Yet ,
despite his wish to appear disinterested, Gritias does have a particular
commitment to his speech. He wants the opinions of others to do his
work for him: let us say for the present that he wants to use Charmides'
beauty as a vehicle for establishing his own reputation - as Charmides'
older cousin, teacher, and benefactor. To say that Gritias wants his
statements to be justified by the opinions of others is not to say that
he never boasts. Boasting and exaggeration are closely allied to the
reliance on the opinions of others. This is because the opinions of
others, when fanned by their awe of a reputation, are liable to whip
themselves into frenzied excess. The apparent modesty of relying on
the opinions of others covers over the boastful impulse to be swayed
or persuaded by those very opinions in the first place: the impulse
to make the opinions of others count, in every sense.
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Yet it is also becoming apparant that reputations, because they must
justify themselves, run the risk of exposure at any time. The risk
is extreme in the presence of an interlocutor who is really interested
in what is good rather than in simply resting with what appears good
(i.e. with the opinions of others, or with sheer beauty). This helps
to account for Critias' way of talking with Socrates at this stage,
prior to Charmides' joining the conversation. He wants to re-organize
Socrates' interest, to make Socrates forget his real interest, to compel
Socrates to choose beauty and opinion over temperance. Socrates as
we shall see, is gradually being placed in a difficult position by
Critias - a situation in which, as we argued earlier, he must avoid
the extremes of choosing sheer beauty and opinion (i.e. succumbing to
Critias) on the one hand, or merely rejecting them (being austere) on
the other. That is, Socrates must re-achieve temperance. Merely to
reject beauty and opinion would be to sacrifice the possibility of
conversation, the possibility of teaching Charmides and Critias to
reflect on their relationship as an icon of the relation between beauty
and temperance. For Critias, at present, that relationship stands as
an opportunity to exploit the preference for beauty and opinion over
temperance - and indeed to exploit the apparently temperate itself
for this end. We can now understand why Critias would secretly fear
the intrusion of Socrates into this situation. Critias is seeking to
tranquilize Socrates in order to forestall the threat he poses to the
tranquility Critias already efficiently organises. Critias' notion of
mastery or temperance is efficient organization: Critias' wants, as
we shall see, to be competent.
Precisely through all of his efforts to control and manipulate
the situation in the interests of appearance, impressiveness, and so
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on, Gritias exposes and reveals but does not genuinely express his own
character. When Socrates asks him to call Charmides over to take part,
Critias, turning to an attendant, says: "Call Charmides, and tell him
that I want him to come and see a physician about the illness of which
he spoke to me". Then, explaining to Socrates that Charmides has lately
been complaining of a headache, he asks; "how why should you not make
him believe that you know a cure for the headache" (l55"b) • Critias is
asking Socrates to estrange himself, to become a physician giving
answers (cures) rather than a philosopher asking questions. Critias is
trying to cramp Socrates' style, to render him ineffective, so as to
maintain his own control over the situation. He wants Socrates to answer
to him: he wants the better (the philosopher) to answer to the worse
(the physician). Critias tries to make Socrates worse than he is: that
is, he is making it hard for Socrates to be temperate.
The same words are making Charmides out to be worse than he is
reputed to be. Critias had just spoken glowingly of Charmides as a
philosopher and a poet. How he has to turn Socrates the philosopher,
into some sort of physician in order to induce Charmides to come to talk
with him. Critias does not seem to place much faith in all the reccom-
mendations he has just made for Charmides' character. If he did, he
would expect nothing to give Charmides greater pleasure and incentive
than the news that a philosopher, Socrates, was in their midst singling
him out to converse with. Despite all he has said, we see that Critias
places little faith in Charmides. He does not consider Charmides capable
of exercising true judgement, of being decisive on his own behalf, but
instead reveals his view of him as one who could only be moved by matters
of immediate discomfort and self-concern. Part of Critias' respect and
esteem for the opinions of others, is his image of action as the expres-
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sion of self-interest. Critias' notion of what motivates action is
making it hard for both Socrates and Charmides to live up to their
best possibilities. Critias' notion tends to confirm itself by act¬
ing (or interacting) in such a way as to make others worse than they
are. Critias' device of the physician, then, is his way of trying to
make the interaction confirm what (he thinks) he already knows.
Critias exposes but does not genuinely express himself. What
he exposes is his lack of faith in Charmides, or better, his lack of
faith in his own words (about Charmides). Critias speaks (faithlessly)
because he is interested in reputation rather than temperance. Critias
is one who tries to master situations rather than master himself. As
we shall see, what his mastery really amounts to is a kind of compe¬
tence. Critias values competence as the highest. Competence is a weak
version of self-mastery because it seeks to control interaction rather
than master and use physiology (nature) for the sake of conversation.
Sheer competence, or, for now, the interest in reputation, is a kind
of intemperance or failure of temperance. Later, however, we shall
need to address the strong interest or strong requirement referenced
by competence. Now, however, the important point is that competence,
as a kind of intemperance, does not genuinely express the self. In
some way that we must pursue, the requirement of temperance seems to
be a requirement to express the self. Expressing the self means: having
faith in one's own words, or having genuine conviction . Critias is
unable to do justice to Charmides or Socrates (i.e. he tempts them
into intemperance) because he does not express himself: that is, because
of his own intemperance.
4. The problem of conviction is developed as the problem of
justice's education of temperance, below, Chapter 6
10?
Socrates himself has already, a few moments earlier, experienced
the temptation of intemperance. He confesses that when Charmides
entered, he was quite astonished at his "beauty and stature. Socrates
remembers his concern for the essential (for worth) by remarking that
Charmides is a paragon, if he has only the "slight addition" of a noble
soul. Socrates reminds himself of the essential nature of the soul in
comparison with the accidents of bodily beauty. Having re-composed
himself once, Socrates has to undergo the harder test of beginning to
converse with Charmides: knowing that this is to come, he has had to
decide whether to accede to Critias' request that he pretend to be a
physician. The austere temptation here is to refuse: simply to say
"No" to the attempts at manipulation, at forcing one to orient to
appearances, taking on a false role, becoming dishonest, and so on.
Yet here the price usually paid for scruples of this kind (which betray
rather than deny the depth of their preoccupation with appearances) is
graphically illustrated. To make this denial would certainly intimi¬
date and frighten off modest Charmides, for he would try to defend
himself from the tricks being played upon him. Since modesty is too
defensive already we can see in this instance a key to the real problem
with austerity. Austerity is aloof from every interest in appearance,
including modesty's obscurity and reputation's desire for impressive-
ness. Austerity, in its ironic negativity, would be unable to converse
with either Charmides or Critias. Austerity invites both competitiveness
(the interest in reputation) and modesty to do more of what they already
do too much: to conceal their genuine requirements from themselves for
the sake of protecting themselves.
Instead, in his conversation with modest beauty (Charmides) and
boastful reputation (Critias), Socrates needs to provide for an interest
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in revealing the self (appearing). The strong interest in self-
revelation is oriented to that for the sake of which it ought to he
pursued: to what is truly animating or compelling for the self. Deeply,
self-expression remembers that it must not stop with itself, that it
is not undertaken for its own sake: deeply it is not an interest in
appearance. Rather, it is the interest in making the interest in what
is good appear. Socrates wants to show in his conversation with the
two cousins the reciprocal relationship between self-expression and
the inquiry into what is (rather than what merely appears) good. Socrates
can risk making mistakes because this is essential to the examination
of what is good. A mistake occurs when one's speech fails to re-achieve
the intimate community it desires between self-revelation and the
inquiry into what is genuinely good. This is the intimacy that actually
makes the interest in what is good appear. Even the mistake is essen¬
tial testimony to (ought to be used in order to re-collect) the inter¬
dependence of the life of self expression and the life of inquiry and
self-examination. In the absence of the willingness to genuinely reveal
the self, there arises in its place either modesty (the disinterest in
mediating appearances, the disinterest in making our interest in what
is good appear), or competitiveness (the interest in appearing good,
the interest in immediate reputation). Without self-expression, that
is, the interest in inquiry suffers: without the interest in inquiry,
true self-expression wanes. Inquiry and self-expression are interde¬
pendent in the sense that the active pursuit of each, in order to thrive,
needs and also fosters the active pursuit of the other.
Gritias thinks he can weaken Socrates by forcing him to appear
as worse than (Critias knows) he is. Gritias here is abusing what he
knows (i.e. that Socrates is a philosopher) for the sake of his own will.
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Critias turns Desire into self-centred will: this is the core of his
intemperance. Socrates must now show that his analytic interest in
self-expression is not compromised by his being cast into the role of
a physician. Far from it: an essential ingredient of the interest
in self-expression is its need to work constructively with the risks
of false appearance. The speaker must always, in the midst of the
exigencies of conventionand the accidents of accessibility, endure the
falsity, superficiality, partiality, and so on, within which his interest
appears to others and theirs appears to him. The desire to avoid these
exigencies produces modesty. The desire to simply manipulate and
organise how they appear produces competitiveness. The desire to
achieve a position of aloof indifference to them produces austerity.
The ideal speaker must instead take the risk of using the potential or
actual falsity of the guise within which he appears (within which he
happens to have become available as an alter for his interlocutor) as
a vehicle for questing self-expression. He must take the risk of making
a mistake. He must integrate the comic hubris that is an intrinsic part
of giving expression to inquiry, of bringing the interest in what is
good to appearance. He must continue to work, rather than panic (as
modesty does) or merely deal "effectively" with the panic (as competi¬
tiveness and austerity do), in the face of what is awkward.
Socrates tells us, though not Critias or Charmides, about his
awkwardness. He relates how, when Charmides came and sat next to him,
he experienced the moving effects of his beauty. He tells us:
"But I, my friend, was beginning to feel awkward;
my former bold belief in my powers of conversing
naturally with him had vanished. And when Critias
told him that I was the person who had the cure,
he looked at me in an indescribable manner, and
made as though to ask me a question. And all the
people in the palaestra crowded about us, and at
that moment, my good friend, I caught a sight of
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the inwards of his garment and took the flame.
Then I could no longer contain myself. I thought
how well Cydias understood the nature of love,
when, in speaking of a fair youth, he warns some¬
one "not to bring the fawn in the sight of the
lion to be devoured by him", for I felt that I had
been overcome by a sort of wild-beast appetite".(l55c-e)
Socrates is telling his "friend", his ideal listener, about self-
expression's need to collect itself with its awkwardness, about self-
expression's need to live well with its awkwardness. Socrates does
not tell Critias or Charmides of his awkwardness in this way. Since
they already have a stock response to the problem of awkwardness, if
Socrates reported it directly to them they would instantly adopt their
respective stances. Gharmides would retreat and become modestly silent;
Gritias would loudly use it as a vindication of the awesome beauty of
Gharmides, i.e. the irresistible power of appearance. Charmides and
Critias would merely repeat themselves. This shows us that self-
expression must be ironic rather than literal. Self-expression is
stronger than self-report or self-description.
Here Socrates would be treating self-expression's need (to work
in the face of awkwardness, in the face of necessary incongruity or
blemish within appearance) as its own solution: as if self-expression's
problem was merely one of self-description, confession, sheer honesty.
(As we have already seen, when anger makes this mistake, it turns into
rage). Yet deeply there would be nothing awkward about this: the art
of self-description could simply be learned (through consciousness
raising, good upbringing, or whatever) and then more or less efficiently
practiced. But it would then evade the centrality and essentiality of
the problem of awkwardness, that is, the intrinsic place of awkwardness
within the interest in making what is good appear (come to speech, come
to self-expression). Awkwardness is part of our fate rather than a
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defect of upbringing or social structure. The ideal speaker must con¬
tinually collect himself in the face of the essential awkwardness of
making an interest in what j_s good appear in the midst of beauty and
ugliness, honesty and deception, collection and dispersion. Part of
this self-collecting or resolving is resisting the temptation to elimi¬
nate awkwardness, the temptation to imagine that it is merely awkwardness
itself that needs to be brought to appearance. The problem of awkward¬
ness needs to remember its place, not as an obstacle to communication,
but as an icon of the problem of inquiry. More deeply, it stands as
an icon of the inquiry married to leadership that generates good
teaching. Socrates must resist the intemperance of eliminating his
awkwardness by simply describing it (making it appear): he must remem¬
ber his Desire to teach Gritias and Charmides.
At the opposite extreme, if Socrates does not describe his
awkwardness, he must also resist the temptation to completely hide or
obliterate it. This would be the alternative, that is, austere way of
generating a Gritias and a Charmides who repeated themselves. They
would now, in this instance, protect modesty and competitiveness by
imagining Socrates to be unique, a freak of nature occurring nowhere
else. They would be able to imagine that Socrates is miraculously
immune from the problem of awkwardness, immune from the effects of
beauty: in a word, superhuman, more god-like than human. If in the
previous instance Socrates had to resist being premature towards his
awkwardness (miscarrying it or aborting it), now he has to resist being
tardy with it, witholding it, becoming fixated on it. That is, he must
transform his awkwardness into work. He must find, through and within
the conversation, the best way of expressing the depth of the problem
of awkwardness, as a feature of the conversation itself. Socrates
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wants to show that the problem of awkwardness is not, on the one hand,
simply "his" problem needing rapid externalization, nor on the other
hand, a problem so intractable that it cannot be articulated or
expressed at all. He needs to display his interest in the problem as
an example of the kind of mediation that the interest in worth needs
in order to make it an intimate of self-expression. He needs to be
neither early nor late, but to respect the untimeliness of awkwardness
as an inner moment of conversation. Socrates needs to remember the
need to transform awkwardness in order to realize its educative possi¬
bilities: in order to recollect its resonances with teaching. Trans¬
forming awkwardness requires an ironic notion of self-expression, or
a sense of the difference between self-expression (irony) and self-
description (literalness). Ironic self-expression makes use of appear¬
ances, whether partial, deceptive, or simply false,as a way of re¬
collecting its Desire to make the interest in what is good appear.
Socrates tells us that "when (Charmides) asked me if I knew the
cure for the headache, I answered, though with an effort, that I did
know" (l55e)• To transform awkwardness is to respect its demands to
bring together philosophy and authority. To refuse this work, through
the temptations of modesty, competitiveness, self-description, or
austerity, is to sever inquiry and rule, to sacrifice one for the
sake of the other: indeed, as we shall be attempting to show, it is
ultimately to sacrifice both for the sake of one, the whole for the
sake of a part. For to concentrate one-sidedly on a part (to forget
the whole) is to distort or weaken even that part itself - by forget¬
ting the need to provide for its place within the whole.
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The one who refuses the work of transforming awkwardness ends
in seeking to eliminate the problem of awkwardness, by forgetting the
nature of the part. He forgets the nature of the part by substituting
his part (modesty, wilfulness, and so on) for the whole - i.e. as a
part that brooks no awkwardness, a part that is self-sufficient. As
a result, he forgets the need to work: the need to be a responsible
part. He forgets the work of continually inquiring and so re-collecting
the place of the part within the whole. For this he substitutes a con¬
cocted wish to make the whole present. The work of transforming
awkwardness, then, is the work of using the part by seeking to make
it a participant within the whole: the refusal of awkwardness is the
dream of by-passing the part altogether in order to recapitulate the
whole. Yet ironically the speech that seeks to re-present the whole,
in its refusal of awkwardness (i.e. in its desire to eliminate awkward¬
ness) has merely elected to elevate one of the parts into the whole.
It is pretentious (pretending that its part - e.g. competitiveness -
is the whole) rather than temperate (acknowledging that its part -
i.e. its need to work to transform awkwardness - is also its need to
re-collect how the part belongs to the whole). Pretentiousness speaks
as if it had no needs: temperance acknowledges its deep need by seek¬
ing to make its work display its need.
The part that is pretending rather than participating suffers
the pain of trying to be what it is not. Socrates, on the other hand,
rather than trying to be what he is not, turns the exigency of appear¬
ing to be other than he is into the enjoyable work of re-collecting
what he is: one whose interest is in participating in the whole by
seeking to re-orient the parts. Socrates seeks to re-collect how the
particular (the cart) needs orienting to the whole as its way of truly
particularizing; itself. Nietzsche writes of justice that "this virtue
never has a pleasing quality; it never charms; it is harsh and strident'.
Yet if the achievement of justice requires temperance we are beginning
to see that it therefore requires a certain charm. Socrates will charm
the parts by relieving them of the pain of pretending to be complete:
he will charm them by showing how they are in lively need.
Socrates will remind the parts of their strong need. After
answering Gharmides with difficulty, Socrates remembers the deep point
of this difficulty by telling Gharmides the story of his (Charmides')
neediness. Since the parts belong within the whole, the cure of Charmides'
headache belongs within the cure of his soul (as one of its parts). "And
the cure of the soul, my dear youth, has to be effected by the use of
certain charms- and these charms are fair words"(157a).The fair words
of inquiry charm the soul by teaching it to enjoy its place (its part,
its participation) in the whole.
2. Gharmides' headache.
Socrates, however, has a competitor for the custody of Gharmides'
soul, one who would turn the well-being of the soul into something one
could compete for: Gritias himself. He replies to the charm of
Socrates by saying:
The headache will be a blessing to my young cousin,
if the pain in his head compels him to improve his
mind: yet I can tell you, Socrates, that Charmides
is not only pre-eminent in beauty among his equals,
but also in that quality for which you say you have
the charm, sophrosyne , is it not? (He continues:)
Let me tell you that he is the most temperate of the
young men of today, and for his age inferior to none
in any quality". (l57c-d)
In contrast to Socrates, who has begun to charm Charmides by reminding
him of his neediness, Gritias inflicts pain on Charmides by speaking
5. Nietzsche, 19^9. p«3&.
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pretentiously of him. He speaks of a Charmides who needs nothing, who
encapsulates the whole. At the present, Gritias is managing to pass
on the pain - of the part pretending to he the whole - to Charmides:
for it is Critias who generates Charmides' headache. Critias gives
Charmides a headache by being boastful rather than charming, preten¬
tious rather than temperate. Instead of re-collecting the nature of
temperance as the work of making the parts truly participate within
the whole - and thus allowing the parts to develop - Critias betrays
temperance by doing the exact opposite: by boasting about it. He
speaks of a supposedly temperate person, Charmides, as if that person
had no needs. As a side point, we can notice how this relieves Critias
of the responsibility of reflecting seriously on how his guardianship
of Charmides ought to minister to the latter's needs. But more deeply,
Critias flies directly in the face of temperance by imagining it to
eliminate, rather than to testify to, neediness. Critias thinks that
his action of educating Charmides aims towards relief from need, both
for himself and Charmides. Critias thinks that the purpose or end of
education is to relieve one from the need to work, the need to transform
essential awkwardness. Critias does not know the true good or end
towards which his action aims. Critias' aim is weak, deflected. He
is having difficulty giving embodiment to the true good or aim of
education as a course of action. At present, his aim, while too weak
to educate Charmides (to make Charmides remember his neediness), is
strong enough to deflect the painful burden of pretention onto Charmides
in the form of the latter's headache. Critias is tempted to think that
as long as he succeeds in this, he is genuinely succeeding. Socrates
must bring home to Critias the unacknowledged weakness of aim that
this disguises. Whereas Socrates must charm Charmides, he must wean
Critias of the false magnanimity of treating the headache as Charmides'
blessing, by bringing him to realize that it is really his pain. Before
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Socrates can "begin to charm or cure Critias, he needs to give Gritias
back his own pain. Socrates needs to give Gritias a pain in the head:
Socrates needs to become a pain for Critias, as the beginning of edu¬
cation, as the beginning of Gritias' quest for real strength of aim.
3- Injustice and the rule of intelligence.
At this point of the dialogue, Gritias thinks he is success¬
fully managing and organizing the interaction. Because he is simply
concerned with the work of appearing in a favourable light, nothing
that has happened so far appears to him to have reflected badly on
him (or on Charmides). So far, Critias feels more complacency than
panic at the prospect of Charmides' conversation with Socrates.Notice
how he prepares the way for this by laying great stress (in the last
speech we quoted) on Charmides' youth: Charmides is, in effect, more
temperate than his peers, very good for his age. Critias formulates
Charmides' peers as his competitors: he is saying to Socrates that
the standard of excellence is competition among peers. The one who
comes out best, on this standard, is for Critias excellent and temper¬
ate per se. On this criterion, Critias has reason enough, no doubt,
to feel confident that Charmides will excel himself. Similarly, Critias
is happy enough, on the basis of what has happened so far, about the
prospective outcome of his- own conversation with Socrates. After all,
he has successfully manipulated Socrates into pretending (to be a
physician). And like the intemperate one who does not properly care
for the whole, he moves from one speech to the next blissfully unaware
of the overall impression his talk makes. If it suits him at one
moment to assert that Charmides is a philosopher and a poet, and at
the next to induce Charmides to talk by pretending to him that Socrates
is a physician, he does both: he affirms both parts without reflecting
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on the kind of whole in which they could possibly belong together^.
In short, Gritias so far is managing to deflect his pain. All
this, however, is soon to change, much to Critias' horror. Socrates'
discussion with Charmides on the nature of temperance takes what is,
to Critias, an unwelcome turn. Charmides, after a few attempts to
say what temperance is, finally says he remembers something he heard
from somebody: that "temperance is doing our own business" (l6lb).
When Socrates rebukes him for simply repeating what Critias, or some
other philosopher, has told him. Critias interjects: "Someone else
then, for certainly I have not"(l6lc). Critias, at the very moment
that Charmides quotes temperance as doing one's own business, realizes
with a shock that he no longer wants Charmides to do his (Critias's)
business. He had imagined that to have alter doing one's work was an
unequivocal blessing, because he imagined that it was an easy matter
to reap the reward. Like the natural star pupil or the deferential
worker, Charmides is easy to exploit: he works diligently and seeks
little for himself. (This helps to explain why Critias tells him that
he needs nothing). How Critias is beginning to realize that he has
been too complacent: because of the youthful innocence of Charmides,
Critias had forgotten the work it takes to reap the benefits of alter's
doing one's business. That is, with Charmides this exploitation has
taken very little effort: so Critias imagined that it was possible
to make others do all the work. Now he is beginning to realize that
this is impossible, that there is always a minimal amount of work to
be done, namely, the work of reaping the benefits, of making the fruits
6. Critias is reminiscent of a story, related by Freud in The Inter¬
pretation of Dreams, of the man who is accused of returning a
borrowed kettle in a damaged condition. He first protests that
he never borrowed it, then that it was damaged anyhow, and finally
that it must have been damaged after he had returned it. Like
the parts of a dream, each part of the speech has the same end:
yet it is a far from temperate reply!
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of alter's work count as ego's business. This is a first step for
Critias. For the first time, he realizes his need to understand him¬
self as needing to work: right now, of course, he wants to minimize
the work needed rather than to do the real work of truly comprehending
the need. For now, he wants to deal with (organize) the problem,
rather than comprehend it, understand it as the comprehensive problem
it is. His model of understanding is still operational!zing rather
than comprehending.
Critias is competing with Socrates in the sense that he imagines
Socrates has joined battle with him for Charmides' soul. He thinks
that if Charmides does not do his business, this will be because he
has begun to do Socrates' business.. Critias's interest in reputation
amounts to the idea that if others are not doing your business (contri¬
buting in their words and actions to your reputation) this is because
they are making you do theirs (using your words and actions to enhance
their own standing). The strongest man is the most persuasive man and
the art of persuasion, for Critias, is the art of effectively construing
and having others construe the words spoken about you in a tellingly
favourable light. Conversation, for Critias, is the negotiation,
between competitors, of these continually generated construals, for the
ultimate prize of reputation. Conversation, then, is the self-centred
interest in appearance: it is the interest in "doing one's own business"
to telling effect in the above sense. So it means something like "doing
oneself a favour", getting one's interlocutors to do one's business.
The competitive ambition of speech, then, is to become the most persua¬
sive one within the conversation, to make everybody else do one's business:
that is, to kill the conversation by becoming the Tyrant.
Unlike Socrates, who is willing to endure the awkwardness of
appearing to be what he is not, Critias is unwilling to acknowledge what
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he is unless this brings him immediate benefit. Critias thinks he can
simply disavow his authorship when the risk that to acknowledge it will
reflect badly on him is too great. He has begun to see that Gharmides
does not really understand any of the definitions he gives of temperance,
including, he suspects, this one. Understanding something, as we have
seen, presently means for Gritias, the ability to organize one's speech
about it in such a way that it is more persuasive than anybody else's,
that it can win any debate, that it can make one's interlocutor do one's
business (by "understanding" it in the same way). Gharmides. of course,
is hopeless at understanding in this sense. The realization is begin¬
ning to dawn horribly on Gritias that this is the necessary outcome of
the way he has been teaching Gharmides. Gritias has been teaching
Gharmides by "persuading" him in the above sense, i.e. by making Charmides
do his business for him: now he is seeing that this in fact renders
Gharmides incapable of understanding (even in the weak sense of organ¬
izing speech around) anything that Critias has told him. Even within
the limits of Critias' own enterprise, it is becoming clear that Charmides,
necessarily - i.e. as a consequence of Gritias' own version of teaching
and understanding - is unqualified to do Gritias' business. Persuading
others to do one's business seems, increasingly, to be impossible.
Yet it would not be enough for Socrates simply to show Gritias
that this is imoossible: i.e. that it is impossible to realize the
ends of tyranny by having everybody else do one's business. As well
as showing its impossibility, Socrates must show its undesirability:
and this means re-collecting both the possibility and the desirability
of the truly good or strong alternative. We shall see that Gritias'
problem is that he is exhausted by the question of possibility and thus
has forgotten the question of desirability. At this point, Critias is
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"beginning to develop some initial sense of the undesirability of having
Charmides do his business for him. But as yet it is weak: it merely
amounts to his sense of growing embarrassment at having to endure the
ineptitude of Charmides, his shock discovery that Charmides is damaging
rather than serving his goal (reputation) with every word he utters.
He does not know yet why it is deeply undesirable to make interlocutors
do our business: he merely thinks that it is undesirable because it is
like trying to do the impossible. He thinks the question of desirability
can be subsumed under that of possibility.
Finally, having been goaded beyond his endurance by Charmides'
manifest lack of understanding, as well as by the intolerable provoca¬
tions of both Socrates and Charmides - that even its author probably did
not understand the definition - Critias can stand no more. He bursts out:
"Do you imagine, Charmides, because you do not
understand the meaning of this definition of
sophrosyne that its author likewise did not under¬
stand the meaning of his own words?" (l62d)
Critias thinks he will resolve the problem through his focus on possi¬
bility, understanding, intelligibility - rather than desirability, worth,
or principle. If it is impossible, in fact, to get others to do one's
business through persuasion (because this method presupposes their weakness,
i.e. their inability when tested to do one's business), maybe it can be done
by enforcing intelligibility as the paradigm of inquiry. Intelligence has,
at this point, made the insight that persuaders cannot really rule, be¬
cause their version of rule depends on weakness. Persuaders at best
can only rule followers, weaklings, unintelligent ones, ones who do
not understand but merely accept. Persuaders rule by turning their
subjects into sheep. Critias decides that intelligence is a stronger
ruler because it can rule without stultifying the ruled: it rules by
inviting those it rules to the exercise of their intellects. The true
ruler is the most intelligent man - the man most qualified for giving
an account of things in terms of their intelligibility, their possi¬
bility, their conditions of existence, and so forth. This ruler is
stronger than the (merely) persuasive one in that he does not have to
rely °n the implied weakness of those he rules. Intelligence, on the
contrary, rules through degrees of strength, for it relies on the
enforcably intelligible fiharacter of things - i.e. on the use of
intelligence by both rulers and ruled. The ruler rules by enforcing
the use of intelligence on others: intelligence rules by bringing its
alters into its fold.
Intelligence is uncomfortable in the presence of those who
differ from itself - the poet, the pleasure-seeker, the lover, or the
true philosopher - because it sees them as unruly. They are unruly in
their visible refusal to orient themselves to the intelligibility of
their actions as the motivating force of those actions. They motivate
themselves by "mysterious" (i.e. unintelligible) things. Intelligence
is uncomfortable with the idea of unintelligibility, which it equates
with mystery, strangeness. Intelligence seeks to rule difference -
including the philosouher, who seeks worth rather than sheer intelli¬
gibility - by demonstrating that its course of action is really depen¬
dent on its prior intelligibility. Whatever poetry, pleasure or philo¬
sophy might subsequently turn out to be, for the intelligent critic
they depend first on the possibility of being made intelligible. The
intelligent critic will seek to show how everything is fundamentally
governed by its possibility, its plausibility, its rules of reproduc¬
tion. The intelligent critic will seek to rule even the ohilosopher.
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Intelligence is motivating Critias' talk. His talk will seek
to vindicate intelligence rather than persuasion. He will seek to
enforce Socrates' agreement that intelligence ought to rule: that is,
he will seek to rule Socrates, which for him means, make Socrates do
his work. In this situation it might be tempting for Socrates to shut
Gritias up, for a number of reasons. It would prevent Critias from
imposing himself on his listeners. And since, in the interaction
between the two cousins, Critias has clearly been doing the talking
and Charmides the listening, would it not do them both good to have
the roles reversed? Critias could learn by listening for a change,
and Charmides could learn by talking for a change. Critias could dis¬
cover others and Charmides could discover himself.
In the face of Critian criticism, Socrates has to resist the
temptation of Charmidean humanism. Socrates must resist the univer-
salistic, sheerly sympathetic, impulse to let Charmides speak and shut
Critias out, to hear Charmides' grievances against the garrulous critic
who had silenced him. Socrates has to resist this because it is not
for the best. The best thing is not mere "free speech", but that
Charmides and Critias begin to ask about the strong alternative to
tyranny: in other words, that they begin to inquire in a self-reflective
way. By taking up this interest, we can see the good reasons why
Socrates should switch the conversation to Critias, as he does by saying:
"Why at his age, most excellent Critias, he can
hardly be expected to understand; but you, who
are older, and have studied, may well be assumed
to know the meaning of (these words); and therefore,
if you agree, and accept his definition of temperance,
I would much rather argue with you than with him
about the truth or falsehood of the definition"(l62d-e)
The problem is not that Critias talks too much and that Charmides
listens too much. Bather, Critias does not talk well, and Charmides
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does not listen well. They talk and listen too much because they do
not know what talking or listening really demand in order to be done
well. Socrates needs to re-orient Gritias and Charmides to the good
of talking and the good of listening as parts within the whole conver¬
sation. At this point, Gharmides needs to listen, because he has dis¬
covered the possibility that Gritias does not really understand what
he is saying. Gharmides needs to listen in a way that he has never
listened before, that is, he has to listen in a way that gives consider¬
ation to the problem of understanding. Deeply, Gharmides needs to learn
the importance of the understanding, not as the whole, but as having a
part to play within the whole - rather than suffering the headache of
pretending to understand the whole. And at this point, Critias needs
to talk, because he has discovered the problem of making others do one's
business. Critias needs to talk in a way that he has never talked
before, that is he has to talk in a way that gives consideration to
the problem of doing one's own business. Deeply, Critias needs to
learn the enjoyment of doing one's own business, rather than suffering
the headache of always seeking the most efficient means of getting
everybody else to do it. Gharmides as we shall see needs to become
just in order to understand: Gritias needs to become temperate in order
to do his own business.
Socrates needs to re-collect for Critias the work of conversation.
Socrates needs to engage in the conversation that is community-oriented
rather than critical or humanistic. The humanist conversation is not
dialectical in that it is centred around the notion of self-determina¬
tion or self-description. The speaker is not responsible for anything
that has already been said by others, hence he can begin afresh all over
again. The speaker is "free" in that he is free to ignore whatever he
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chooses to ignore. In this way his speech shows his independence,
his freedom from the "oppression of influence", his ability to think
for himself and make all his own decisions. Humanist speech is fear¬
ful of real community because the latter requires the decisiveness of
the rule of the best: humanism wants to say that every voice is valid
in its own way in order to incorporate it into a flaccid community
without awkwardness. Humanist speech lacks development or consequence,
determination or accountability, because it wants the worst as well
as the best to be self-governing. Humanist speech would have Charmides
tediously describe himself without accountability to Gritias or influence
by him, yet without accountability to worth or influenee by it.
Having resisted humanism, Socrates must also avoid mere intel¬
ligibility. Critical speech is syllogistic: it knows how to develop,
but only logically. It forgets to keep alive the question of the good
of its development. Like the mathematician, it enjoys sheer conclusive¬
ness for its own sake. The conclusion is the external "good" towards
which the syllogism/conversation moves: once achieved, the conclusion
renders the preceding conversation redundant, no longer necessary,
external. Merely intelligent conversation follows the rule of "one at
7
a time" leading up to a "closing" or a conclusion. Intelligence sees
this everywhere, even in conversations that do not understand their own
intelligibility. Intelligence's version of justice, then is taking
turns, allocating a scarce resource (time): giving everyone the
opportunity to be the most intelligent. Intelligence is meritocracy,
the competition of talent, the rule of brains or disembodied minds.
Its community is the community of competitors, who do things "one at
a time", on their own, rather than together. Even when they look like
they are doing something together (e.g.conversing) they are really doing
it "one at a time".
7. See the work of K.Sacks and E.Schegloff for this usage, for example
"Opening Up Closings"in R.Turner ed. 1974.
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If intelligence is a weak version of justice, it nevertheless
is an attempted embodiment of the interest in justice. Intelligence
is a course of action oriented towards justice as its end. For example,
consider here the legalistic or bureaucratic version of justice. The
legal document, the legislative instrument, and so on, embody competent
and unambiguous instances of the Desire for justice. Somehow, then,
Critias' interest in intelligence and necessity is a (deflected) inter¬
est in justice. What is it that provides for a kinship between intelli¬
gence and justice?
Essentially, the kinship resides in a quality Critias has in
great measure. We have already seen his willingness to interfere and
meddle in situations: and we shall see more of it. Justice seems to
be born of, and even to require, this willingness to interfere. Justice
must not leave things as they are: it must intervene, put things right,
change situations. Justice rectifies: it is a very active and vigorous
virtue by nature. In this sense, it is the very opposite of temperance.
To say that justice is born of a willingness to interfere or meddle is
to say that it is born of a kind of intemperance. Unless the initial
(meddlesome) Desire for justice works to overcome its intemperance, it
develops into competence or intelligibility, legalism or exegesis, rather
than genuine justice.
Socrates rules justly by being answerable in his talk for the
good of the community as a whole. This requires temperance because
Socrates must seek to do what he needs to do in such a way that this
is the best thing not only for himself but for everybody. That is,
Socrates must develop the interest in rulership rather than merely
interfere. So in selecting Ci-itias rather than Charmides as the next
speaker Socrates is not giving Critias his turn, or allocating Critias
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his fair opportunity, or forgetting about Charmid.es for now in order
to think instead of Critias. Rather, he is doing what is best for both
Charmides and Critias as well as himself. Charmides can learn to lis¬
ten, Critias can learn to speak: Socrates is learning to rule.
Socrates has asked Critias (see page 122 above) if he is
willing to accept the definition of temperance as "doing one's own
business". When Critias agrees to accept it, Socrates' reply is a
brief little comment, "very good", before continuing with a question.
There is satisfaction in the remark, but also brevity. This is because
something has been achieved, but what has been achieved is only a be¬
ginning. What has been achieved is the space to begin working. In
getting Critias to accent the responsibility for the definition, to
make it analytically "his", Socrates can do the work of making Critias
answerable to his talk, i.e. he can make Critias do his own business.
Critias thinks that his own business is to rule by getting others to
do his business. Right now, that is, Critias does not know what his
business is. Nor does he know what ruling is. He thinks that ruling
is getting others to do your work: he does not know that ruling is
doing your own work in the way that promotes what is best for every¬
body. Ruling needs a strong sense, in any given situation, of what
is best for everybody. Socrates is showing that he has the temperance
required to rule Charmides and Critias by expressing what is best for
them. Critias, however, thinks he is a ruler but is not a ruler: even
of himself, for he does not know what is best for himself ( he does
not know his own business). The work of the conversation, then, is to
convince Critias that it is more advantageous to him to reflect on and
discover what his business is rather than in ruling unwisely (imagining
he can rule by getting others to do his business). To put this another
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ways Socrates must make Critias reflect on the nature of temperance
(self-mastery or rulership) and the need justice has for temperance
rather than presuppose that intelligence and justice are the same.
Socrates must converse with Gritias, work with him, without
being cajoled by him into doing his business. Critias will try to
rule Socrates by making him speak about intelligibility and possibility
to the exclusion of desirability. It will help us to get the measure
of the problem if we anticipate a remark Socrates makes about Gritias'
commitment to intelligibility. Critias has got into difficulty with
the questions Socrates has been raising. Socrates tells us that as
Critias
"had a reputation to maintain, he was ashamed
to admit before the company that he could not
answer my challenge or determine the question
at issue; and he made an unintelligible attempt
to hide his perplexity" (l69c-d).
Critias, who wants sheer intelligibility to rule, becomes unintelligible.
We recall that Critias was motivated to re-enter the conversation by
intelligence i.e. by the desire, in the face of Charmides' problems with
understanding, to make intelligence rather than persuasion rule. We must
ask: why does the one who is ruled by intellect - Critias - become un¬
intelligible?
Sheer intelligence seeks to rule (i.e. seeks justice) through
abstraction. Intelligence interferes in everything by abstracting
from everything that is external to itself. It turns everything into
an instance of itself (i.e. an intelligible phenomenon) by ignoring
everything else about the thing. That is, it abstracts from the thing's
force: from the idea that the thing could be a potential force for
good. It abstracts from the spirit that seeks to replenish the good
of our resources, that seeks the enjoyment of re-collecting source in
our speech. Intelligence abstracts from the spirited integration of
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soul and "body and instead treats disembodied mind as the whole. So
mind segregates itself, severs itself from its inheritance (our re¬
sources) , and become tangential to the whole rather than an oriented
participant in the whole. Yet mind is needed by the whole as one of
its lively parts. The deep speaker needs to speak understandingly:
that is, not merely intelligently, but - with comprehension. This
elaborates the ideal speaker's desire to particularize that we shall
consider in Chapter 5 • The ideal speaker is interested in the liveli¬
ness of the parts: this requires not intelligence, but comprehension.
Justice requires comprehensive understanding, the vision of
the part's true end or excellence within the comprehensive whole. We
call this comprehension in order to remind ourselves that it preserves
understanding: i.e. it does not dissolve the part into the whole (as
if the whole could be re-presented intuitively to the mind) but rather
re-animates the oart by giving it the vision it needs to truly partici¬
pate. Comprehension will use the vision of understanding not for the
celebration of intelligibility, claritas, but for the work of giving
to the part its sense of its true aim or orientation. To comprehend
the part is to re-orient it to the comprehensive: to transform it into
another occasion on which we re-achieve the enjoyment of belonging to
the whole. In comprehension we give understanding its place, and this
is both an example of, and a decisive contribution to, enjoyably be¬
friending the "all is one". The mystic mistrusts intelligence because
he has seen instances of its pretentiousness, its didacticism, its
abstraction. Yet the mystic forgets the good of comprehensive under¬
standing, hidden within its discursiveness, its sequential character,
its temptation to become syllogistic. Deeply all of these excesses
cover over (at their roots) a willingness to dwell upon and develop
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the part: that is, they conceal the Desire for justice. If the Cri-
tian elevation of intelligence to rulershio is an instance of forget¬
ting to limit the place of the part the mystic rejection of compre¬
hension in the name of "direct awareness" of the whole forgets to preserve
or develop the place of the part. Mysticism orients to the temptation
(or excess) rather than the good of comprehension. The good of com¬
prehension is to develop rather than by-pass the part: its tempta¬
tion is to imagine that its vision is perspicuous, complete, all-
objectifying. Sheer intelligence imagines that it encapsulates the
whole (rather than exercise responsibility toward the whole); that
it dissolves practice within an ostensive unity of practice and theory
(rather than seek to practice this unity within ideal speaking). Sheer
intelligence dissolves particularity within itself - rather than, as
comprehension or transformed intelligence does, seeking to exercise
both the respect and the violence of re-animating the part. Sheer
intelligence forgets what comprehension's vision is for.
Because sheer intelligence forgets particularity - that is,
because it is more wrapped up in its own universal perspicuity - it
becomes tenuous, tangential, incomprehensible. Its speech "covers"
everything but reveals or relates to nothing. Its speech seems to
3
hover above everything . Sheer intelligence externalizes itself from
what it talks about: in this externalization, abstraction, objectivity,
and value-freedom have their common understanding. Sheer intelligence
does not acknowledge how it deeply belongs to the community (of parts
and usages) it gathers. It treats its speech as constitutive rather
9
than re-animating convention, re-convening spirit .
8. Recall how Aristophanes in The Clouds portrayed Socrates as
hovering in a basket. We read Aristophanes (and Kierkegaard)
as reflecting on the excess of s'neer intelligence.
9. Karatheodoris (1979) recollects strongly the notion of speaking
as assembling, convening, answering to Logos. This is the very
thing that hovering, detachment, and so on, forget.
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As a way of instancing this, we will summerize the long speech
Gritias makes as his expication of "doing our own business" (l63a-c).
First, he draws a distinction between "making" and "doing" in order
to insist that he really meant that those who "do" their own business
are temperate. Asked by Socrates to justify the distinction, he uses
a line from Hesiod, "work is no disgrace", to say that "working and
doing" refers to things nobly and usefully done, and is therefore
never a disgrace, whereas "making" refers to mundane activities, some¬
times disgraceful or dishonourable. So those who "make" the business
of others (e.g. make their shoes) may be temperate - though, presumably,
not because of this activity. Critias, in the course of this rambling
piece of verbal juggling, has simply switched the focus from "one's
own business" onto the word "doing". He is trying to evade doing his
own work by glossing some obscure semantic distinction between "doing"
and "making". This instances graphically the use of terminology,
technical distinctions, and so on, to which intelligence is prone in
its evasion of depth or worth. Rather than explicate the ideas of
nobility and honour that he uses to gloss "doing", Critias focusses
instead on the distinction between "doing" (things nobly done) and
"making" (things merely done). Gritias does not understand the point
of making a distinction - as an important first step, to be sure, in
the work of explications instead he substitutes distinguishing for
explicating, with the result that he ends up with terminology. When¬
ever talk or writing seems terminological, we should ask: what kind
of reflection is it leaving out? What work is it not doing?
Making terminological distinctions is being meddlesome with the
Logos rather than participating in it: trying to use the Logos to do
one's private business,rather than genuinely doing one's own business
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by remembering how it belongs to the Logos. Terminological distinc¬
tion blurs genuine distinction (the unfolding of Logos) and the work
it calls us to. Take Critias: he, has moved words around in such a
way as to dissipate the force of the distinction between noble and
ignoble into the much weaker one between doing and making. The usage
of "doing and making" covers (over), abstracts from, the nature of
what is noble by glossing it, presupposing it. Technical speech is
a case of distorted priorities: the more important being obscured,
pushed out of sight, by the less important. Terminology forgets that
the point of dividing is always to re-collect again, as we saw Socrates
doing earlier, i.e. that division (between one part and another) ought
to remember its auspices: the unity of the whole. We need divisions,
parts, and differences as our topics: yet precisely as necessary
ways of being strongly oriented to the whole. Hence the divisions
and parts we need must seek to be just: that is, strongly bespeaking
a vision of their place within the whole, revealing rather than evading,
resonating rather than being technical, fertilizing rather than being
neologistic. The parts must be partial towards the whole rather towards
themselves: centred rather than dispersed. The parts must do their
own particular work. In order to achieve justice (do their own parti¬
cular work) they need to be temperate (oriented towards the whole rather
than themselves).
Gritias wants intelligibility without a notion of desirability:
hence he wants distinctions without asking what their point is, what
they are good for. He imagines that justice is possible without temper¬
ance. Although terminological talk can sound collected, it is at most
neat and schematic: deeoly, it is dispersed, for it does not re-gather
the Logos, it does not seek to show how its own interest is internal
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to the Logos that gathers it. Gathered, it does not gather in response:
merely intelligible, it does not do the work of showing desirability.
That is, it does not work to show the desirability of being gathered
in the whole.
4. Justice's need for Desire
Earlier we said that Critias' problem is that he is exhausted
by the question of possibility and thus has forgotten the question of
desirability. We have seen that in Critias lie the seeds of justice:
yet because he does not confront and transform the meddlesome impulse
associated with these seeds, they have been growing into something
other than true justice, that is, into competence or the interest in
intelligence. Critias, instead of doing justice to a notion (e.g. the
notion of temperance) seeks to define it, that is, to stipulate what
it is in the manner of legal stipulation. "Sophrosyne I define in
plain words", he says, "to be the doing of good actions" (l63e).
Critias' style of argument is modelled on that of the lawyer who
engages in a debate in which to make a point is to s^ore a point. When
refuted by Socrates on his definition, he suddenly switches to a new
definition unconnected with the previous one. He tells Socrates:
"My object is to leave the previous discussion
(in which I know not whether you or I are more
right, but, at any rate, no clear result was
attained), and to raise a new one in which I
will attempt to prove, if you deny it, that
sophrosyne is self-knowledge" (i65a-b).
Critias wants to cancel the earlier discussion because as he conceives
it, he lost a point: he "will not be ashamed to acknowledge that (he)
made a mistake" (15^)' because in this way he will cut his losses.
Thus we see that Critias' interest in competence and intelligibility
resonates with a basic instrumentalism in him.
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Justice is intimately related to making visible, giving shaoe,
giving recognizable and tangible form^. To do justice to self or
other requires objectification, for in the absence of this, there is
no basis for evaluation. The interest in objectification lends itself
to justice whereas vagueness or hiddenness makes the practice of
judgement impossible. So we can say that objectification is oriented,
at least implicitly, to the Desire for justice, whereas th'e oracular
or the mystical is indifferent to justice^. The speaker who begins
with a disposition to objectify seems to have a certain incipient
Desire for justice. The problem is that this disnosition tends to
begin in intemperance, that is. as a kind of meddlesomeness, a desire
to be definitive: in short, an interest in "how things look" which
has not yet gone beyond an interest in reputation. Academics, critics,
and Gritias, all think that what will make or break them is their
reputation. Since their business is objectifying and giving defini¬
tive shane to recalcitrant matters, they know only too well that they
too are objectified and given definitive shape. To orient to a repu¬
tation is to treat oneself as recalcitrant - i.e. subject to definition
and intelligibility.
Socrates' aim in his conversation with Gritias is to temoer
his embryonic Desire for justice so that it can begin to mature itself.
As we shall see, Critias needs to particularize by learning to objectify
what is worthy or valuable. At this moment, his tendency, as we have
seen, is to overlook worth in favour of terminology. His nascent
justice is turning into exegesis rather than genuine objectification.
10. In Chanter Four, we shall strengthen this into the notion of
marticularizing, and seek to show the temperance of particulari-
zation. See also the account of Garfinkel and his desire to
"make commonplace scenes visible". Garfinkel will emerge as a
modern version of the Critian interest in justice as competence
and intelligence.
11. In our final chanter, we shall see (through the example of Gharmides)
how it actually courts injustice.
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Socrates will seek to introduce him to what is desirable rather than
merely possible or intelligible.
To say that Gritias needs to invite Desire into his talk is not
to say that his speech merely lacks Desire altogether. Rather, Desire
is transformed into wish or volition: it becomes the desire for repu¬
tation and recognition. We recall Gritias' boastful pride in Charmides,
who is "of the same house" as himself. Desire in Gritias* discourse
(the discourse of competence) can only live the transfigured life of
the desire for self-aggrandizement. The reason for this development,
or the basis for its occurrence, begins to emerge now in Critias'
notion of temperance. Sophrosyne, he says "(is alone) a science of
other sciences and of itself"(l66c). Now this resonates perfectly with
his interest in competence and definitiveness. A definition, in the
Critian sense, provides its own standards: it does not rely on anything
outside itself. To define is to stipulate: for example, the existen¬
tialist says we must define the meaning of our lives, by which he means
we must stipulate its meaning by providing the standards on which it
is based. To provide the standards is to set them down: notice the
legalistic resonances again here. For Critias, sophrosyne is the only
science that provides its own standards, because it knows itself and
requires nothing outside itself. Gritias' Desire turns into a desire
for itself (rather than a Desire for the good or excellent) because
he will not acknowledge anything except the self. He will not acknow¬
ledge sophrosyne's need (or Desire) for a standard. He collapses
sophrosyne's Desire into itself.
To begin the education of Gritias' Desire, to draw him from
the intemperance of sheer meddling, will require the turning of this
Desire away from itself towards what it is for, towards its standard
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or good. Socrates begins to address this when he says to Critias,
about various sciences, that "I can show you that each of these sciences
has a subject which is different from the science"(l66a). For examole,
the science of computation takes its standard, not from itself, but
from the nature of all the various numbers with which it deals. The
study of politics, Socrates might have said, takes its standard,not
from itself, but from the nature of the polis itself. Socrates is
telling Critias that knowledge is not merely a matter of definition
or invention, but is somehow an act of self-transcendence. The knower
must achieve his unity with the known by going beyond what is immediate
to him (his self-identity), rather than merely assuming his unity, or
(as in Critias' case), defining or stipulating it. Knowledge requires
us to dwell with our object rather than uproot it: that is, it requires
temperance. It requires us to develop our Desire to meet its standard.
Critias needs to let go of himself so as to allow himself to inquire.
Letting go of himself means: loosening his hold on his own definition
of himself. How can Socrates introduce Critias to the temperance he
needs?
In the dialogue, Socrates takes the risk of seeming to indulge
Critias. He contends with Critias, debates with him, becomes immersed
in the problems associated with the notion of a science of science. He
risks - perhaps intemperately - getting caught in the whirlpool of
Critian abstractions. Worse still, he indulges Critias by conceding
arguments to him for the sake of discussion. "Let us assume", he says,
"that this science of science is possible" (l69d). He gives Critias
his head, and in effect, fills his sails for him. Is this not the exact
opposite of what is required? Why encourage Critias when it seems that
this must make him more intemperate?
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Instead, of only resisting Gritias, and inviting only his resis¬
tance in return, Socrates also risks indulging him - in order to invite
him to experience his Desire for justice as requiring a standard.
Socrates "concedes" the question of possibility to Critias (" let us
assume that this science of science is possible") in order to have
Critias confront the question: is sheer possibility truly Desirable?
Having granted the assumption to Critias, Socrates questions the
desirability of the "science of science". To Critias, this question
has never occurred before. Competence or intelligence is automatically
desirable to Critias: the only issue for him, up to this point, is
whether it is possible. Critias, then, is amazed at Socrates' ques¬
tion, and at Socrates for raising the question. "How very strange"
(l72e), he exclaims on hearing it. This is a new departure for Critias.
For the first time, Critias is provoked to reflection by some¬
thing strange and enigmatic. Socrates can explain and develop what
he means, yet Critias has no idea what it will be. That is, although
Socrates is not being oracular (and hence indifferent to justice),
Critias is unable to anticipate what Socrates will say. Critias is
unable to deal competently with the situation by being intelligent:
this challenges him to re-consider his notions of knowledge and under¬
standing. Critias realizes that knowledge and understanding are use¬
less without Desire.
When Socrates agrees that the "science of science" is a strange
notion of dubious value, Critias at last allows his Desire to voice
itself. He asks: "What do you mean? I wish that you could make me
understand what you mean" (l73a). Critias comes to grasp his need
for education: he comes to see that intelligence per se is not self-
sufficient. He realizes that, in the words of Homer quoted by Socrates,
13?
he is a "needy man". He must learn to Desire what he truly needs.
Sheer possibility resonates with supreme competence or efficiency.
If the science of science is possible, and is actually given sway over
us, Socrates says, "then each action will be done according to the
arts and sciences" (l?3a)» Mankind will live according to knowledge:
"Our health will be improved; our safety at
sea, and also in battle, will be assured; our
coats and shoes and all other instruments and
implements will be skilfully made" (l?3b-c).
Society will be efficiently organized and intelligence will rule. Yet
none of this will in the least ensure that "we shall act well and be
happy" (173d). All of the competence and efficiency in the world
leaves untouched the question of the desirability of such a life.
In one sense, such a society would be just. Perfect exegesis
would have been realized: clarity of definition, total specification
of meaning and complete removal of equivocation, would have been brought
about. The goal of Wittgenstein's Tractatus would have been achieved.
As a result, the disagreement among men so feared by Hobbes, and diag¬
nosed by him as having its source in the ambiguity of our concepts,
would disappear. The liberal goal of distributive justice and ascrip¬
tion on merit would be attained.
The persuasiveness of the exegetic version of justice is beau¬
tifully illustrated in O'Casey's play, The Shadow of a Gunman. Davoren
is thought by everybody to be a gunman in hiding, with a great deal of
influence in the I.R.A. A small delegation visits him in order to
present him with a letter written by one of its number - a letter




"I wish to call your attention to the persecution
me and my family has to put up with in respect of
and appertaining to the residents of the back
drawing-room of the house known as fifty-five,
Saint Teresa Street, situate in the Parish of
St. Thomas, in the Borough and City of Dublin.
This persecution started eighteen months ago -
or to be precise - on the tenth day of the sixth
month, in the year nineteen hundred and twenty"." 12
In order to put his case, the author feels it necessary to copy
the style of the legal document. The letter is full of bureaucratic
turns of phrase. What makes it ridiculous, of course, is the incon¬
gruity of this style with the triviality of the matter and the humble
rank of its author. Yet the ridiculous character of Gallogher is
precisely the opposite of Critias' ludicrousness. What they share is
a notion of justice as intelligence or exegesis. Yet Gallogher is
incapable of carrying it off because he does not genuinely subscribe
to it (though he imagines that he does and presents himself accordingly).
In his humble simplicity, he is naive but not pretentious. The absurd
competence of his letter is simply, for him, a format for the expres¬
sion of its real subject matter. That he chooses this format shows
us that his problem is that he takes the Critian project seriously.
Critias' problem, on the other hand, is that he does not take Gallagher's
Desire for justice, obscured as it is in its ridiculous and ill-fitting
pedanticism, seriously enough. Critias is ludicrous, not, as Gallogher
is, for failing absurdly (and likably) at being exegetic, but in the
far deeper sense of imagining that exegesis is self-sufficient.
Critias' request that Socrates teach him is made possible by his
realization that, although, in the eyes of some, he may be able to carry
off a display of competence, he has not achieved genuine self-mastery.
12. C'Casey, 1957- P-98.
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That this is so had, in fact, surfaced earlier in his display of anger
at Charraides. Socrates tells us that when Charmides went on pointing
out that Critias had been refuted,
"Critias grew angry, and appeared,as I
thought, inclined to quarrel with him; just
as a poet might quarrel with an actor who
spoiled his poems in reciting them" (l62d).
We can see here that Critias' anger is not so much a genuine Desire
for justice as an instance of the attachment to self and self's off¬
spring. Critias' anger is more like rage. Rather than exemplifying
self-mastery, it simply asserts his competence. To teach Critias, we
need to provide a notion of the desirability of self-mastery, as being
more valuable than the sheer intelligence of competence.
In his commitment to intelligence, Critias is certainly resour¬
ceful. He artfully uses the skills of argument to generate offspring
and make himself visible. He might reply to us at this point by say¬
ing, in his sardonic way: what, are you about to strip me of my re¬
sources and leave me with nothing but a barren Desire? Am I simply
to renounce all of my talent and all of my artfulness? If we are to
convince Critias, we will need to provide him with a notion of resour¬
cefulness: the resourcefulness of Desire rather than competence. What





1. Justice's need for spirit.
With Socrates, Kierkegaard remarks, "the outer and the inner
did not form a harmonious unity". "What Socrates said meant something
'other'", hence, "not even his contemporaries could grasp him in his
immediacy".^ Kierkegaard's anger towards Socrates is thus a demand
for immediacy, or that the external and the internal form a "harmoni¬
ous unity". How this is an observational version of unity: it seeks
the co-incidence of what "appears" and what is "real" as if the former
were "the visible" and the latter "the invisible". Reality, in this
observer's Utopia, would become immediate because it would become
directly apparent (visible). However, we can deepen the notion of
immediacy here by re-formulating anger as the demand that the orien¬
tation of principle be made into something immediate. Strongly, anger
wants the speaker's interest in value to be expressive of him, some¬
thing he embodies, affirms, and develops. This recalls us to the
analysis of the interest in self-expression in the previous chapter.
Anger as the Desire for justice requires temperance: that is, genuine
self-expression, or immediacy oriented to worth. It is the nature of
this quality of temperance that we must now pursue, using as our
example the immediacy of anger. We shall ask: how can anger moderate
and educate its desire for immediacy?
Earlier, we said that anger is the demand for trust: anger is
the passion that allows us to give voice in the face of what could
silence the human voice altogether, namely the betrayal of trust. The
worst betrayal here would not be of interactional trust between concrete
TT Kierkegaard, 1968, p.50.
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individuals, but of the trust in speech, reason, logos itself as
discourse, that permits oriented courses of action and interaction
to take place. Kow this enables us to say: the particular value
towards which anger (strongly) is oriented is the value of friendship.
Anger is grounded in the Desire to befriend conditions. The befriend¬
ing of conditions requires the trust that they will not consume us,
and anger we now grasp as our immediate response to the betrayal of
2
this trust.
Our inquiry seeks now to deliver anger of its promise by inducing
its best. All of the foregoing has referenced anger's need to express
its best: its desire to achieve conviction, to find a character for
itself, to find what truly compels it. In short, anger must realize
its Desire for justice by educating itself into temperance. In order
to become convinced of its commitment to worth (suggested in the notion
of the demand for trust) anger needs to speak it, to give its account,
to give it a life, a vision and a visibility. Anger needs to become
positive, to find its compelling usage through which it can realize
its strength of character, so that it can take its place as truly be¬
longing within a commitment to the life of value. Our present need,
then, is to inquire into the life of trust. We develop our grasp of
the point of anger (its demand for trust) by inquiring into the strength
of trust. We ask: why is trust strongly required?
Let's consider once again the notion of anger's struggle against
the betrayal of trust. The speaker who betrays a trust denies what has
been entrusted to him. He misuses it, that is, he uses it for purposes
that fail to live up to or do credit to its best ends. This can reson¬
ate with examples of individuals who abuse things that others concretely
2. Whereas anger sustains trust, rage and remorse are instances of its
betrayal.
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have given to them, but also, and more deeply, it makes reference to
the speaker who betrays his resources in language and tradition.
The speaker who is in touch with resource seeks to live up to
it as something with which he has been entrusted, not by this or that
man, but by the source itself in its desire to find self-expression.
The source itself desires to maintain and strengthen the contact
(mediation) between speech and source. When resource imagines that
the source needs it, it loves its work, because now its work gives
source its means of influencing the practice and pursuit of social
courses of action. The work of resource becomes available to itself
as a strong requirement. So the ideal speaker trusts resource by
furthering the work it loves through his talk and activities. He
does this by articulating the work of resource as the work of sustain¬
ing its contact with its true need. Resource deeply needs to re¬
collect source: it must satisfy this need in speech, by endowing
speech with its gift, since speech is the practice, modus vivendi, or
vehicle of expression through which man's essential capacity for re¬
membering his source (i.e. the source of all) is enacted. Resource
enables speech to enact the capacity to re-collect source.
Speakers are perennially tempted to allow themselves to be
distracted by their "own" resourcefulness. An instance of resource
is, of course, mastery of anger. Mastery is the resource that enables
anger to overcome the extremes of rage and remorse. Anger's struggle
with trust, then, is not simply an external matter - a struggle simply
in the face of conditions, circumstances, or chance challenges - but
is essentially and necessarily internal to its character, and its
work of living up to its character. The question of trust is anger's
fate because it is the question around which anger must orient so as
143
to live up to its fate. Trust is integral to anger because in order
to become part of the just speech it has to itself live up to the
resource that is essentially entrusted to it: self-mastery.
When anger pursues this work, submits itself to what it needs.
it thereby schools or prepares itself for integration within the speech
that is oriented to value. Anger becomes a demand for trust by edu¬
cating itself to be a display of trust, that is, to display the capa¬
city to use the resource of mastery for the sake of the end or value
for which it is fitted. Anger's work is to make mastery answer to
its need, as anger's resource, to develop the speaker's collectedness
with the source of his speech.
The joy of resource is its particularization of our indebted¬
ness to language, its shaping and building work of making this re¬
collection speakable and thus sustainable, capable of being given and
received, shaped and enjoyed. Resource, through its activity of
forming and building gives the speaker a home to live in within the
world of conditions. Resource particularizes the interest in ends,
or value, and so gives that interest a place within the multis of
interests, concerns and pursuits with which it cohabits and the source
of which it seeks to re-collect.
Mastery of anger particularizes in one way the essential con¬
cern speech has for the problem of value. In the absence of particu¬
larization, such "essential concern" remains unconvincing, difficult
to show or make compelling for an auditor. Objections against the
idea of the "essential concern" would succeed in confusing and silen¬
cing the theorist, since he would be unable to bring any passion to
bear on the issue of what is compelling about the "essential concern".
lM
Particularization is not intended here as a mere device for agreement,
since it never guarantees the winning over of the sceptic to the idea
of "essential concern.". Rather, particularization gives the theorist
a way of developing his committed character, his passionate interest,
instead of simply being faithful in an abstract way to "what is essen¬
tial" . It enables him to live up to the demand of source by giving
voice to that demand. Since the "essential concern" can only shine
through the particular usage, instance, or practice, the task for
inquiry is to particularize itself so as to enable this to take place.
Where sheer concreteness simply amasses detail, fact, or observation,
thus stultifying inquiry, the opposite (the sheer "essential concern")
turns out to be equally fatal for the conversation.
Mastery of anger particularizes speech's essential concern
for worth by serving as the resource through which this essential con¬
cern re-establishes itself within speech, i.e. as a concern that actually
speaks. Anger, we said, is the integration of force and potential. On
the one hand, potential without force, i.e. remorse, resonates with the
absence of particularization which segregates the "essential concern"
from the life and passion of speech. Remorse is unable to use the
"essential concern" to distinguish what needs to be said from what doesn't,
what is worth saying from what isn't - that is, to value or give dis¬
tinction to conversation. It is incapable of using or realizing value.
This shows us the remorseful character of negative irony: for it is an
irony that empties out all positive, substantive, content (i.e. all
particularity) and posits an absolute, or an idea, determined only
negatively or by implication. On the other hand force without potential,
i.e. rage, suggests the notion of sheer multiplicity of usage, or the
enforcability of convention. Rage, sheer rule of physiology or many-
1^5
ness, forgets value: the only possible values are those imposed sub¬
sequently by the will (over self) or the tyrant (over the community).
Now it is emerging that the negative ironist has a way of orien¬
ting to particularity that is peculiar to, and very characteristic of,
him. He will take any topic - without feeling compelled by it - and,
for reasons that are intimately connected with this, will tend to exa¬
mine and delineate the value or worth it is capable of by limiting it
3
m terms of its excesses . Because the negative ironist does not find
his topic compelling, i.e. does not develop a sense of character through
it, he finds it difficult to make positive formulations, but instead
tends to identify the phenomenon in terms of its outer limits. Simmel,
in an essay entitled "Sociability", sets out the challenge for us. He
initially discusses the limits of his phenomenon. He says, "One can...
speak of an upper and lower sociability threshold for the individual".
What these thresholds are need not concern us here. Then he goes on
to say:
"From this negative definition of the nature
of sociability through boundaries and thres¬
holds, however, one can perhaps find the
positive motif". k
For Simmel, to talk of a phenomenon through its limits is to characterize
it negatively; and in this sense of limits, as "boundaries and thresholds",
he is right. For Simmel, an interest in a phenomenon's limit is a negative
interest,a reserved speech that does not say anything positive on its own
account. Given this conception, the problem would be, how does the
theorist move on to develop a positive interest? Neither Simmel nor
Kierkegaard can grasp how this movement can be made. For Simmel, out
3. An example would help here. Take the notion of style: in inquiring
after a good or strong version of style, the negative ironist might
say, "sheer style is merely oriented to appearance, whereas the
absence of style is indifferent about appearance, i.e. terse and
unconversational. So the value of style lies in the mean or mea¬
sure between these two excesses". If nothing more were said, this
would simply be what Kierkegaard would call a "negative determination."
4. Simmel, 1971, p.132.
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of the negative definition, "one can perhaps find the positive motif".
Thus, while he is prepared to acknowledge some kind of movement of
questioning, in the absence of any further work, the nature of this
movement is of course left hopelessly vague. Kierkegaard, on the
other hand, is unwilling to acknowledge that any such movement is
possible at all. Commenting on the difference between Book One of the
Republic and the subsequent books of the same work, he insists that
between the former and the latter there is a total break:. The subse¬
quent books do not really develop Book One, but rather, what
"must not be lost sight of" is "the great
difference between the first book and those
that follow, the fact that the second book
begins all over again, begins from the
beginning". 5
We could ask Kierkegaard to consider a number of factors that
suggest an alternative reading. For example, why does Plato write a
single dialogue called the Republic, if Book Two is really a new begin¬
ning? Clearly he means to suggest a unity underlying the various dif¬
ferences. Again, even though a new beginning is suggested through the
replacement of Thrasymachos by Glaucon and Adeimantos, and by Socrates'
admission at the end of Book One that "the whole conversation has left
me completely in the dark" (354b), on the other hand, when Glaucon
and Adeimantos speak, they do not "begin from the beginning", but they
develop Thrasymachos' talk. Why does Kierkegaard not turn his atten¬
tion in this direction, since it suggests that the development of a
positive irony is, after all, possible? Yet, merely asking Kierke¬
gaard to attend to these points that emerge in the course of the inquiry
does not make available a sense of the reasons why we want to do so.
To seek the unity of a discourse is to ask what limits it rather
than to delineate the "limits" within it. It is worth noting that this
5- Kierkegaard, 1968. p.148. Kierkegaard's notion of a total break
seems to anticipate Althusser!
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requires the trust that ideal speaking is possible: here, this means
a speaking that orients decisively to what limits it. Ideal speaking
is speaking that gives expression to what is truly compelling in the
particular instance. The particularity of its orientation is stronger
than the particularism of rage: instead it seeks to express value
through the particular. What notion of speech does this require?
Speech is always and necessarily a thing in that on every occa¬
sion, it could be otherwise; it has characteristics that belong to
it contingently rather than essentially or necessarily. Yet the idea
of speech is always the same, i.e. the idea of speech is necessarily
/"
unlike its opposite . What belongs centrally or essentially to speech
(as its idea) is its capacity to recall us to the idea, to consideration
of what is essentially what it is, of what is essentially limited by
what it is not. Now we can ask: what is essential to speech? It
belongs essentially to speech that through it we have the capacity to
call on resource so as to re-collect the source of our speech. That
this capacity belongs essentially to speech means that it belongs to
the idea of speech. Speech as a thing is charged with the task of living
up to what it truly is: that is, it needs to show an interest in its
idea, i.e. in the source of its value. Speech's Desire to dwell with
its idea expresses itself through its disciplined work of caring for
the ideas that animate and illuminate its topics, usages and examples.
Speech draws near to what it strongly is (its idea) by showing how it
respects the ideas that animate it in any particular instance, rather
than simply collecting a chance gathering of images, usages, or propo¬
sitions. Through the orientation to limit (the idea, rather than the
thing) speech returns its gratitude for that with which it has been
entrusted: the capacity to summon resource in order to call upon value,
6. A.Blum,1978 pp.73-4. As explicated by Blum a thing could be
such or otherwise it is what it happens to be whereas an idea
is limited by its onposite. by what is essentially unlike it.
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to call value to attend upon us. Speech becomes temperate through
the development of resources that befriend conditions and recall
value.
Now we can formulate how anger is grounded in its interest in
value. The passion for value is the passion that has anger as one of
its possible expressions. Anger is evoked for the sake of reminding
us of the need to justify being entrusted with resources. Neglect, or
the betrayal of trust, results in the wasting of speech's resource,
i.e. of its capacity to orient to notions, ideas and limits.
The Desire to develop resources that befriend conditions and
recall value is the Desire of spirit. Spirit is the passion to develop
the orientation that particularizes and gives body (or substance) to
the theorist's "essential concern". Particularizing, giving body, are
ways of making reference to the passion of the theorist for his talk.
The theorist Desires to be genuinely moved by the compelling source
that originates and gathers together the themes or the ideas, within
his talk. We formulate spirit, then, as the theorist's passion to
particularize value, to enact resource. Since anger in its strongest
sense is an expression of spirit, anger needs to be mastered as its
way of living up to its idea as such an expression.
The passion for value essentially wants to keep resource - the
orientation to notions, limits, ideas, as our way of mediating source
and speech - alive. The question of worth or value, i.e. of our
collectedness with the source of our speech and action, is a question
that we are required to participate in. The notion of being a parti¬
cipant, rather than a passive recipient, or a worshiper of the text,
resonates with a desire to be involved with rather than outside the
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limit. Desiring to be involved xri-th the limit means having the spirit
to treat the pursuit of inquiry into ideas as our means of partici¬
pating in and thus keeping alive the questions "what is worthy?" or
"what is valuable?". Instead of seeking the detachment of being out¬
side of the limit, the participant seeks involvement with limit as his
means of resolving the question of value by bringing it to life within
speech itself. He seeks to make his involvement with essential limits
answer to the life that is spirited and truly expressive. "Expressive"
now means: developing the resourceful renewal of the collectedness
of speech and its source.
At the heart of spirit is its commitment to keep alive within
speech its collectedness with its source. That is, spirit does not
want the source or origin of speech to retreat and be forgotten, but
instead to resourcefully integrate within speech our dependence on the
source. Now, what kind of commitment is spirit, the passion for value,
such that it takes part in the recollection of grounds? What part
does it play? Spirit, we said, is the passion to involve speech with
value: that is, to bring to expression the ideas and notions within
talk, rather than to restrict it to sheer description or chance effect.
Now, spirit must ask: how does this passion for value place the
speaker inside that which gathers and shelters all, i.e. source or
language? How does the pursuit of ideas and notions fulfil the desire
to participate, the desire to treat source as something that essen¬
tially needs the work of recollection?
Even the most dispersive speech is gathered within language:
yet, what makes it dispersive is that it is heedless of how it is
gathered by source. An interest in the idea of dispersiveness requires
us to consider what essentially limits it. The idea of dispersiveness
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is limited by its opposite, the idea of decisiveness. Thus, T/hile even
dispersive speech is part of the whole, only decisive speech exercises
7the capacity to say this. Placing the self inside that which shelters
and gathers all (including dispersive talk, talk that orients to sur¬
vival or circumstance rather than value) requires the exercise of
decisiveness. It requires the decision to orient to the distinction
between dispersiveness and decisiveness. This decision is the begin¬
ning of spirit, of the passion for limit. So the passion for limit
needs to remember the relationship between the dispersive and the
decisive in order to initiate the particularization of the theorist's
interest. Of course, to forget the distinction is to generate many-
ness or difference rather than particularity. Yet, crucially, to
treat decisiveness as segregated from dispersiveness, because it is
forgotten that dispersiveness is also gathered by language, is to seek
to secure decisiveness as a purified guarantee rather than to re-create
decisivensss in the midst of usage. Because it loses the passion of
decisiveness, segregation is incapable of achieving particularity. It
is unspirited will rather than spirited resourcefulness.
Decisiveness, or the enactment of spirit, initiates particular-
ization because it seeks to rule manyness, not externally, from outside
and above, but by inviting manyness to participate in recollecting its
source. Decisiveness does not, like exegesis, seek to regulate usage,
by bureaucrat!zing the relations between its parts, by dictating the
rules of its enforceability. This is to treat usage as the whole, as
everything: the theorist is seen merely as a collator, describing or
explaining what already exists outside of him. Nor does decisiveness,
like metaphysics, seek to be "free" from usage, through the invention
of its own categories, divisions, schemes and programmes. This is to
?. Blum and McHugh eds, 1979» Introduction.
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regard usage as nothing, out of the misplaced fear that its manyness
is merely threatening. Instead, decisiveness seeks to achieve the
governance of sT>eech by that which truly shelters and gathers it,
language. It wants to persuade manyness that secretly, it is governed
by language: it is always addressing and encountering usage, seeking
through it to recollect the source that makes it intelligible. The
work of theorizing is unending because any usage needs to be turned
towards its grounds. Yet every usage is collected within source in
particular ways, so the theorist does not sdopt a merely indifferent
relation to "all usage". The theorist exercises decisiveness as the
passion to re-call source through the required enactment of resource
within speech: that is, he exercises decisiveness in response to the
demand for particularization.
Spirit is the passion to exercise the true decisiveness that
participates in the relationship between speech and language through
speaking. Being decisive towards the distinction between decisiveness
and dispersiveness allows the particularization of the theorist's
interest to emerge as the fruit of his willingness to participate.
Willingness to participate means, continuously seeking to re-achieve
decisiveness within the multitude of practices and topics he engages
in. The theorist needs the fertility of spirit to exercise decisive¬
ness in the midst of the (as yet) indecisive. The theorist needs the
mastered anger of spirit, not as a response against threats to his
own survival or well-being, but as yet another way of inviting usage
to reorient itself to the source. Mastered anger is a means of serving
the interest of spirit because it seeks to re-call dispersiveness in
the face of its tendency to profligacy, to speak in ways that would
neglect the possibility of resourceful talk. Yet it re-calls disper-
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siveness to its source: that is, it does not merely orient wilfully
to usage by segregating it from its source. Spirit is resourceful
because through it, we inherit our resources as valuable (oriented
to value). So the theorist is the one for whom anger is the demand
that he re-affirm (or re-enact) resourcefulness in the face of its
neglect (in sheer usage) or its formalization (in abstraction).
Mastery seeks to do justice to anger's grounds in spirit: it
seeks to recollect, in the midst of the potentially dispersive occa¬
sion of anger, neither to give way to it. nor to merely censor it, but
to use it to re-achieve decisiveness. Mastery is thus an instance of
the relation to usage sought after by spirit, since it initiates the
particularization that rage and remorse both sacrifice. The limit
or opposite of the idea of mastery is the idea of slavery. We can
treat the outcome of the speaker's failure to re-achieve mastery as
one or other of two versions of slavery. Rage, the first version, is
an enslavement of passion to the merely physiological, to the cycle of
retribution, to self-degeneration. Being "enslaved to the passions"
means, more deeply, being enslaved to a weak version of the passions.
True passion, mastery, seeks to give the body, usage, and accident,
their place within the whole. Remorse is the second version of slavery
because its consequence, as we have elaborated, is the absence of
character or particularization. Lack of a voice or a character reso¬
nates with slavery not only, to draw on Kegel's argument, because it
prevents the possibility of recognition but more deeply, because,
lacking passion, it generates detachment or indifference. Notice that
this is precisely the problem for Hegel's "master". Since for this
master the relation to other is one of external domination (in our
terms, the master is not a participant), the result as Hegel develops
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it resonates with our notion of remorse. Kegel's master is a remorse¬
ful, guilty speaker without passion or self-particularization. This
results from the exercise of a "mastery" that externalizes itself
Q
from its other, the slave .
2. The deep sneaker as inheritor.
It is time for us to develop a stronger notion of the ideal
speaker, the speaker for whom spirit, the passion for limit, is an
essential ingredient of his talk. In terms of what we have said in
this chapter up to now, our ideal speaker seeks to make his speech
participate in re-animating the question of value or source. He
seeks to speak resourcefully, that is, to exercise resource in order
to put speech in touch with its source. The idea that test captures
our sense of what he is, is the notion that he is interested in depth.
He is interested in deepening what is said ("by himself or by others).
in developing it, in refreshing and renewing speech's capacity for
9
resourcefulness . Deep or resourceful speaking seeks to re-open
inquiry at a level where it is empowered to give access to the problem
of worth or value. The deep speaker seeks to make conversation dwell
at the demanding but rewarding level where inquiry is given back its
freshness. Essentially, the ideal speaker desires to socialize the
experience of knowledge as something compelling, by sharing it in
conversation with others. The deep speaker wants to treat the
problem of worth or value, not as a matter of generalized, categorical,
"knowledge" that is shared indifferently by all because it is external
to each, nor as a matter of private, unshareable and hence indisputable,
8. For Kegel's account of the master-slave dialectic see Kegel.
19^9, pp.228-2^0.
9. I owe much of the thinking behind the present discussion to the
work group in which I participated at the Conference on Theoriz¬
ing held at Perugia. Italy, in August 1979'• in particular to
Leslie Killer who so fruitfully collected the group's work in
the notion of the deep speaker.
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"experience". He acknowledges the problem of worth as one that
requires, in order to be pursued in a way proper to it, the speaker's
participation: it cannot be treated either as "internal" or "external"
to the speaker, for the problem in both cases is that the speaker- is
used as an unquestioned reference point. Both "solutions" have already
(secretly) settled the problem of value, since they treat the speaker,
the "subject", in the one case as supremely valuable, in the other as
supremely detrimental to value. For the deep speaker, the dichotomy
between "knowledge" and "experience" is precisely a consequence of a
superficial notion of both. Deepened, they are no longer segregated.
Yet, the deep speaker is tempted to forget spirit.
How can this be - since he is interested in refreshing speech"s
resourcefulness, that is. its capacity to re-call value?
The deep speaker is tempted to disregard whatever is contingent,
secondary, non-essential, subject to casual laws and so on. Because
of his Desire to say and do what is worthwhile, he tends to find con¬
tingent or caused things superficial and boring. In this sense he
tends to overpopulate his world with enemies: he is intolerant of
all instances of talk that ignore the demand to display interest in
worth.
The deep speaker might find in the words of poets sentiments
with which he can agree and in which he can seek consolation. Words¬
worth touches a chord in this speaker, when he writes-
"The world is too much with us; late and soon,
Getting and spending, we lay waste our powers". 10
Or he might become like Gerard Manly Hopkins, of whom it was written
that (characteristic of him was) "a refusal to accept the (merely)
10. Wordsworth, 1935, 0-122.
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notional, the tendency to act, both privately and publicly, as if out
of a state of emergency"."'''''
The deep speaker because of the very intensity of his desire
has a tendency to turn the question of worth into a matter of life
and death. That is, he could mistreat the notion of being compelled
by the question, by turning the compelling into an imposition, some¬
thing externally given, rather than something he participates in.
Instead of the pleasure and enjoyment of participation, he becomes
consumed by the question, "am I worthy?" or "am I capable of living
up to the compelling question?" Whereas he wants to be animated by
the work of particularising his interest, and seeking what is compel¬
ling in it, instead he becomes self-preoccupied- centred on the question
of self-identity, and the mere survival of his own capacity to sustain
the problem of worth. Tragically, sustaining the problem of worth
becomes weakened into the obsessiveness of sustaining his self-identity.
It becomes a kind of endurance test.
The deep speaker experiences the temptation to turn away, in his
"refusal to accept the notional". from those things that are resistant
to value, the things that embody what is partly inert - for example,
the passions, or sheer enthusiasm for particular things, or convention.
These things, he argues, merely accent a. notion of what-they-are and of
what their purpose is. Therefore, they are only what they happen to be:
they have not deeply chosen to be what they are, but simply find them¬
selves in a given condition that has been caused by unknown and unques¬
tioned origins. Neither passion nor enthusiasm, nor convention, know
or care where they have come from: they simply carry on, like "oad
actors thrown onstage from the wings, in whatever direction they are
11. W.Davies, Introduction to G.Ii.Hopkins, 1979, ppl^-15-
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already moving. The deep speaker is tempted to hate the enthusiasm
of self-display. or the assurance of convention that rests on the
failure to question itself. He is tempted to collect these examples
in a notion of self-exegesis. He resents the forcefulness of what he
calls self-exegesis "because he considers it undeserved and unjustified:
all it does is self-description, enumeration and display of jjreference.
What he calls self-exegesis is the rule of sheer upbringing,
the self-celebration of the arbitrary: upbringing gone wild. At this
degree of corruption by his temptations, the deep speaker takes on the
tone of rancour that we hear in the poet's or the Christian's complaints
against "men of the world". It is the shallowness of self-exegesis,
of course, that makes it objectionable to the deep speaker. He looks
upon it as a form of cheating, an opting for the easy way: to make
matters worse, for him, this is the way that seems to have inherited
the world. How it is the weight of this rancour, rather than, as he
thinks, the weight of the world, that turns the deep speaker away from
the "world" and towards the inwardness of his own soul. Ironically,
the one who sees the world as being populated by cheats comes to be
seen (sometimes justly) as taking the easy way out. not trying, not
12
bothering to talk, and so on. He comes to be seen as unjust.
One crucial thing our speaker has forgotten is that the shallow
version of having a place, giving a life to passion, namely self-
exegesis, doesn't really inherit anything except in an equally weak
sense. It fails to inherit resource, that is, the capacity to enjoy
the worth of its decisions. Instead of forcing the deep speaker to
renounce anything, self-exegesis ought to be another incentive for
him to invoke spirit, or his passion to give a place to worth and
12. The genesis of temperance in a kind of injustice will be
addressed in our final chapter).
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value in speech. It is what needs to be affirmed (spirit) that is
truly compelling, not what needs to be renounced (self-exegesis).
Again it is ironic that the deep speaker who succumbs to his excess
is more compelled by the idea of renouncing something that he regards
as external (both to him, and to the question of value) rather than
centering himself on the affirmation of spirit, of that which is his
real contact with worth. This suggests that there is a fatal equivo¬
cation which seeks to gain admission to the deep speaker's enterprise
and which, if it does, will decisively weaken it.
The question is this: does self-exegesis generate particularity
and character in such a way that it inherits anything worth inheriting?
Tailure to resolve this issue results in the deep speaker's insecurity
about his chosen commitment, with the danger this brings that his
passion could turn sour, or vacuous: he could become limited to remorse
hope, or nostalgia.
To actively inherit something means to make it one's own. One's
genuine inheritance is not merely property or culture or material re¬
sources, but the relation to tradition bespoken by the notion of "making
the resources one's own". Inheriting is the opposite of alienation in
that, by transforming something estranged and external into someting
friendly, it fosters participation i.e. the re-en]ivehing and exercising
of resources. Notice that it's not that inheriting turns the external
into the internal - that would be the property-ownership version - but
that the external is transformed into something that is participated
in. Participating in something shows that we belong to it, and that it
belongs to us because we allow ourselves to belong to it. Now. what
is truly worth inheriting is resource as the capacity to call on the
best in the tradition. Resource, to remind ourselves is the means of
1 rQIjO
re-enacting the passion to re-discover anew every time the belonging
of speech with its source or value. Spirit needs to inherit this re¬
source. Let's ask now: what does self-exegesis or sheer enthusiasm
inherit? V/hat it inherits is a self. Self we re-call (Chapter 2)
does not have to mean the individual ego: analytically it means that
which is familiar, the set of particulars with which one identifies.
Self-exegesis has inherited a self in this sense: that it can dynamic¬
ally activate the various parts of this self in a speaking relation¬
ship, that the whole self is integrated yet the parts within it are
distinct, and that this structure is both sustained by, and at the
same time, permits, the speaker's participation with the self.
Yet, this self, since it is founded on familiarity, has a weak
sense of value or limit. Its limits are accidental, sheer matters of
upbringing and circumstance: so it is always ready to become enraged,
to make war on different selves. The mildest form of this war is the
conflict of opinion by which multis is animated.
The deep speaker must overcome the temptation merely to renounce
the "conflict of opinion". The failure of self-exegesis to inherit
what is truly worth inheriting, that is, resource, does not mean that
it inherits nothing. Self-exegesis, sheer enthusiasm, the acceptance
and use of what one happens to think good as if it were good, does
not inherit resource because it is uninterested in re-enacting the
question of worth. But its disinterest is not the result of mere
animosity, but more of blindness or the desire not to lose what it
has inherited. Self-exegesis, because it already has something going
for itself, something that it finds rewarding, thinks that it has the
answer to the question of value. Above all it is wary of the remorse¬
ful speaker, the speaker who remembers the idea of value but is in-
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capable of giving it particular expression. mhis sneaker could only
disinherit self-exegesis. It is for this reason that self-exegesis
is the deep speaker's greatest challenge and greatest risk. Self-
exegesis is precisely what most tempts the deep speaker to become
remorseful, to merely renounce opinion: and self-exegesis is also what
most requires of him that he remember his strengths. In the face of
the partial inheritance enacted by self-exegesis (or sheer enthusiasm).
the deep speaker must remember rather than forget the idea of inheri¬
tance. This is a crucial phase or moment for the deep speaker: in
the face of weakened versions of what is strongly desirable, he must
overcome the impulse to be merely negative (i.e. give up on the idea)
but instead, sustain and re-invigorate the idea (here, of inheritance)
all the more strongly. That is, he must recover his passion for the
particular worth of the idea, his passion for its limits: he must
re-call his spirit in and through his speech.
Spirit enables the deep speaker to remember that self-exegesis
inherits something in that it constructs the possibility for partici¬
pation. It belongs to what it loves and what it loves belongs to it:
thus it achieves recognizable character, the character of a self. The
task for the deep speaker in conversing with self-exegesis is, not to
disinherit it, but to deepen its idea of inheritance. The ironic
character of the relationship that the deep speaker seeks with self-
exegesis amounts to this: the deep speaker does not think of himself
as having (i.e. occupying) a "position" from which to accept or reject
sheer enthusiasm, but rather, he seeks to engage enthusiasm without
merely succumbing to it. In order to be properly qualified to seek
conversation with self-exegesis, the deep speaker's irony must be
positive, rather than negative. As we saw. merely negative irony
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would, "be the irony expressed by remorse towards the sheer enthusiast:
it could only fall on deaf ears, but worse, it could only be symptom¬
atic of a weakening of the deep speaker's own interest in inheritance
and resource. Positive irony resists the temptation to be offended
by self-exegesis (since merely to be offended is to adopt an external
position) but instead seeks to enter, develop and deepen the conver¬
sation about what self-exegesis thinks it knows.
To understand how the deep speaker might enter the conversation,
or better, initiate it from within, we can ask: what is the self that
achieves itself through self-exegesis? It is a particular integrated
dynamic of familiar parts that enter and re-enter various combinations
and relationships. The love of familiarity is the love of exploring
this dynamic. The nature of the parts and the nature of the whole that
collects them is not a topic: what excites the interest is the dynamic
of the parts. The interest is in how the various parts of the recog¬
nizable world interact with each other. Self-exegesis treats the "how"
of life, i.e. how to go about courses of action, and so on, as the
central interest. Self-exegesis is grounded in its conventional orien¬
tation to limit as the interest in how one thing affects, causes, fits
together with, or is incompatible with, another thing. Knowing the
conventions is knowing the various relationships between things, and
taste or "knowing what is proper", is cutting the right things together
and keeping the wrong things apart. Living tastefully means: applying
this to life, considered as the most valuable of the various things.
Self-exegesis has already settled the problem of value: the most
valuable thing is life. Life is the value to which all the other parts
are to be tuned or addressed. Life is the highest good, yet it is also
the supreme familiarity, the thing that is most ours, the thing for
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which death is the ultimate stranger or alien. Death is the most
strange, mysterious and perplexing thing, because it is the opposite
of the most friendly, familiar and known thing: and death is also
the most inimical, monstrous, and undesirable thing, because it is
the opposite of the most valuable thing. Life is the familiar good.
Life is reassuring because it makes familiarity and value coincide.
Life is the self of self-exegesis, the self that sustains self-assurance.
Life is understood by self-exegesis as the highest value (the
most valuable thing) because of its inherent familiarity, and as the
most friendly of all familiar things because it is inherently valuable.
Life is the only thing to combine frora the outset the inherently
familiar with the inherently valuable. For self-exegesis, the good
life is the immediate life. Life seeks to re-discover itself imme¬
diately in the things and forms through which it expresses itself.
How this means that the re-discovery, re-construction, and so on.that
life engages in, its use of the things that it finds in its environ¬
ment as instruments of vehicles of self-expression, must aim not to
be a construction of anything additional but rather to be the re¬
construction of nature. Convention - as the re-construction of life -
is treated as the mirror of nature: the "mediate" is a mere point-by-
13
point translation of the immediate .
13. For a theoretic expression of this, see Rousseau's Essay on the
Origin of Languages.19 66 . Rousseau we take to be a good
example of self-exegesis, because he represents its radical
expression. Rousseau knows better than to blandly equate con¬
vention with nature- since there are many conventions but only
one nature. Yet for him this only serves to show that most of
(what passes for) convention is a foreign overlay on nature: a
speech or an education and so on that directly expresses nature
is however possible, and Rousseau devotes considerable energy to
developing these possibilities. Yet the notion of re-achieving
worth is banished in favour of that of re-constructing or re¬
capitulating immediacy. Rousseau, or strong self-exegesis, thus
represents the unorthodox conventionalism of seeking the conven¬
tions with which to encapsulate nature: where weak self-exegesis
might be the orthodox conventionalism of assuming that the given
conventions already do encapsulate nature. The latter is the
"conventional" speaker in the ordinary usage: in these terms it
is "unconventional" to create new conventions. We want to focus,
however, on what the two have in common by calling them orthodox
and unorthodox conventionalism.
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For self-exegesis, it is life (rather than source or value)
that needs to particularize itself: moreover, in such a way that its
innate immediacy - the source of life's value - is not sacrificed or
compromised. Self-exegesis orients to convention (either by creating
one or following one) as if it were natural: that is, it seeks to make
its speech directly and immediately self-expressive, and it seeks to
sustain the claim that the particular usages, icons, and methods it
instrumentalizes are merely derivations of inherent natural capacity.
Self-exegesis seeks particularity as the convention that most
intimately expresses what is natural. When this is novel, the result
is trend or fashion. When it becomes old, the result is politeness
or staidness. The latter becomes formalized or ritualized, and loses
its capacity to express the immediate (the natural). The dynamic of
self-exegesis is its never-ending struggle against formalization, its
constant pruning of the unnatural that inevitably accompanies even
its most enlightened efforts.
Hence self-exegesis is blind to its own convention, because it
is inside it. This is why we speak of "blind rage". Rage has no re¬
source with which to converse with other particularities, since par¬
ticularity is equated with convention, and other conventions are some¬
how "unnatural". Immediacy lives on the verge of becoming enraged with
its interlocutor: the risk is more extreme the more orthodox a version
of conventionalism is involved. Sophisticated, unorthodox> versions
recommend tolerance towards what is "merely" conventional, those
ossified conventions that have become empty forms or gestures out of
touch with immediacy, but do not deserve to be taken seriously because
they make no genuine claim to particularize (i.e. re-capitulate) immediacy.
Every version, however, insists that these accretions, being non-natural.
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although in some measure inevitable, he kept to an absolute minimum.
Ideally, the "merely" conventional would disappear, and the "true"
convention-that-isn't-really-a-convention would win universal adherence.
Convention conceives of itself as self-exegesis. That is, it
conceives of itself naturalistically: it sees itself as a transcrip¬
tion of nature. We recall that in our Introduction, we analyzed nega¬
tive irony's hatred of convention as originating in its notion that
convention makes a bland truce with nature. That is, negative irony's
hatred of convention stems from its hatred of nature. Here, a new
development has occurred. We can grasp now that the alleged truce
with nature is not, in fact, of convention's own making. Rather, it
is the negative ironist's artifact: it is the negative ironist's view
of convention's effective or realized relationship with nature. Con¬
vention's self-conception, as has now emerged, is very different: self-
exegesis is no longer the truce of convention and nature, it is their
identity. Self- exegesis understands itself as saying what it is natural
to say or doing what it is natural to do. Garfinkel speaks of this
self-understanding as one that finds its own reflexivity uninteresting :
that is, its own constructive work remains hidden from itself. Self-
exegesis affirms itself but does not reflect on itself. It exists on
the paradigm of nature. Hegel calls this mode of speech "barren assur-
1 ^
ance". "By giving (this) assurance", he says "(a speech) would declare
16
its force and value to lie in its bare existence". The problem of
self-exegesis is that it relies on its bare existence. It exists and
immediately it acts. The absence of irony towards nature shown by its
assumption that nature speaks directly through it bespeaks the presump-
tuousness or intemperance of self-exegesis. Self-exegesis tends to
W. Garfinkel, 1967, o.?.
15. Hegel, 1949, p-135-
16. Loc. cit, p.134 (my emphasis).
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imagine Its own self-sufficiency.
If convention, then, understands itself as particularising
what is immediate to us, that is, life itself, how ought spirit -
the passion to particularize limit or value - orient itself to con¬
vention? The problem with sheer convention - whether orthodox or
unorthodox - is that it emasculates the conversational inquiry into
the value or worth of what is chosen. The problem of value stops at
the boundaries of the particular convention at hand. The convention
is blind to itself in that it wants to ftirget as much and as quickly
as possible that it is merely a convention: in the process of "natural¬
izing" the convention, the capacity to restore and renew the problem
of value is weakened. Indeed, the "naturalizing" process and the
weakening of the question go hand in hand, together giving rise to
the career of convention. When life - the immediate, natural, life -
is the most valuable thing, nothing else can be interrogated with regard
to value, or brought to bear on the problem of worth, without submit¬
ting first to the rule of life as the primary value. Yet life itself is
not treated as a topic for inquiry: the real value of life is not
a matter of conversation. Hence the question of value is treated as
a merely technical problem answering to an already made decision that
is shielded from question. The deep speaker wants to invite conven¬
tion to lift the shield/ that is. to x^ermit the value of life to become
a topic of inquiry rather than an assumption. The deep speaker wants
to invite convention to become temperate.
The deep speaker invites re-appraisal of the notion that life
is the most valuable thing. This means that the deep speaker wants -
not the presuppositionless beginning, but the strongest beginning. Ke
wants to re-collect the strongest beginning as the beginning that best
initiates the influence of value over speech. For the deep speaker
speech is an image of life, "because his speech aims to give life to
value. Life pel- se is not valuable, "but the value of life (speech) is
that it has the capacity to re-enact (give life to) its collectedness
with value or source. Giving life to the problem of worth requires
the particularizing of the problem in speech, through the willing
acceptance of what could be otherwise as a necessary feature of one's
talk. What could be otherwise are the usages, examples, topics of
conversation, as these become the conventions through which the inquiry
achieves its voice and makes itself heard. Yet speech (unlike sheer
biological life) is also required to orient to what could not be other¬
wise. What could not be otherwise is that in order to be truly resource
ful, these conventions must be re-fashioned as offspring of the speaker'
passion to give life to the problem "what is value?" in speech. The
particularizations will vary from speaker to speaker as features of
his upbringing, history of usage, and so on, but what is invariant is
the need to make the passions around which they revolve answer to the
question of worth - so as to develop this question as a spirited ques¬
tion. The speaker must respect both his own particularity - which is
to say that any particularization will not be equally compelling for
him - while remembering that every speaker has the opportunity to trans¬
form the mere familiarity of his upbringing into a set of usages and
examples through which to re-invoke, once again and as if anew, the
problem of worth. Thus the deep speaker seeks to be a conversation¬
alist, re-engaging what has become merely (and lazily) conventional,
not in order to undermine our adherance to it, but to see what the
spirited enjoyment of it involves. The deep speaker is playful with
convention, not by being flippant with it, or imagining that he should
live without it, but rather by instrumentalising it for the sake of
his interest. He seeks access to what is essential by constructing
a convention that is enlivened by the passion for limit (the particul-
arization of worth). The deep speaker plays with convention as the
medium through which to give expression to the ends that are compel¬
ling.
3. Temperance, spirit, and convention.
Spirit's relation to convention we maintain to be one of posi¬
tive irony. Whereas convention naturalizes itself, spirit requires
irony towards nature. Only thus does spirit empower itself to achieve
its strong relation to convention.
Spirit. as the passion for involvement with value , does not
merely negate or undermine convention since convention (what could be
otherwise) is required as the particular way in which the interest in
what is essential is embodied and given voice. Spirit is positively
ironic towards convention because while it recognizes the need for
convention - and the need to throw oneself into convention in an
enthusiastic way - it seeks to make convention answer, not merely
to itself, but to that value or end for the sake of which convention
uses itself. Spirit mediates passion and worth (in order to truly
particularize the "essential concern" for value) by seeking to make
available the passion that generates this or that convention, not
merely the passion for life per se, but the passion for the worthy
life, the "examined life". Spirit makes the„problem of worth a lively,
compelling, problem while seeking to temper the sheer passion for
life in its multitudinous forms by making passion answer to what is
best. Spirit tempers sheer physiology and seeks to transform it into
a participant in theorizing. In this way Spirit re-presents for con¬
vention the work of moderating nature. Spirit shows convention that
in order to inherit truly valuable resources, it is necessary to re¬
call its irony towards nature.
We saw earlier that the deep speaker is prone to remorse and
disappointment. He might wait too long for the truly worthwhile to
present itself: his passion, for lack of use, withers, becomes passive,
and becomes a caricature of itself. In a sense, the deep sv)eaker never
even in this event, forgets himself, since his loss of passion causes
a withdrawal from conversation which continually throws him back upon
17
and thus reminds him of the principled reason for it. Yet the prin¬
ciple becomes weakened through its enforced withdrawal from conver¬
sation. and comes more and more to be treated as "internal" to the
deep speaker himself. So we can make good sense of the advice that is
often proferred to the remorseful speaker that he needs to "forget him¬
self" or "get out of himself": what this strongly means is that he
must resist segregating his deep interest from the resistance and the
fulfilment, the discipline and pleasure, of conversation among various
interlocutors. The deep speaker must seek to make the activity or the
passion of conversing the very resolution of his desire to do so -
rather than impose as precondition the likelihood that the conversation
merely "live up to" demands he makes in advance. The latter has as
its consequence the interiorization of the question of worth, the
treatment of it as a question of self-identity, the survival of the
self's integrity in the face of the external threats offered to it by
the violence of circumstance.
The interiorization of the question restricts the deep speaker
to the "refusal to accept the notional". He is tempted to transform
17. The failure of spirit in this instance - that is> the interior-
izing and withdrawal of the question of worth - leads to a self-
indulgence of inwardness. The speaker hides his interest from
particularization - hence it becomes vague and impressionistic.
There is something unjust about this self-indulgence, a kind of
incipient injustice, that we shall have to question.
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the question into one of building a self-identity within 'which integrity
is equated with refusal. That is, the deep speaker could imagine that
the desire for worth is "best served through purity, terseness, aphoris¬
tic obscurity: in short, by keeping clear of the risk of compromise.
Yet keeping clear of this risk also keeps clear of the possibility of
particularization, since this requires precisely the willingness to
make the question live through usages and examples, i.e. live through
the variable and the many. Deep speaking, strongly, does not want to
abdicate the realm of usage, that is, to leave it untouched by the deep
need to re-involve it with its source. Rather, it seeks to re-call how
the parts, various and many as they are, belong to the whole (to that
which collects all) as particular possibilities for voicing our interest
in what is one, the whole. Hence the deep speaker must reach out to
the parts (the usages and examples through which he seeks to give con¬
vincing character to what is compelling). Remorse suffers the turning
inward that preoccupies itself with the question "am I worthy of the
whole?" Spirit, however, remembers that what makes it worthy of the
whole (i.e. fit to be a part that answers to the whole) is the work it
does to give the whole (the logos, the source) a memorable character
through the re-enlivening of parts that re-call themselves to it.
Since spirit is the tempering of sheer physiology into the force
of good, it also develops the resourcefulness that is other than sheer
force. When resourcefulness is weakened into what is merely forceful,
it becomes self-exegetic. Sheer force resonates with the power of en¬
forceability, of convention, of the exigent. Sheer force has an exegetic
interest in whatever is externally compelling. How we can understand
tolerance, sophistry, social control, and so on, as various ways of
controlling what is externally compelling. In a way, they all re-enact
the externally compelling, "because, although they intend to give
speakers (a measure of) control over its worst excesses, this is
achieved only through the various organizational and methodic devices
that enforce a control that is itself only externally compelling. That
is, control is treated as a matter of enforcement "by the more power¬
ful rather than of the rule of what is worthy. At the opposite extreme,
remorse resonates with the absence of method, a turning away from that
which is external to value. Remorse is the "refusal" of character, of
self-identification: remorse hides itself from question, it makes
itself inaccessible to whatever it considers itself to be above.
Unlike remorse, spirit is not a stranger to power. Spirit be¬
friends power: it improves the merely forceful so that it answers to
what is good. Spirit's interest is in re-collecting the intrinsic.
The intrinsic is the essential matter or concern to which we orient
in the pursuit of the question of worth. Now, recalling the notion of
particularity, we are reminded that the intrinsic is not a ghostly,
invisible "essence" devoid of content, but requires the life of some
matter (of issue or usage) through which to achieve the persuasive
character of an interest. Having an interest entails treating some
conversant matter as a focus that is continually animating and inviting
to talk. The speaker with an interest nourishes that interest in order
to achieve a sense of its inexhaustible character, the sense that it
can be recurrently topicalized without mere repetition. An interest
is not inexhaustible to just anybody, because this relation has to be
achieved through work in every instance. Yet what is truly inexhaus¬
tible is language, the source of speech, the source that demands the
endless work of resource as the bringing to expression .of its inexhaus-
170
An interest in what is merely extrinsic or consequential cannot
orient itself to the question of worth. The capacity to ask about
worth, as speech's essential capacity, is dependent on being able to
say what is intrinsic, that is, on being interested in limit, in how
an idea is limited by what is unlike it. Genuine worth is intrinsically
as well as extrinsically valuable. It is valuable for its own sake as
well as for its consequences.
Hence if being consumed by an interest in the extrinsic is not
valuable, then neither is the alternative excess of aloofness. Overlook¬
ing the extrinsic generates a pale, weak, sense of the intrinsic, be¬
cause the latter gets treated as "the pure", the "essential concern",
which in the absence of spirit is liable to remain silent. The spirited
speaker is neither overawed nor distracted by whatever is extrinsic,
but rather establishes a conversation between the intrinsic and the
extrinsic. Interest in the intrinsic (the innate, what could not be
otherwise) is an interest in value, not a desire for inwardness or
sheer subjectivity. So spirit seeks and cultivates conversation. The
conversation takes the form of moderating the violence of the extrinsic
for the sake of re-furbishing it for the theorist's use. Spirit draws
upon resource in the face of what is initially strange, daunting or
terrorizing, in order to sustain its expression of its interest . Instead
of treating the problem of strange conditions as a merely personal prob¬
lem spirit seeks to show how they are one more occasion to revive our
attachment to what is intrinsic via speech. The decisive issue is the
theorist's need to sustain his participation in resource in the midst
of what is merely extrinsics i.e. instead of being cut off from partici¬
pation (by becoming either remorseful or exegetic), actually using the
extrinsic for his interest by particularizing his interest in its midst.'
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k. Spirit's enjoyment of the intrinsic.
We will conclude this chapter with an illustration of our argu¬
ment "by examining the work of a sociologist deeply concerned with con¬
vention, spirit, exigency, and the relations between them: Harold
Garfinkel. Garfinkel is simply an example, since every attempt to
particularize the social character of man's speech is faced with the
same problem: how to deal with the exigent, i.e. sheer physiology,
sheer convention, and so on. Spirit, as we have seen, relates to the
exigent by seeking to befriend it, by seeking to playfully use it to
re-generate the interest in what is intrinsic.
Now the temptation for the social theorist is to treat the
exigent (the extrinsic) as something all-encompassing and hence, awe¬
some. The extrinsic influences speakers through external compulsion,
that is, it enforces itself upon them. Now, if "external" here, is
taken to mean external to the individual, this can generate a Durkheim.
Durkheim tells us that what is truly compelling is what is extrinsic
in the sense of external to the individual - i.e. "society", or the
"conscience collective". Garfinkel sees that this turns the individual
into a "dope". Yet, like Durkheim. he tells us that what is truly com¬
pelling is what is extrinsic, in the more fundamental sense of: indif¬
ferent to worth. This sense was also present, of course, in Durkheim,
for he glossed the value of "society" by treating it as valuable per se.
And this more fundamental sense, obscured in Durkheim's work through
his incessant focus on the individual/society dichotomy, comes to the
fore in the work of Garfinkel.
Garfinkel is awed by the social order, what he calls "the moral
13
order 'without'", what we have been calling the exigent or the extrinsic.
13. See the following, in Garfinkel (1767): "For Hant, the moral order
"within" was an awesome mystery; for sociologists the moral order
"without" is a technical mystery"(p.35)• Aral again: "In the un¬
known ways that the accomplishment (of social structure) is common¬
place it is for our interests, an awesome phenomenon", (p.10).
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We call it extrinsic because it sustains its life through enforcement.
Hence it resonates with the sheer force of rage rather than the mas¬
tered anger of the ideal speaker. For Garfinkel, multis lives the life
of rage rather than of mastered anger. That is, the world of multis
is an "obstinately familiar" one: common-sense devotedly accepts
without question the parameters of its world and not only does not
question but actively resists questioning these parameters. Like rage,
it is the sheer particularism of conditions. We are justified in saying
"conditions", because although they participate in an order (a whole),
it is the order of intelligibility rather than value. That is, our
interest in conditions can only be in them as so many extrinsic things:
our interest can be a highly intelligent one, but not that of an ideal
speaker. For Garfinkel, an interest in the social character of speech
pre-empts the possibility of the ideal speaker (one who is interested
in value, in the intrinsic). That is, his interest is in its "charac¬
ter" (external characteristics) rather than its nature (its fatedness,
its essentia.1 demand to be social). Or, to put it again: he is inter¬
ested in what is extrinsic (enforceable intelligibility) rather than in
the work of spirit.
If the enraged member is more likely than the complacent one
to state his preferences (to say that reasons have come to an end), then
we could conceive an interest in provoking multis' rage. As we saw in
the last chapter, sheer particularism becomes enraged when an element
of strangeness is introduced by an interlocutor. Now we can explicate
"sheer particularism" as love of the particular without reason. Its
reason comes to an end because it has never had a chance to begin. 3o
if we are interested in understanding what happens when reasons come
to an end. we can introduce the strange. "Procedurally", Garfinkel
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writes, "it is my i)reference to start with familiar scenes and ask what
19
can be done to make trouble". ' And again, of his famous common-sense-
disrupting experiments, he says, "I have found that they produce reflec¬
tions through which the strangeness of an obstinately familiar world
can be detected" (p.33). He calls these experiments "aids to a sluggish
imagination" (p.38). That is, the sluggish imagination of sheer par¬
ticularism will be provoked into expressing its preferences by being
enraged, i.e. through the introduction of the strange.
Garfinkel, of course, is not interested in what common-sense
prefers: rather, he is concerned to locate what its limits are, where
its reasons come to an end, at what point it becomes enraged, rather
than, say, in the rage itself. He himself is other than common-sense.
Yet he treats this "where" as something enforcable, something whose
enforceability is intelligible and in need of being made visible through
the workings of sheer intelligence. Garfinkel is the intelligent rather
than the ideal speaker because he is interested in making rage visible
rather than making it educable. He is interested in construing anger
as the defence of enforceable familiarity (i.e. as rage) rather than
as an expression of spirit (the interest in the intrinsic). We can
20
develop this by examining the "trust" experiment.
Garfinkel's idea in this experiment is that the "deliberate
display of distrust" ought to lead to the production of "highly stan¬
dardized effects" (and, as we can anticipate, affects) (p.50). "Trust"
remains extrinsic for Carfirikel (i.e. unconnected with the life of
spirit) in that he defines it merely as a "person's compliance with
19- Garfinkel. 1987 p.37* Throughout the following discussion.
references from this work are made by page-number.
20. Garfinkel, 1967 pp.^-9-53 ("Background understandings and socil
affects"). "Students were instructed to engage someone in con¬
versation and to imagine and act on the assumption that what the
other person was saying was directed by hidden motives that were
his real ones. They were to assume that the other person was
trying to trick them or mislead them" (?-5l)*
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the expectancies of the attitude of daily life as a morality"(p.50).
Trust means membership, convention, loving without reason. And being
able to articulate what this consists of requires stepping outside of
the "sluggish imagination", adopting the standpoint of the stranger
with regard to the "obstinately familiar". Awe towards the obstinacy
of the familiar, i.e. its enforceability, seems to require, for its self-
sustenance, a standpoint of mistrust, of putting the "undoubtable" into
doubt. But how could awe depend on an attitude of suspicion? Awe and
suspicion are more opposite than similar: the awed one completely
surrenders to something that silences him. whereas the suspicious one
never affirms anything, never lets anything develop properly, because
he always has an arresting question.
Notice however that the distrust practiced by Garfinkel himself
is of a different order than the distrust he has instructed his students
to engage in. The students were asked to assume "that what the other
person was saying was directed by hidden motives". This is to distrust
the familiar in order to render it epiphenomenal, less "real" than the
"real" motives that lie underneath it. ¥e can call this "motivational
distrust", and remark that it captures the sense of suspicion's prac¬
tice. However, Garfinkel seeks, not to discover the "real" motives
underlying social action, but to make "background understandings"
21
visible . That is, the limits of familiarity, invisible to common-
sense itself, are made visible - in order to display the awesome char¬
acter of these limits. They are awesome because they are all-encom¬
passing, supremely persuasive, vigorously self-enforcing. The interest
is in seeing or understanding how these limits enforce themselves
through the oriented compliance ("trust") of members. Members' trust
is the enforcement of the limits of the familiar: the "demand for trust"
21. His experiments are "aids to a sluggish imagination" designed to
make commonplace scenes visible. See 0.36, "Making commonplace
scenes visible".
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is now seen as the (potentially enraged) insistence on what is loved
without reason. What is complied with "by the member lacks reason in
that it enforces itself: it is extrinsic. We can call the practice
of making this unremittingly subtle enforcement visible, the practice
of experimental distrust. Now experimental distrust, unlike suspicion,
does not seek to undermine or challenge the member's practice, but rath'
to make its accomplishment as an enforceable practice (i.e. its ground-
edness in background understandings) visible or intelligible. In this
way, experimental distrust re-achieves, on an intelligent, articulate,
level, the enforceability of the familiar. It is the awe of the insight
ful one rather than the faith of the blind.
How we need to ask: in what sense do motivational distrust and
experimental distrust forget or neglect the need for spirit? How could
they be invited to become interested in a spirited version of trust?
Experimental distrust produces, in order then to test out the
effects of, motivated distrust, Unlike suspicion, it does not distrust
motives in order to find the "truth" behind them, but it asks: what
happens when motives are distrusted? However, for experimental dis¬
trust, the "what happens" is merely an "affect" that is produced by
"socially structured conditions" (p.^9)- That is, "what happens" is
extrinsic - the re-affirmation of the enforceable - rather than spirited
Experimental distrust is not really interested in "what happens" per se
(i.e. anger, disgust, bewilderment, anxiety, and so on) but only inso¬
far as it is an indicator of the presence of the enforceable, father,
it is interested in asking: what is the method of "distrusting motives
that has as its result the things that happen (anger, disgust.etc) when
"motives" are "distrusted"? It explicates the gloss of "distrusting
motives", but not of "what happens". Ethnomethodology's principle,
176
then, is to treat anger - for anger is the strongest affect that the
experiments, especially the trust experiment, evoke - as an index or
expression of the extrinsic. In other words, the experiments are
designed to demonstrate the member's rage: to display how the life
grounded in sheer particularity (the "obstinately familiar") defends
itself through rage, anger without reason, mere insistence. Given
this interest in displaying something, making it visible, the possi¬
bility of educating it (reminding it of the need for spirit) is sacri¬
ficed. Experimental distrust forgets the need for spirit, the demand
that anger deeply is.
Our interest is not in arguing with Garfinkel about the existence
or non-existence of multis, the potentially enraged member, and so on.
Instead, given that Garfinkel's "member" coincides with our idea of
rage (sheer particularism), the issue is one of principled speaking.
We need to educate rage bather than show its necessity: we need to
invite it to reflect rather than merely understand it. The interest
in merely understanding common-sense leads to the desire to re-produce
it: to design the experiment that will enable one to see what one is
looking for. Instead, the interest in ideal speaking - in this con¬
text, the virtue of spirited anger as distinct from the excesses of
rage or remorse - generates the desire to educate "common-sense"
(Garfinkel's metaphor for rage).
To study the difference between education and re-producing rage,
let us examine the outcome of the "trust experiment". Garfinkel writes
that he expects that
"on the part of the person distrusted there
should be the demand for justification, and
when it was not forthcoming, as "anyone could
see" it could not be, anger", (pp.50-51)
Here, the demand for justification is pre-anger: the anger follows the failure
17?
of the demand. Now anger in its strong sense, because it is animated
by spirit's Desire to befriend, lives in the throes of deciding between
the strange and the unfriendly. This shows us that Garfinkel's "anger"
is really rage, for it has already made this decision. To put this
differently: strong anger coincides with the demand for reasons,
whereas Carfinkel's "anger" follows the failure of this demand. For
Garfinkel, "anger" results when "anyone can see" that any possible
demand for justification will not be met. Yet the "anyone can see"
is telling here. If a demand for reason fails when "anyone can see"
that it will not be answered, then it is not,deeply, a demand for
reason so much as a demand for confirmation or recognition. "Anyone
can see" is the resource of one who seeks shared recognition (inter-
subjectivity) rather than reason (conversation). In short, it is the
resource of particularism and rage.
The anger evoked by the experiment, we want to suggest,shows
something stronger than the appeal to "anyone can see", something more
than the man of habit's shrug of the shoulders. It shows spirit.
The first note Garfinkel makes of anger is the following.
"With many students (he writes) the assumption that
the other person was not what he appeared to be and
was to be distrusted was the same as the attribu¬
tion that the other person was angry with them and
hated them". (p»5l)
Whereas Garfinkel takes this to be evidence of the enforceability of
"trust" as compliance, we take it to show ego's need to find a reason
for his own distrust. Ego decides that the "reason" he "feels" dis¬
trustful of alter is that alter is angry with ego. Yet why is alter
angry with ego? Answering this question requires a stronger version
of anger than mistrust, because anger as mistrust will not account for
alter's anger with ego. Is alter angry (mistrustful) with ego because
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ego is angry (mistrustful) with alter? Yet ego takes himself to he
angry with alter because alter is angry with him. Since ego is show¬
ing an interest in reasons, this circular account is not enough to
satisfy his demand. Instead, we take ego's attribution of anger to
alter to be his construal of alter, not as a mistrustful one, but as
one who is demanding trust. In x>retending to mistrust alter, ego is
brought vividly to confront the deep need for trust: he re-constructs
alter as one who is entitled to demand trust, one who is entitled to
be angry, one who is an oriented actor.
Garfinkel continues:
"On the other hand many victims, although they
complained that the student had no reason to be
angry with them, offered unsolicited attempts at
explanation and conciliation" (pp.51~52).
For these alters, to experience ego's motivational distrust is to
experience his anger. Again we are shown the need for a reason. Here,
even though there was no reason for anger, anger was the "reason" for
the distrust. Alter is prepared to account for one thing (distrust)
by introducing another thing that he freely admits is itself unaccoun¬
ted for. This, we consider, shows the strength of the need for a reason,
i.e. the strength of the demand for trust. The worst thing, for an
oriented actor, would be to live in a world of unaccountable distrust:
hence, distrust will be explained now in terms of something else (anger)
that can be explained later. The oriented actor says: sheer mistrust
(mistrust without reason) is a hellish world, because it makes talk
impossible, whereas anger is at worst troublesome (without apparent
reason) because even then it opens the demand for an account. At worst,
with anger alter can get angry himself if ego's "anger" turns out (as
here it does) to be without reason. When alter's attempts at concilia¬
tion. Garfinkel writes. were "of no avail there followed frank displays
of anger and 'disgust'" (p.52).
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For both ego and alter, ego's practice of motivational distrust
is impossible except as grounded in anger, i.e. in a deep demand for
trust. This was the demand that was truly compelling for all the
oriented actors in the situation. Motivational distrust is not accep¬
ted as being entitled to arise, willy-nilly, without reason, in the
natural course of events. The experiment shows us that everyday life
is not the same as sheer rage (anger without reason). Both ego and
alter will question imputed distrust, and will seek in this question¬
ing to distinguish anger (the demand for reason) from rage (the absence
of reason).
There is the spirit of the demand for trust in the students who
were surprised to find, in the words of one, that
"once I started acting the role of a hated
person I actually came to feel somewhat
hated and by the time I left the table I was
quite angry".
Garfinkel goes on to remarks
"Even more surprising to us, many reported that
they found the procedure enjoyable and this
included the real anger not only of others but
their own", (p.52)
We find this report, not so much surprising, but refreshing or renewing:
in short, enjoyable. For the report reminds us that the work of spirit
is the enjoyment of (making) the demand, the enjoyment of re-discovering
that anger does not signify collapse but can invigorate and renew by
making a demand. The students were able to enjoy the anger because they
remembered the work that goes into it: they remembered that anger is not
some abysmal reflex. The students re-discovered the enjoyment of spirit
in the midst of potentially tyrannical conditions. They re-enacted the
good of seeking to satisfy or resolve anger, the joy of remembering that




1. Desire and the problem of difference
The ironic speaker seeks to particularize the interest in worth.
We have shown that irony towards nature (e.g. physiology) is necessary
in order to develop this Desire. Irony towards nature enables the
speaker to inherit resources for the particularizing of value. Now
to particularize an interest is to make a difference to mere existence
(nature).
Central to our formulation of the ideal speaker is a notion that
in order to sustain the Desire to particularize value. resourceful
speech is required. The ideal speaker desires speech and resource¬
fulness - where resource is strongly grasped as the particularizing
of value. Yet, as we will see in the next section, there is an impor¬
tant alternative version of Desire. In effect, it says that to limit
Desire by speech and resource is to weaken it. To seek vainly to
integrate Desire and speech, this version says, is to dissipate genuine
Desire, to lose its focus, to sacrifice its ineffable purity. Genuine
Desire is irreducible to speech, it tells us. This notion directs our
inquiry towards the problem of Desire's relation to speech. First,
however, we must provide ourselves with a more fully developed notion
of Desire.
The ideal speaker wants to sustain his Desire to particularize
worth. Yet this is vastly different from a life of mere suspended
anticipation^ where desires are prolonged and unfulfilled simply in
order to keep them alive. That is, it is stronger than the life of
flirtation. The flirt has forgotten that life, since it ends, is a
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kind of consummation: a life should be satisfying rather than unsatis¬
fying. The consummate life remembers that the inexhaustible and self-
replenishing character of Desire (i.e. our true need to keep speech
open to the worthy and beneficial) is served rather than threatened
by the completion and fulfilment of particular desires.
However, the consummate life does not simply seek the glutton¬
ous fulfilment of an endless succession of desires. That is, the ideal
speaker seeks to moderate the extremes of flirtatiousness and gluttony^".
Now although they seem to be opposites, flirtatiousness and gluttony
are at least alike in that they are never able to develop or deepen
their desires. The flirt touches only the surface,whereas the glutton
consumes or destroys, and then seeks more. Their problem, then, is
that neither of them matures his desires. Because their desires are
perpetually unsatisfied, they always begin again just where they began
the first time. They are essentially repeaters: the flirt seeks to
sustain his particular desire by never consummating it, whereas the
glutton is incapable of consummating it because he doesn't know what
would satisfy him. This suggests that the difference they make is
not a real difference. They are unhappy because although they want
to make a difference they are unable to do more than repeat themselves.
This means that neither the flirt nor the glutton are spirited.
Spirit empowers the ideal speaker to particularize his interest because
it composes his willingness to trust resource. Spirit trusts resource
by giving itself over to the work of developing it through particular
expression - rather than suspecting the particularity of resource (as
remorse does) or limiting resource by imprisoning it in this or that
particular (as rage does).
T. S.Raffel,(1979) pp.31~32 develops the notion of the glutton's
greed as a way of capturing the observer's desire for perpetual
life.
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We can understand the flirt, who never reaches a conclusion with
anything, as the negative ironist. Kierkegaard says of the negative
2ironist that he has a merely abstract grasp of the Idea , and in this
sense he can be said to continuously flirt with the Idea. The flirt
is often said to be suggestive. Here we can understand suggestiveness
as a kind of speaking which never decisively takes responsibility for
what it seeks or for its own Desire, but hopes for others to make some¬
thing of its hints. In this way, the flirt can apparently be rescued
occasionally by the decisive speaker, but the rescue does not really
improve anything if it only consists of doing the flirt's work for him
rather than inviting him to begin working (i.e. deciding) for himself.
Now it might seem here that the flirt's problem is that his relation
to his desires is (too) ironic - i.e. he lives only to perpetuate
rather than satisfy his desires. Without irony, perhaps he can con¬
summate his desire and mature his passion or interest. However, it
is the glutton whose very problem is his absence of irony. The glutton
always wants more because he is unable to see the kind of difference
his desires make. What the glutton does not grasp is that particular
desires furnish the invitation, not to satiate them for their own sakes,
but to treat them as occasions through whose consummation the Desire
for worth is re-collected. Unlike the flirt, the deep speaker does
not live on the edge of Desire: but unlike the glutton, he does not
become frustrated because of the oartial character of the particular
consummation. The flirt's problem is not his irony, but the negative
character of his irony. Unlike the flirt, the deeo speaker seeks to
make conclusions when appropriate, because not to do so starves Desire
of the development it needs. The glutton on the other hand imagines
that consummation can, through multiplication, reach infinity: he seeks
~2. Kierkegaard, (1968), p.238.
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nothing else than eternal repetition. The ideal sneaker, instead of
multiplying consummation, treats the satisfaction it gives as his way
of maturing his Desire. Consummation is the development of Desire.
We want now to develop our grasp of how the achievement of
temperance, or a strong sense of Desire, requires us to reflect
on the nature of Desire. Flirtation and gluttony are weak versions
of Desire. The flirt, as we have seen, is the negative ironist as
one whose Desire remains tangential. Later, we will want to ask how
gluttony develops itself as a speech. For now, our notion of the
weakness of both is their failure to consummate their desires. The
ideal sneaker, we begin by saying, develops as a consummate speaker.
Our work is to develoo this very initial idea. We shall seek to
achieve this in terms of the ideal sneaker's problem of justice. But
first (Chapter 5) we must explore the alternative version of Desire
displayed in Kierkegaard's work. We have to respond now to the re¬
jection of Socratic Desire in a way that is not flirtatious (negatively
ironic). We must develop the strongly ironic notion of Desire.
2. Awe and the use of resource.
The idea of Desire reminds us of the charges made against Socrates
(the theorist) by Kierkegaard, and thus serves as an icon around which
we can re-consider theoretic responsibility. Kierkegaard's charge is
that Socratic ignorance is a crime against the community. We will
construct the speaker who could raise this charge by seeking to formu¬
late the ideas it draws UDon. Kierkegaard's (or any) soeech is depen¬
dent on its source in language: deeply, it needs to integrate itself
with the whole by truly belonging together with its source - rather than
forgetting its source. Speech that forgets its source invents secondary
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reasons for why It wants to sneak: polemic, competitiveness, self-
description, and so on. That is, it forgets its Desire. The theorist
seeks to re-call Desire "by asking after that which (any) speech Desires.
To say that Socratic ignorance is a crime against the community
questions Socrates' relationship to ignorance. Socrates' animation,
Kierkegaard (in our re-construction) would say, comes from his hatred
of ignorance, and in this sense, it remains abstract. Hence Socrates
remains negatively ironic. Negative irony is only a symptom of some¬
thing, a symptom of Socrates' defectiveness (his abstractness, his
negative relation to the Idea). Socrates is defective in that he does
not really know love. Socrates' Desire is merely abstract. Socrates'
speech, having its origin in his hatred of ignorance, knows the good
only by implication: the good is merely Other, other than ignorance.
For Kierkegaard, Socrates' problem is his unwillingness to defer to
the Good, to undergo a positive experience with the limit. He does
not know how to love the Good, that is to defer to it, to let himself
3
go . Socrates' pride prevents him from finding anything awesome. He
relates dutifully, rather than deferentially, to that which is greater
than himself. Yet desnite his incapacity to love, to experience the
awesome, Socrates claims to theorize. The member of the community
does not experience awe, yet he also has the modesty to defer to his
place: he does claim to be qualified to pursue the inquiry about the
good. What is criminal is to claim to be qualified when one is really
deficient, lacking in the capacity to experience the enigma of the
source. To respect the enigma of the whole is to show awe towards it.
Socrates lacks the canacity for awe because he is unwilling (too proud)
3» Notice that this makes Socrates sound like the Gritias we en¬
countered in Chapter Three. As we shall see, one version of
what Kierkegaard is saying is that there is nothing to choose
between Gritias and Socrates.
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to show acceptance of the enigmatic character of the whole. If the
whole is essentially enigmatic, if it is greater and higher than us,
then our experience of it is essentially one of not being adequate to
it. "Every good and perfect gift is from above", Kierkegaard reiter-
4
ates from the Scriptures , and it is in the nature of such gifts that
they are irremediably enigmatic. It is human folly and pride, the
folly of constructive theorizing, the failure to truly love the gift,
to imagine that its awesome and enigmatic character can ever be sur¬
mounted. It is not for us to formulate the gift but simply to accept
it with overflowing gratitude of heart.
Socrates succumbs to one of the very temptations discussed by
Kierkegaard in his discourse, the vanity of trying to tempt God: the
vanity of thinking that men can inquire about what is best for them,
which is like seeking to know God's thoughts"'. This is a refusal of
awe in favour of re-construction, a refusal of love in favour of duty,
a refusal of the ineffable experience of the awesome enigma of the
whole in favour of an artificial re-synthesis after the fact. Awe,
the acknowledgement of the enigma of the whole, is also an acceptance
that "life is a dark saying",^ an acceotance that life is not adequate
to the comprehension of the enigma. The enigma (the Other) could only
be re-constructed on this side of man's thinking, and hence this very
re-construction would essentially falsify what is Other than man. The
enigmatic Other remains unimpeachable at the hands of man because of
his essential inadequacy. Any attempt to re-collect it in sneech is
inevitably a translation that instantly sacrifices the awe-inspiring
enigma. As we see, this charge dra.ws upon one of the most fundamental
4. Kierkegaard, Two Edifying Discourses. See R.Brettal ed,1946,p.110.
5- Kierkegaard's words are: "With humble prayers and burning desires
you sought, as it were, to tempt God" (loc.cit, p.112). "You wished
that God's ideas about what was profitable to you might be your
ideas (and thus to) corrupt God's eternal Being".(loc.cit,p.114)
6. Loc.cit. p.114.
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ideas of modernity, the this-sidedness of man's thinking. What is at
issue for modernity is the precise nature of man's thinking; the rules
it must follow to preserve its this-sidedness; whether "this-sided thin¬
king" is man's most valuable possession, or whether existence, experience,
etc, is more fundamental-, and so on. But at the root of all these con¬
troversies is the notion that thinking, whether it be the most or the
least valuable thing, is incapable of venturing into the realm of what
is greater than man without essentially distorting the whole. The re¬
lation to the whole that awe recommends is one of deference and a deep
sense of one's own inadequacy. Awe is sustained in the notion of life
as a "dark saying": awe accents that "life is a dark saying", that is,
that life is a kind of darkness in the face of the whole.
This returns us to the conversation in Chapter Three between
Socrates and Critias. We recall that a decisive point was reached in
the conversation when Critias for the first time gave expression to a
notion of strangeness . He became willing to acknowledge his own igno¬
rance and to ask Socrates to "make me understand what you mean" (173a).
Socrates had achieved this transformation from intelligence to the
Desire to inquire by taking the risk of indulging Critias. At this
point, Kierkegaard might commend Socrates: the fruit of the risk, for
Kierkegaard, would be that instead of experiencing his own intelligence,
Critias experiences awe.
It is what Socrates makes of this situation that Kierkegaard
finds objectionable. Instead of remaining with Critias in the purity
of Desire that is his awe, Socrates continues in motion by developing
further questions. Eventually he tells Critias and Charmides that
they still do not know what temoerance is. Inquiry must therefore con¬
tinue . Socrates' refusal to accept awe as the terminus of conversation
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is construed, by Kierkegaard as showing that deeply there is nothing to
choose between Critias and Socrates. Kierkegaard would say they are
the same in that Socrates' development in the face of awe amounts to
his election of Critian intelligence and foolish pride. For Kierke¬
gaard, the Socratic Desire to formulate is the same as intelligence.
It will not defer to, but instead manipulates, the Good.
Awe rejects Socrates (the theorist) because he does not know
where the quest for knowledge (theorizing) stops and awe begins. Con¬
sider here the notions of silence recommended by awe, and by Socrates.
Kierkegaard starts with his inadequacy (in the face of the enigma).
He insists that the power that limits one (the whole) must be exper¬
ienced as superior. "Every great and every -oerfect gift comes from
above". Awe is essentially mute in the face of the higher power: awe
does not seek to converse with what leaves it speechless. Yet, when
the god spoke to Socrates through the Delphic oracle, and told Socrates
that he was the wisest of all, far from leaving Socrates speechless
it simply invited him to greater efforts of conversation. Socrates
did not experience awe, but instead he decided to test the truth of
the oracle. Awe begins with the experience of inadequacy and seeks
to generate the immutable, the muteness of awe, the unconversational
intuition of enigma: we might say, awe's scepticism is most deeply
directed towards conversation and its attendant pride and vanity.
Instead, the theorist starts with the adequacy of what he needs (to
recollect, within speech or conversation, the influence of the whole)
and seeks through inquiry to re-achieve the aporia of speech with
respect to its beginning, as the incentive to continue and deeoen
the inquiry. Being named by the oracle does not silence Socrates: it
compels him to inquire.
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Kierkegaard wants, not so much to stop, as to be stopped hy the
awe-insoiring, to be silenced by it. Kierkegaard thinks that Socrates
does not know when to stop, that he is really like self-exegesis,
talking endlessly. Kierkegaard's notion of the limit, the ground of
the community, is that it mutes us. Although self-exegesis does not
know it, it is grounded in the ineffable. Kierkegaard might quarrel
with self-exegesis because it is deaf to awe, because it is intemperate
and opinionated, but deeply he seeks to silence it (within himself) by
bringing it to defer to its limit. Kierkegaard, who treats the grounds
of community as awesome, wants self-exegesis (which is ignorant of its
own limit) to be awed by him. Kierkegaard is attracted by the idea
7
of the speech that will "will one thing" , the speech that will show
its deference to the awesome, the speech that will silence multis (many-
ness). Socrates rejects this invitation because he does not want to
stop self-exegesis. Because Socrates deeply accepts his beginning
(the adequacy of Desire) he is able to resist injustice (stopping self-
exegesis) .
Awe begins with its sense of inadequacy, with its guilt, with
its problem of self—identity. It treats man as the essentially passive
recipient of the gifts from above: its experience of Other confirms
its inadequacy. Thus its experience of Other treats it as complete
or conclusive with respect to man. This is a beginning decisive in
its unhappiness, its self-oreoccuoation, its sense of estrangement.
Awe, because it begins unhappily, is oriented to a decisive stop, a
stooping that abolishes (mutes) the unhaopiness of its own beginning.
Alternative to this is the idea of the theorist as one who, since he
accents the adequacy of that with which he begins, is able to stop.
7. Kierkegaard, Purity of Heart is to Will One Thing. See
Bretall ed, 19^6, pp.271 et seq.
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Socrates can start and end conversations in a strong spirit because
starting re-activates Desire (shows our acceptance of Desire) and
stopping does not close the Desire, but enjoys the consummation that
the conversation provides in the form of its achieved methods, prac¬
tices, and conclusions. Stopping is not (as in the case of awe) orien¬
ted to the exhaustion of Desire, but rather to its replenishment. To
stop a conversation is to resist the temptation to make it go on for¬
ever, thus diluting Desire, but instead to keen the Desire to oarti-
cularize worth fertile. When conversation begins in the light of
adequacy, then this means: it need not be preoccupied about stopping.
What stops is the particular, occasioned, inquiry into some idea, the
composed self-recollection that answers to Desire. What never stops
is the call of Desire itself, the need to converse, the need to for¬
mulate. Stopping is composed rather than essential, decisive rather
than necessary, chosen rather than ineluctable. One stops when it is
appropriate to, not when one is forced to.
Awe's relation to Other (that which it treats as essentially
enigmatic) has profound consequences for the kind of speaking it comes
to generate. We have spoken already of awe's estrangement from its
source: awe's relationship of deference and self-annihilation in the
face of the enigma means that language remains a stranger to it. The
grounds of speech remain hidden and unfathomable: the source of the
community's practices is awesome. Awe,in short, has no notion of the
intrinsic which in this context means, the ideas that enable us to
collect resource with language. In a sense, it "overstates" the in¬
trinsic character of the source, thereby rendering it extrinsic, or
external to the inquirer. It overstates the intrinsic by treating man,
the inquirer, as extrinsic, as deeply estranged from source (the intrin-
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sic). Speech and. language remain essentially estranged: awe's notion
°f what is greater than speech (i.e. the enigmatic) does not invite
g
or entertain the belonging together of sneech with its source.
3- Awe and artifice.
Awe is that relation towards one's Other (that which silences
one) that treats it as self-sufficient, signalling the sneaker's impo¬
tence or insignificance. Awe says: the Other, in its ineffable,
irreducible, and irremediable otherness, is awe-inspiring. Instead,
we seek (by coming to formulate Desire) to treat Other, what silences
us, as the need to formulate (i.e. the need to converse, to seek
principle within speech). The need to formulate Desire (to moderate
the temptation of awe) is the need to live in a fertile way with what
is Other: the need to overcome its strangeness without seeking to
familiarize it, the need to overcome its abstractness without simply
concretizing it, the need to speak from within its grip without be¬
coming merely intense.
The Desire for the expression of value risks ironizing communal
practises in order to re-open the idea of worth as a problem. This
is a notion of an end that can never be terminated. Awe, however,
rejects theorizing on the basis that it risks (all or any) community.
Awe is indifferent to the particularities of the community that is
established (it is apolitical in this sense), but goes on to insist
that the community ought to be recognized as awesome. Awe accuses
theorizing of the failure to show trust. We learned from Garfinkel
in the previous chanter that trust is a central ingredient in social
interaction: without trust, life would be impossible. Without trust,
8. The argument of this section has been indebted in particular to
Alan Blum.
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the competence through which the social is enacted would be incaoaci-
tated: it would soon cease to function. For Garfinkel, trust estab¬
lishes the possibility of social life (of the moral order "without")
by enforcing and thus maintaining the context within which normal
social competencies become operative. Garfinkel shows that the life
of man is not "nasty, brutish, and short", that it does not need an
external sovereignty, because it has its own sovereignty internal to
it - the rule of trust. Awe's strongest claim, then, is to trust: it
establishes the centrality of trust for life, and also charges the
theorist with a lack of trust. Awe says that the theorist can never
justify anger because he does not know how to trust.
Although Garfinkel does not explicitly draw the distinction we
have made in the previous chapter between experimental and motivational
distrust, the consequences of this distinction surface in various ways
throughout his writing - showing that it is an implicit resource for
him. Most importantly, of course, it has decisive implications for
his notion of adequate sociological method: whereas hitherto, most
sociologists have been constructive theorists, seeking to remedy the
indexicality (conventionality) of everyday life, bureaucracy, etc,
Garfinkel seeks to understand the intricacies of the "technical mystery"
through which a "person1s compliance with the attitude of daily life
9
as a morality" is enforced. The basic point here is that since man
is completely conventional, and since a person's compliance consists
of his compliance to a convention, the enforcement is not imposed from
outside (by "society" or whatever) but is re-achieved, from moment to
moment, by the speaker himself. What is re-achieved is not passive
obedience but rather, the whole edifice of convention which does not
9. Garfinkel 1967 p.50- Subsequent references are to page numbers.
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exist outside of this ongoing re-achievement. This leads Garfinkel
to his famous condemnation of the judgemental dope syndrome within
sociology, that is, the use of explanations which fall prey to exter¬
nalizing the order governing man's speech and action. Garfinkel
writes :
"The common feature of these 'models of man'
is that courses of judgement. ....
(involving) the person's use of common sense
knowledge are treated as epfphenomenal"
(p.68, my emphasis).
By treating "courses of judgement" as "epiohenomenal", these "models
of man" treat speech as being ruled by something prior to speech:
motives, interests, social conditions etc. Garfinkel, then, has a
principled interest in showing that man is not governed by the external,
but governs himself through what is internal (convention): he seeks
to achieve this by showing that there is nothing external to conven¬
tion. Garfinkel is in effect saying that by treating conventions as
epiphenomenal, those theorists who espouse "models of man" are them¬
selves practicing motivational distrust. By casting doubt over what
they would call the "rationalizations" by which common-sense accounts
for itself, they place the integrity of convention in jeopardy.
Garfinkel's technique of experimental distrust is designed, as
we have said, not to risk the stability of conventional practices, but
on the contrary to show their truly enforcsable (powerful) character -
and incidentally to protect them from those who dismiss them as epiphe-
nomena. This reminds us of the Greece within which the Sophists also
treated convention as epiphenomenal, as a mere "manner of speaking"
that could be brought for a price in order to further one's private
motives and interests. Now we can see how awe (Garfinkel) opposes
the sophist, by showing him that it is impossible to think outside of
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convention, to think the other-than-convention (nature) so dearly
valued by the sophist. By showing the sophist that art (convention),
although chronologically coming after nature, is really prior to it
in the sense of being more fundamental, awe wants to show him that
it is impossible for man to be ruled merely by capricious motive:
such a man would be unable to sneak. Man is fundamentally social,
not by virtue of "the human condition", his ontological constitution,
and so on, but because of the nature of speech as convention. The
question now emerges: given the option of showing the priority of art
or convention, why would the theorist choose to risk convention through
the relentlessness of Socratic conversation? Is it not perverse, awe
asks,to refuse the invitation of awe, the invitation that protects
man from the sophist? Why risk art (convention) when one has the
option of showing its awesome character? The theorist now is challenged
(called upon) to give a reason for the risk he takes. The deep speaker
replies to awe's charge by reflecting on the need for the risk. The
risk is necessary because without it Desire is killed. In other words,
awe,by refusing the risk, weakens the influence of worth on our speech
and action. Awe, by protecting us from what is worst in man (unregu¬
lated impulse) also segregates us from what is best. It prevents the
work of transforming the idea of worth into what is worthy in man
(virtue). Man, although saved from being his own worst enemy, is
denied the opportunity of befriending what is best.
Kierkegaard provides us with telling usage for this idea. In
his Philosophical Fragments he takes up the problem of the teacher and
his relation to truth. He begins by discussing Socratic maeutics.
Kierkegaard comments that the foundation or premise upon which this
practice rests is that, for Socrates, "at bottom every human being is
19^
in possession of the Truth" : in other words, it is not necessary for
Socrates to introduce anything extraneous, but merely to induce his
interlocutor to remember what he had forgotten. Now although Kier¬
kegaard' s notion has an embryonic truth in it, because of the abstract
way in which he states it, i.e. because (although true) he does not
really understand it, he is unable to accent it. Kierkegaard needs
a notion that would enable him to agree to the thesis that although
we often forget the Truth, we are "at bottom in oossession of the
Truth". Our naradigm for this is language, the learning of which is
dependent on the orientation of the learner towards its order, that
is, on the belonging of the learner within language^. The idea of
language enables us to give a sense to (i.e. to particularize) the
pronosition that we are already in the grip of Truth, and that our
need is to besoeak (give usage to) this grip.
The issue now is this: what relation between usage and its
source constitutes inquiry? For the ideal speaker, usage is needed
in order to deeoen our relation to our source: usage consummates our
Desire to be influenced by the worthwhile. The ideal speaker seeks
to make his usage compelling (he seeks to be comoelled by it) because
otherwise he becomes flirtatious or gluttonous. For both the flirt
and the glutton any usage will serve their purposes, but their problem
is that no usage will satisfy. The flirt does not mature his interest
because he is untouched by any of the usages he skates over, whereas
the glutton is a greedy character because, given his aim of eliminating
his need for the realm of usage,he seeks to voraciously consume (incor¬
porate) it. The glutton wants to be a kind of empire unto himself.
10. Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments. See R.Bretall ed, 19^-6,p . 158.
11. Mathematics, of course, stands as another instructive paradigm
of learning as the re-collection of our "forgotten" knowledge.
See alato, The Meno, 1956.
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The glutton seems to say "I am (or long to be) self-sufficient, I
have (or long to have) everything I need to live to the full". He
spends forever packing his bags and never gets to make the journey -
whereas the flirt never stays anywhere long enough to need a bag.
Instead, the ideal speaker seeks the right measure of preparation,
movement, and arrival (stopping) in his relationship to usage. When
he takes up a particular usage, he does so not with the intention of
simply drooping it tomorrow, nor of exhausting every possibility in
advance, but rather in the spirit of consummating his work.
In the absence of a compelling version of Truth as that which
we already possess, Kierkegaard conceives a need to import it from
outside. He wants to treat the moment in which the truth is revealed
as decisive, so that it can never be forgotten. The problem with the
Socratic conception, says Kierkegaard, is that the teacher is merely
an occasion, a vanishing moment serving only to remind us of the
whole and then disappearing within it. "How rare", Kierkegaard exclaims,
12"is such magnanimity!" Because of the contradiction between the
Socratic notion of continuous re-achievement and the sheer scarcity
of magnanimous teachers "in a time like ours when almost every
13
second person is an authority" , Kierkegaard experiences the need for
something less risky, something more assured. The moment itself must
be made somehow decisive so that its lesson will never be forgotten.
In a word, the moment must be made awesome. The decisive moment becomes
external to the speaker. It becomes the good and perfect gift "from
above" (i.e. from outside), through which all is changed. As we know,
this awe leads Kierkegaard to re-construct the Christian notion of the
teacher as saviour (as divine); first,
12. Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments: in R.Bretall ed 19^+6,0.156.
13- Loc.cit., p.156.
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"if (the moment) is to have decisive signifi¬
cance the seeker must be destitute of the Truth
uo to the very moment of his learning it"; then,
"if the learner is to acquire the Truth, the
Teacher must bring it to him". 14 (my emphasis)
The point here, however, is that awe externalizes its Other. Other
is externalized in Kierkegaard by being sanctified as ineffable, by
being called "the Truth"; in Garfinkel by being treated as extrinsic
(since nothing other than convention is enforcable). Awe refuses to
take the risk of Desiring what is best because its principle (protec¬
ting us from what is worst) sees the risk as unjustified.
Awe deoends on artifice, on technique, in order to generate its
passion, and in this sense we can say that its Desire is artificial.
This surfaces in Kierkegaard as the nroblem of uncertainty and the
"passion of the infinite". Kierkegaard draws a cleavage between the
objective and the subjective. The essential truth is inwards it is
a question of "the relationship sustained by the existing individual,
in his own existence, to the content of his utterance"''"^. It is the
"passionate inwardness" that is decisive, not the "objective content"
(here Kierkegaard is guarding above all against hypocrisy): so he
defines truth as "an objective uncertainty held fast in an appropriation
process of the most passionate inwardness"^. Indeed, given this
divorce of utterance (usage) from intent (inquiry) - a divorce intro¬
duced by the hypocrite and treated as decisive by Kierkegaard - then,
the higher the degree of uncertainty, the better for "passionate in¬
wardness". Hence the attractiveness of the "paradox" of Christianity
17
for Kierkegaard. "Without risk", he comments, "there is no faith".
14. Loc.cit., p.158.




Notice that this is to treat risk as embracing; uncertainty (and hence
becoming fixated upon it): instead we want to recommend risk as the
work of sustaining one's self in the face of uncertainty,for the sake
of the Desire for what is good rather than protective.
Kierkegaard continues: "If I am capable of grasping God objec¬
tively, I do not believe, but precisely because I cannot do this I
must believe". The believer remains "out upon the deep, over seventy
18
thousand fathoms of water, still preserving ( his) faith" . This
image nicely captures awe's gluttony as a sort of whipping up of pas¬
sion by relying on what is external. Indeed, because source is
essentially external for awe, our passion (since it is incapable of
being a genuine Desire for the influence of worth on the actual content
of our utterances) has to be whipped up artificially, through the use
of devices like the "paradox", the "seventy thousand fathoms", and so
on. This has its analogue in Garfinkel in the estrangement he needs
to introduce in order to make "commonplace scenes visible", that is,
in order to be able to see. In itself, the accomplishment of the
moral order is something that members "obstinately depend upon, recog-
19
nize, use, and take for granted". The moral order is obstinately
familiar - and this requires the forceful resistance of the theorist.
Knowledge is seen as a struggle against a resistant object, as a kind
of war against the recalcitrant.
Now Garfinkel says that social settings can only be known and
understood "from within" yet this basic recommendation needs to be
18. Loc. cit. p. 182.
Compare this desire for oceans of water with the following passage
from The Republic as quoted by Kierkegaard himself as a prelude to
The Concept of Irony. "The fact is that when a man is out of his
depth, whether he has fallen into a little swimming bath or into
mid-ocean, he has to swim all the same". Here the focus of atten¬
tion is on the swimming rather than on the water. The work of
dialectic is not served, any more than that of swimming, by intro¬
ducing artificially the ubiquitous depths of the unknown!
19. Garfinkel, 1967, p.l, my emphasis.
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examined more fully in the context of aw®. It is usually taken to
suggest that the theorist ought not externalize himself from the object
of his inquiry (the "commonplace scene"'). On the contrary, the inquirer
is to make it more (not less) vivid than it already is. Yet this is a
strange - in the literal sense- version of making usage more vivid,
since it requires the technique of estrangement, of "making trouble",
in order to locate the theorist "within" the setting. "Making visible"
requires "making trouble". Garfinkel's original sense of the awesome
character of "commonplace scenes" requires that he too, artificially
whip up the passion of knowing and understanding. As with Kierkegaard
earlier, the passion is artificial - not only because it depends for
its life on device and strategy (the "seventy thousand fathoms", the
"trouble", the "risk" that is not really a risk but a device) but more
deeoly, because it is born of the initial estrangement of the Other.
When the source of Desire is estranged, passion has to be re-introduced
artificially by the speaker. Passion comes to rely on the device, or
the trick. This can help us to understand the problem awe has in being
convincing. Awe has a tendency to be melodramatic, owing to the tenuous
character of its passion. The community of awe is not a teaching or
conversational community, but one in which the players outbid each
other for heightened effect. Awe is melodramatic in that, like melo¬
drama, it has no grip on the intrinsic. Sheer emotion without substance
is heightened beyond all proportion because sheer emotion is our only
response when the source of our speech becomes estranged. As a result
of this estrangement, nothing rings true any longer: an atmosphere of
unreality is established in which there is an increasing tendency towards
hysteria.
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4. The martyrdom of awe.
What is it that holds these different versions of awe together?
It is the idea of the split life. The split life is the life that
segregates its own speech from the source of that speech: it produces
speech that treats its own origin as unspeakable. The social order
problem this generates becomes most visible when we consider the ques¬
tion of community. For awe, the grounds of community are enigmatic,
unspeakable. Either one defers to the enigma (is awed by the grounds),
or else one is a member. The member is deaf to awe, he simply follows
communal practices and usages. Yet if the member is not compelled by
any sense of awe to respect the community, how shall the community
sustain itself? The member must have, or be given, some way of remem¬
bering and bequeathing community. There is a need for discipline, duty,
intelligibility and social order in the face of awe, for awe in itself
can provide only muteness rather than speech: in any case, the member
is immune to awe. What awe loves (the enigma) is essentially mute,
that is, removed from life: because of this, awe comes to inhabit an
inner realm that is separated from the possibility of conversation.
But in the realm of life, awe must surrender to the policing of duty
and enforceable intelligibility. This, then, is the split that piety
towards language produces: that an unconversational duty to the grounds
of community must be sustained as the price of the experience of the
enigmatic. For awe, the Socratic practice of inquiring into grounds,
into the belonging together of speech and source, risks community.
That is, it places the community in jeopardy. Socrates raises questions
which seek to induce the member to address the grounds of his practices,
to question the nature of the good community, to go beyond duty as the
expression of his relation to the social. Where Kierkegaard invites
others to share the ineffable experience of awe as an inner and essen-
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tially subjective truth , thus protecting (by segregating) the grounds
of the communal, Socrates seeks to make grounds conversational. In the
present context, this means that Socrates seeks to treat conversation
as a method of re-invoking the Desire for the source's influence in
that very conversation. Conversation collects itself around its Desire
because the Desire needs to be given a life by being made conversational.
By collecting conversation around its Desire (to re-enact or display
the influence of its source in the good) the strongly passionate
speaker seeks to unify his life in/with his sneaking.
Now if the flirtatious life is dispersed among many things,
having only a tenuous relation to any one of them, what is greed? In
a way, greed also embodies a unified life, for it is usually fixated
upon a particular object - money, food, or even life. Yet the unity
of greed differs crucially from the unity of Desire, in that greed is
fixated (as we say) on a single object, whereas Desire develops itself
by particularizing value within speech. Greed treats the aim of its
desire as an object that will satiate it whereas Desire's aim is the
practice that consummates its relation to its source.
Now we can see that awe resonates in its single-mindedness
with greed. Awe is moral greed or moral intemperance in that it is a
kind of craving for unlimited good, or good that is not limited by
the finite usage through which it shows itself. In the case of awe,
single-mindedness takes the form of intensity. This gives to awe its
sense of its own nobility, not in the sense that it equates itself with
what is higher, but rather because it differentiates itself from the
mundane on the basis of this intensity. Awe's intensity is its passion
20. See "Truth is Subjectivity", in Kierkegaard, 19^1, pp.169-22^.
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for the good that has turned into greed for the good, i.e. it has
turned "the Good" into an object of devotion rather than the value
that needs particularizing. This is why the intense person converses
with difficulty. He has always imagined and feared that to risk con¬
summating his desires would risk dispersiveness, and that this would
make him immoral. As a result, he relies on his intensity to act as
the motor of his talk: his "outwardness" (the need for conversation)
is made dependent on a "deeo inwardness" rather than on spiritedness.
Socrates would say that awe's discovery is only the beginning. Nobody
willingly does evil, he says: that is, we all notionally subscribe to
good. Conversation seeks to turn the notional into knowledge (hence
realized virtue) by particularizing it.
What is the nature of awe's intensity, and what is its relation
to the split life? Intensity is in awe of the good. It finds it dif¬
ficult to live with the idea of source (the good): hence it elevates
artificial and grandiose ideas like "being shaken to the foundations".
Intensity is the outcome of an awe that treats itself as an experience
of the good, pure and simple. The experience of awe is regarded as a
kind of salvation. Yet awe is segregated from its source, because the
source of which it is an overwhelming experience remains, for all that,
ineffable. Awe is segregated from its source (its Other) because it
experiences its Other as irremediably estranged. Awe feels permanently
estranged from what is Other, because it knows that Other's nature
could never be made to coincide with self-consciousness. The self-
consciousness or SDeech of man can only, by its very nature, violate
what is truly Other to that speech. Indeed,in a sense, says awe, this
is as it ought to be, for by virtue of this situation, Other preserves
its character as truly Other. To seek to familiarize Other, to domes-
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ticate it, to make our soeech (or minds) coincide somehow with it,
would, at the same instant, effect a transformation of Otherness into
Sameness, thus losing the Other as such by making it non-Other. Our
task, in response to awe, is to formulate a strong notion of Other
that no longer generates estrangement but instead invites friendship
and conversation. Other is greater than self-consciousness yet it
requires conversation (i.e. the realized consciousness of value within
practices) rather than devotion (i.e. the treatment of Other as an
object of greed). This task, as it has now emerged, was bequeathed to
us by the opening chanter.
Awe sustains an estranged Other in the belief that this preserves
its character as "Other"(strange), that is, it estranges Other as its
way of resisting disuersiveness (the undifferentiated) or the rule of
science (the domestication of whatness). Awe opposes science on the
basis that it smugly divides Being into areas that it then appropriates.
21
i.e. that it lacks a strong sense of what is Other to it. (Shortly we
shall see however, that in a strange way awe also generates science or
bureaucracy). Yet awe also onposes the theorist because he makes Other
/ 22(as source of value) the source of influence rather than noumenal
The theorist desires the pleasure of conversation i.e. the lively
recovery of the ideas that re-enact sneech as belonging with what is
Other (its source in language).
Awe relates to Other by treating it as mystical or ineffable.
Awe is a witness to something unsoeakable and majestic: awe's typical
emotion towards the majestic is fear. For the religious version of awe,
the "fear of God" (of majesty) arises from a sense that His majesty
21. See Blum, 197^-.Gh.2, for a formulation of science's attitude
to whatness.
22. In Kant's sense. See Kant, 193^< pp.180-191.
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might not even permit one to live: for the sociologist who experiences
awe towards the massive objectivity or enforceability of the social,
his fear is perhaps an apprehension that the awesomeness of society
makes it pointless for him to speak at all. Analytically, both ver¬
sions fear the silence that the awesome (the enforceable) threatens to
enforce. The awesome could render any speech in its presence (and
typically, the awesome-God or society - is omnipresent ) irrelevant,
23
meaningless or pointless . Awe has the problem of producing a speech
that is not irrelevant, meaningless, or pointless. The awed speaker
imagines that any strong notion of responsibility is pre-empted by
the power (majesty) of the awesome. Responsibility here means: being
able to make a difference, or having a soul that has the capacity to
choose worth. For the ideal speaker, it is the exercise of this
responsibility that gives him the incentive to speak. For awe, how¬
ever, this incentive cannot arise, since responsibility is seen as
impossible. We suggest that instead, awe solves the problem of gener¬
ating soeech by speaking as a martyr. The root of the word "martyr"
2k
tells us that originally it meant "witness" . We can think of a
martyr as a fearful witness of the awesome. He wants to remain shocked
by what he has seen. The martyr sneaks out of a sense of resignation
(as the antidote to the complacency of the unawed speaker). The
martyr has already accented fate as terroristic: somehow, he has
been chosen, like Abraham, to bear the burden or the mark of being
spoken to by the awesome. Awe's mistake is to treat that which terror¬
izes it as its fate, i.e. as its true calling or challenge to become
what it is. Since awe is in fact engendered by the arbitrary and irrat-
23• novice sociology students who complain of the "pointlessness"
of seminar discussion might be seen as being in awe of the
social, and simply accepting the silence it reduces them to.
2k. Chambers's, 1901.
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ional power that terrorizes it, we can imagine that awe takes its
hearings from a notion of the terroristic father. Awe lacks a good
notion of authority because it imagines authority to be unlovable.
For awe authority is fear-inspiring, majestic, terrible. Awe's
problem is that it treats its fate as something externally and bur-
densomely imposed upon it: it fails to collect its talk around a notion
of the intrinsic nature of our fatedness.
To say that our fate is intrinsic is not to say that its
invention is merely a matter of each individual's subjective preference.
Earlier we recalled that Socrates was spoken to by the Delphic oracle,
given a sign from a source external to his individual self. Rather
than merely being awed by the word of the oracle, Socrates tested it
out in conversation to see if it was true. In spite of the authority
of the oracle, Socrates would not merely passively accept what it told
him, but sought to re-create its truth through his own conversation,
not simply fo confirm it, but to deepen it by finding out its true
meaning. So the intrinsic nature of our fate has nothing to do with
the source of the signs it gives us (i.e. whether these come from
"inside" us or "outside" us), but rather with our need to live uo to
our fate, that is, our need to recover our collectedness with our fate.
Our fate is strongly ours , because it requires us to become what we
really are, to realize our strongest possibilities: as such it is
truly Desirable. Living up to our fate (i.e. collecting our speech
around what is truly compelling) resonates with inquiring into and
doing what is most Desirable. The life of Desire is integrated with
its fate whereas awe is estranged from (terrorized by) it. We can
anticipate that this will have far-reaching consequences for the
authoritative and compelling character of speech.
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Awe speaks as a martyr because it centres its speech around its
experience of constraint. To be awed by something is to be under sheer
constraint to it because it is stronger. Analytically this results in
speechlessness, in the sense of being incapable of making a difference,
incapable of participating. Awe speaks as a martyr because it feels
itself to be constrained. Its speech will respect the constraint out
of which it is generated by speaking as a martyr, that is, by saying
only what is permissible. As Kierkegaard would nut it, awe will resist
trying to tempt God. The theorist "temnts God" in that, by re-collecting
v
source in speech, he seeks to demonstrate source's need for speech.
Now since what constrains us is also ineffable, it is impossible
to be genuinely compelled (in speech) by it. To be truly constrained
would be to be silent: yet this would leave the field open for speech
that is unruled by awe. That is, mere silence might invite the theorist
to usurp resource. When awe sneaks as a martyr it also stipulates the
possibilities for speech. Since to be truly constrained would result
in silence, this means that speech is a kind of freedom. However, it
is really the freedom of indifference, non-particioation, estrangement
from what is truly compelling. For example, the idea of value-freedom
says that values must be eliminated because they are subjective and
idiosyncratic. The mistake here is not the devaluation of the merely
private, but rather the devaluation of value by treating it as if it
were merely private. "Value-free" speech refers, then, to the decisive
absence of what is valuable. Speech, after awe, gets divided into two
realms: the "word of God" - or the miraculous poetry of the Scriptures
25to which Kierkegaard gives voice in some of his writing - and the
word of man, in which the truly compelling is not heard. For the awed
speaker, value becomes uncompelling. The reason for this is that the
25• Kierkegaard Philosophical Fragments. See R.Bretall ed,19^6
pp.170-172.
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exoerience of awe is like the famous River of Forgetfulness: awe forgets
the centrality of our participation in what is compelling. Awe forgets
that our source needs to be (become) Desirable to us. Without our
participation in what is compelling, the latter is re-created as tyran
nical or terroristic: the compelling is treated as alien power rather
than authoritative source. Without the work of making source desirable
to us, it simply burdens and exhausts us.
Awe's objection to the deep speaker is that he tries to enter
a relation with what could only tyrannize us. The deeo speaker con¬
spires in the enslavement of man by trying to establish a speaking
relationship where there could only be domination and one-sidedness.
The deep speaker's pretence of relationship obscures what is actually
tyranny. Since value could only tyrannize us (rather than influence
us), awe will martyr itself - that is, refrain from speaking about the
unspeakable and allow man the freedom to operate at "his own level".
A famous example of the awesome is time . in St. Augustine's remark
that although we all (think we) know very well what it is, as soon
as we try to speak about it, it slips away from us. A defining feature
of the mysterious is that it is always of the verge of "slioping away
from us". Awe accents the awesome (e.g. time) by accenting this nro-
hibition it places on soeech. Awe accents its own death (in the sense
that it can never teach but at best edify) because it is grounded on
the notion that it is impossible for it to give an account (a logos)
of its authority to its offspring. Awe is the father or nostalgia -
which we might think of as its daughter - and bureaucracy - which we
might think of as its son. Nostalgia and bureaucracy cohabit in an
26
uneasy comoromise in modernity. Nostalgia is the guilty memory of
26. Hence modernity, in our sense, is the "nost-Christian" age, in
that Christianity necessarily generates it as its successor.
We might say, modernity is the snlit life of Christianity's
offspring.
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the dead parent, who after all did embody (a mysterious and terrible)
authority, and bureaucracy is the soeech that re-affirms the absence
or death of authority, since the parent could not speak of his autho¬
rity, or not in such a way as to make it Desirable or lovable. Nostalgia
and bureaucracy are both collected around the problem of what is compel¬
ling for speech: in the absence of the authoritative, their notion of
"why speak?" has to be resolved without a real reason, a reason that
compels our deepest assent. Nostalgia and bureaucracy re-construct
their sense of "why speak?" on the basis of dissatisfaction rather than
the experience of consummation. Nostalgia looks back in the hope of
finding the origin awe has denied it: bureaucracy speaks in the measure
of man because it accepts awe's notion of Other's ineffability.
5. Awe and the force of the compelling.
Because awe segrates and dichotomizes language and speech, it
mis-conceives our relation to language. Because it forfeits any notion
of the belonging together of speech and language, it remains incapable
of re-collecting the idea of the compelling. For, if speech is outside
of and essentially posterior to language, then language cannot be com¬
pelling in any strong sense. For language to be compelling, awe argues,
it would have to compel us to speak in particular ways. Since unlimited
ways of speaking are possible, that is, since language does not compel
us to speak particularly in any way whatever, awe treats language as
if it were undifferentiated, merely like a medium through which we
soeak. Language is weakened, now, into a medium or system that permits
soeech to occur but has no intrinsic relation to what speech says. This
intrinsic relation, overlooked by awe, is that of source to utterance.
The deep speaker seeks to treat this relation, not as enigmatic, but
as an incentive to properly orient utterance to that to which it is
related, its source.
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It is as if awe insisted, on language being an active agent, and
when it does not comply, deciding that it must be merely a passive
medium instead. Awe forgets the need to develop the Desire through
which speech re-achieves the compelling character of what it has chosen
to say by re-orienting its chosen usage towards the notion. Language
does not compel us in the manner of an active agent; nor is it merely
an abstract medium; rather it makes the demand that our speech re-call
what compels it. We answer this demand by collecting ourselves to for¬
mulate the whatness of the ideas we resourcefully use. Speech faces
the demand to show the Desirability of the particular ideas that make
usages, in all their variety, possible. It must generate true parti¬
cularity out of sheer variety.
Awe is the treatment of what is other than man as awesome. Awe
says that only two possibilities exist concerning man's relation to his
source: either he is awed, and hence silenced, by his source, or else
he is separated, "freed" from it in the world of speech. Awe says
that men are constrained to choose between paying silent homage to
their source or else speaking in its absence. We could understand
modernity as imagining itself to face the dilemma, in choosing to speak,
of whether to lament or simply ratify the absence of source.
Because neither awe nor the "free speech" that is adrift from
source engage in the work of particularizing, they share an abstract
notion of source. Source is treated as awesome when it is thought
that its necessary yet insufficient character is something to be passively
accepted. Source is necessary in that it makes possible any action or
speech whatever: yet it is insufficient in that, in itself, it does
not generate particular speeches or actions. Whatever is said or done
owes its possibility to its source in language, yet it is not determined
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in its particular character by what founds it. We treat this situation
not as awesome, but rather as the need for work. Work wants to turn
this situation into a Desirable one by accepting its necessity as the
opportunity to develop Desire. The ideal speaker works because he
wants to develop Desire. This means that his work is oriented towards
particularizing a strong sense of what is necessary to him. The nece¬
ssity of source is not (as awe imagines) an index of insufficiency but
rather the openness that demands us to re-collect a sense of what is
sufficient. Abstract necessity needs work in order to be developed.
The uncoerciveness of source is the origin of our Desire to develop
its necessity into our grasp of our need for what suffices. Our
particularized and developed Desire will develop our grasp of what is
necessary for us. Desire points to man's need to work as a continuous
measure of what he is. The work man needs to do is to recover the com¬
pelling character of his source by particularizing its influence.
Awe treats source as uncompelling in that its necessary but
insufficient character is taken to brook no further intervention. Our
source can coerce us (when we are awed by it) but it cannot compel us.
Coercion is one-way: it works on something externally, enforcing some¬
thing upon it. The person who is coerced acts or speaks in a way that
he experiences as originating outside himself: he remains separated
from it to the extent that he feels merely coerced. He is not par¬
ticipating in his own speech. For awe, since the source is coercive,
it cannot be decisively oriented to. Awe treats source as uncompelling
because it does not drive us to particularize in any specific way.
Source is uncompelling because it does not drive together speech and
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language: it merely coerces our silence. This is how awe, as we saw
earlier, expects the source of speech to be an active agent. Instead,
the ideal speaker wants a notion of the compelling that makes a demand
upon the speaker's responsibility. The source does not bequeath its
compelling character, but demands the enactment of Desire as the
speaker's work of developing what truly compels him.
Awe treats source as coercive (extrinsic) rather than compelling
(intrinsic), yet it does not generate any particular speeches or actions.
Particular speeches or actions, then, depend on a kind of separation
from source, the separation of freedom, yet also the separation of
ignorance. Awe says that the freedom to speak depends on a kind of
ignorance. It treats the sneaker as one who has forfeited his possible
interest in his source. Garfinkel, for example, writes:
"One matter....is excluded from (members')
interests: practical actions and practical
circumstances are not in themselves a tonic,
let alone a sole topic of their inquiries". 27
Members take the "awesome phenomenon" of the accomplishment of social
structure for granted. "Members take for granted that a member must
at the outset "know" the settings in which he is to operate" (p.8).
That is, members take whatever knowledge it is that membership consists
of for granted. Membership is that which takes it-self for granted.
The member's ignorance implies, for awe, that he is not compel¬
led by his source. The member speaks out of his disinterest in the
source, his ignorance that is also his freedom. This means, above all,
that the member is seen as artful. Ethnomethodology will show that
common sense, far from being a world of externally determined "dopes",
artfully re-produces itself from moment to moment. Against the sophist's
2?. Garfinkel, 1967, p.7. Subsequent references in this discussion
are to page numbers.
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appeal to nature, to the beast in man, ethnomethodology reminds us of
convention, the artist in man. Convention is not a veneer (as the
sophist imagines) but rather the necessary and artful work required
in order to speak at all. To speak is to be artful: it is to artfully
orient to what is enforceable (convention). Men say what they want, but
with the rider that what they "want" they can only imagine within the
parameters of the enforceably"accountable-for-all-practical-purposes" (p.9).
Awe says that source is not compelling by treating it as a set
of parameters within which members artfully operate - although their
interest is not in their limits but only in the "practical purnoses"
for the sake of which they are continuously accountable, and continu¬
ously make themselves accountable. Awe forgets how the source could
be compelling by forgetting how it could make a demand on the speaker.
Thus, for awe, the source is abstract in that it requires a self-
disinterested artfulness: whereas for the strong speaker, the source
is demanding in that it requires a self-reflective nurturance of Desire
for its beneficial influence. The ideal speaker needs more than a
notion of artful orientation to our foundations, for this is (still)
to treat our relation to source as extrinsic rather than intrinsic.
Our relation to source is what is meant by fate: the ideal speaker
develops a strong notion of his collectedness with his fate. He seeks
to express principled rather than merely artful orientation. To be
oriented in a principled way is to be oriented to our need to collect
ourselves with our fate. We become decisive towards our fate when we
elect to re-achieve its comoelling character by seeking for what is
intrinsic. We express our love of our fate by bringing together our
enjoyment of our speech with our sense of answering its demand.
6. Awe, convention and enthusiasm.
The theorist Desires to give embodiment to his strong relation
to source. He wants to represent his grasp of man's collectedness
with his fate. Desire has introduced us to the idea of what is com¬
pelling for us. Where awe experiences fate as coercion, Desire re-
appropriates it as compelling. We need to ask - what is it that is
compelling for us? As a beginning we can say that what is compelling
is our expression of what we truly are. What we truly are is our
innermost necessity.
Because the ideal speaker enjoys Desire as the pleasure of
developing what he really is, he develops a strong idea of acknowled¬
gement. The deep sneaker acknowledges language as the source of speech:
that is, he acknowledges speech's dependency on language. The account
he aims for seeks to be a true account by re-orienting the dependency
of the speech at hand on language. To acknowledge language means to
submit our speech to the demand of language. Desire always wants to
keep itself alive. Desire enjoys the gifts of language (rather than
being in awe of them) because this enjoyment is its way of sustaining
itself. Desire's speech gives it access to the Desire of the source.
The source is just because it Desires conversational re-enactment
rather than merely enforced rule-following. The source compels assent
not as the brutal arbitrary tyrant does, externally, but? rather, intrin¬
sically. That is, to acknowledge the source requires not awed piety
but rather the enjoyment of its Desire. There is no other way to truly
acknowledge language, because awe prevents us from grasping the justice
of source. Desire's acknowledgement is oriented to its grasp that the
gift is not given gratuitously: Desire must qualify the speaker to accep
(that is work) in order to be capable of receiving it.
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Awe, rather than acknowledging language, experiences a submer¬
gence or overwhelming in the face of source which renders it inarticu¬
late. For instance, it speaks abstractly of Truth in a way that renders
it unbelievable. Because awe re-constructs source as tyrannical it
experiences a barrier to the achievement of conviction. For awe, the
phenomenon of speech is like the impossible birth of justice from out
of the unjust. The idea of embodying justice (of just speech) is un¬
believable for awe.
Dependency itself needs to be oriented (decisive). Because awe
mistakes the authoritative for the tyrannical, its dependency is unor-
iented. To say it is unoriented is to say that it fails to re-achieve
for itself the justice of source. Earlier we spoke of modernity as the
offspring of awe. Now we can understand where the roots of this idea
lie: in the fact that modernity lacks a notion of oriented dependency.
Power is understood by the modern as what creates and simultaneously
corrupts: that is, it is understood as injustice. Modernity's ques¬
tions are concerned with the mechanisms of power, exchange, zero-sum
conflict, losses offsetting gains. Because of these preoccupations,
modernity is ashamed of the idea of dependency, because this implies
a more powerful, necessarily corrupt, alter, i.e. it implies injustice.
Acknowledgement of dependency sounds to it like slavishness. The mod¬
ern considers Desire or love of language to be a ratification of injus¬
tice. To Desire is to lose one's head. Keeping one's head means keep¬
ing one's distance from the encounter with language, i.e. refusing to
acknowledge language.
Awe, by segregating source from convention, says that for man's
speech, convention is first. It protects us from the tyranny of brute
force, "nature", i.e. from the sophist, by telling speakers that con-
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vention, not nature, is compelling. Again, awe rejects the theorist
not only because he risks convention, but because, as we see now, he
seems to ratify injustice or slavishness. The theorist is imorudent.
In the face of the sophist on one side and the theorist on the other,
awe and its offspring offer protection and prudence.
The theorist orients to that which is deeper than convention
and is needed to animate convention: he orients to what is compelling.
It is through this orientation to the Ideas with which speech is preg¬
nant that the ideal speaker develons his Desire. The ideal speaker is
compelled by whatness rather than convention, yet this does not mean
that he laments the need for convention. The ideal speaker accepts
28
the fact that what he says could be said in another way . He accents
the necessity of convention for the address of whatness, yet under¬
stands that this necessity alone is not the strongly compelling need.
Convention needs to be strongly oriented or animated through the
influence of what compels us. Convention needs enthusiasm.
Awe is unenthusiastic because it equates enthusiasm with free¬
dom, mobility, self-assertiveness - the opposites of the experience
of being overwhelmed (awe). So awe finds difficulty in attributing
any good to enthusiasm. We can begin to teach awe, then, by asking it
to reflect on the best of enthusiasm, or on the place of enthusiasm in
the theorist's speech. Enthusiasm is the capacity of speakers to be
motivated by the comoelling source. To be motivated resonates with
the idea of being brought to life, finding one's real resources, by
wanting to articulate and exoress the truly compelling. The ideal
28. Special acknowledgement is due to Alan Blum and Peter McHugh
for my sense of the problem of convention here.
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speaker consummates his Desire in the exercise of this want. So it is
the intrinsic connection between enthusiasm and the compelling that
reveals enthusiasm as a speaker's deep need. Enthusiasm is our living
intimately with what compels us. Man's relation with what is compel¬
ling sustains itself in enthusiasm because in enthusiasm it is con¬
tinuously exercised. Enthusiasm, by involving the speaker in the
development of the Idea, allows the speaker to befriend the intrinsic
and accountable character of what enthuses him.
We can develop our graso of the need for enthusiasm by examin¬
ing the notions of authorship generated by awe and enthusiasm. Earlier
we sooke of two versions of awe, the "religious" and the "sociological".
What collected them was their failure to re-construct speech as a course
of action that makes a difference. Now we can ask: what are we glos¬
sing with these two versions of awe?
This question returns us to the opening part of this essay. The
problem of irony, we recall, emerged as the question of our relation
to nature and our relation to convention. That is, it emerged as the
question of the integration of temperance and justice. Throughout our
essay the achievement of temperance and the achievement of justice have
been closely bound together. The demand for justice (anger) was shown
to require temperance or irony towards nature. As we saw, to go beyond
rage and remorse, to speak strongly, required an ironic relation to
physiology. Temperance educates justice by transforming it from exegesis
(born out of intemperate meddling) into genuine justice. We have sought
to show what temperance is and how it inherits resource. Yet, as we
can see, what remains is the question: what is "genuine justice"?
We can pose this question in a more urgent way by considering
the work of the present chapter. Having attempted to demonstrate tern-
perance's need for resourcefulness, or the development of its Desire,
we have been faced here with awe's challenge to this notion. We have
sought to show that awe's problem is the lack of enthusiasm that re¬
sults from its treatment of Other as extrinsic and coercive. Yet awe
claims that it undergoes a more genuine and authentic experience with
source than the "merely" speaking, "merely" resourceful, theorist.
Awe sees itself as being closer to the source than the "proud" theorist
who, in electing to speak in a way that orients to source, shows his
desire to "tempt God". Awe sees the oriented motion of the theorist
as a vain imitation of celestial (God-like) motion. Awe says that men
ought to move in relation to their earthly existence (i.e. in quest of
food, shelter, or worldly pleasures) but in no other way at all. The
only alternative to earthly motion is the immobility of awe: this is
the "higher alternative" that is not of this world. Earthly motion -
which for Kierkegaard includes all thinking and reflection on the
Ideas - is of this world. It is this-worldly and nothing else. It
is the discourse of nostalgia or of competence (bureaucracy).
So we see that, just as temperance and justice are intimately
bound together, so the exegetic version of justice is ratified and
sustained - by awe itself. If awe seems to dwell closely to temperance
since it resonates, like temperance, with a certain composure or one¬
ness with its source - it also seems to be a peculiarly deceptive
temperance. Awe as a version of temperance has not resolved the prob¬
lem of justice, since (indirectly) it generates exegesis or bureau¬
cracy. Temperance, then, needs to be educated by justice: for other¬
wise, a certain inertia (awe) that is perhaps "natural" to it assumes
dominance. Our final chapter will aim to develop this notion.
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Here, we seek to provide for how awe construes authorship and
in what sense this is unjust. How does awe generate (its own) speech
and what kind of speech is it? Earlier, we said that awe soeaks as
a martyr: now we can examine more closely, with respect to the prob¬
lem of justice, the particular ways which lead to its self-sacrifice.
Now if awe is immobility and silent mystique in the presence of its
source, this means that awe naturalizes source. Awe treats source as
an external power (as we have seen): this means that it treats source
as a natural phenomenon. Source is natural in that, like nature, it
exists (prior to all human rationalization) as an in itself. The in
itself has no necessary relation to value, and the for itself (speech)
which creates or invents value has no intrinsic relation to source.
Awe is always essentially awe of nature inasmuch as it naturalizes
its object.
Awe treats self-exegesis as complacent, not because it sees
it as unreflective, but because self-exegesis imagines that nature
speaks. Self-exegesis (like positivism) imagines that nature speaks
directly through it. The difference here is between the "naturalism"
of self-exegesis and awe's attitude to nature. Naturalism is perfectly
matter of fact with its speech. Self-exegesis does not see itself
as being conventional (i.e. what could be otherwise) but rather, nat¬
ural (i.e. what is given). So, whereas awe is immobile in the presence
of its naturalized object, self-exegesis treats its very motion as
(the image of) nature. Yet awe does not seek to educate the enthusiasm
in self-exegesis but instead leaves self-exegesis as it is even though
it claims to know better. We have already seen the reason for this.
Awe accepts the ineducability of self-exegesis because exegesis (earthly
speech) is no more or less than awe's notion of justice. "Human justice"
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as exegesis is accented by awe even though it has forgotten its own
awesomeness. Awe as the split life is the unwillingness to acknow¬
ledge the theorist's need for justice.
Consider now what we called the "religious" version of awe,
exemplified by Kierkegaard. We accented the common-sense notion of
religion in our account, because of Kierkegaard* s appeal to God, faith,
and so on. Yet we must now go beyond this: it is not enough simoly to
call Kierkegaard "religious". The decisive point is that Kierkegaard
naturalizes the so-called object of religious veneration, God. God
is Kierkegaard's metaphor for all the power and all the mystery that
precedes man. His real point is that, because of this precedence,
the only attitude open to man is awe. Any other attitude is a denial
of the precedence of what orecedes man.
Since what precedes man is utterly without reason, or at least
utterly precedes reason, it cannot be accounted for or grasped within
speech. Yet this does not stop Kierkegaard from referring to God on
a great number of occasions. Speech cannot particularize God's first-
ness - yet it can, and must, exoress its faith that God particularized
His firstness. God did what speech cannot do by ordaining the coming
into history of the divine. Christ made the Logos flesh: Christ
saves man because man can now realize that God particularized value
even though speech (man) cannot. Man must rely on and have faith in
what takes precedence. Man must believe, in the face of all its
absurdity, that God (who takes precedence) achieved the utterly irra¬
tional by releasing the divine into the realm of rational discourse.
Discourse in its mere rationality could not give body to what takes
precedence - because only that which transcends reason can achieve the
meta-rational. Man (the rational animal, the speaker) must transcend
himself in faith^.
29* This discussion draws on Sartre's essay on Kierkegaard; see J.?.
Sartre "The Singular Universal",in J.Thompson,ed,1972.
219
Thus man must "believe precisely because of the absurdity of
Christ. To transcend mere rationality requires the active choice of
the absurd. We have already examined the artifice of this passion
as well as its martyrdom. Now we can say: the sense of nobility of
this passion expresses itself as heroism. Since source and speech
are decisively Other, man (the sneaker) ennobles himself by purging
speech (the pretentions of reason) from his soul and thus making room
for the sheer heroism of faith. Sheer heroism is faith in defiance of
its own absurdity, faith because of its own unaccountability. It is
faith in faith itself regardless of the decisive absence of any
possible human grasp of the good of faith, the point of faith, the
benefit of faith.
This enables us to grasp why the story of Abraham exercises
Kierkegaard so strongly. The God to whom Abraham gives his devotion
asks him to sacrifice his own offspring. This anticipates awe's story
vividly. The source to which awe devotes itself requires of awe that
it sacrifice the possibility of offspring or speech. Awe may speak,
but as we have seen, it cannot embody within its own speech the authority
of its speech. And ultimately, if it continues to sacrifice its offs¬
pring, it ends by martyring itself in the face of its offsorings'
insistence on speaking. For the failure of authority in awe generates
either regret for its demise, or exegetic justice. Awe's failure of
authority is shown in its inability to generate offspring who could
acknowledge and develon its influence (rather than lament it or forget
it).
Kierkegaard's unhappiness, like Abraham's unhappiness, with all
its nobility of bearing, is the resoluteness of their belief in the
inadequacy of speech (of man). Kierkegaard's unhappiness is that, at
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the last, when everything is weighed up, he thinks he is condemned
to a useless speaking. For some, this would be a totally shattering
experience. This would result if worthwhile speaking were thought to
be attainable by others but not oneself. Kierkegaard, however, believes
in the inadequacy of speech: this is a special insight, not achieved
by many, so it has a sense of its own nobility. This sense of nobility
means that Kierkegaard sees the inadequacy of speech as something to
remember and hold on to always. An added dimension of awe's immobility
now enters. There is, beyond mere immobility, a fixity of attitude
that it generates from its unhappiness and the nobility it attributes
to this. Awe becomes unhappy when man's diminutiveness compared with
what takes precedence assumes the form of inadequacy. Awe fixes itself
in its unhappiness when it scorns the only possible justice (the justice
of its exegetic offspring) as being pathetic or worthless. Kierkegaard's
suffering thus results from his idea that justice is impossible.
Justice is seen as impossible because awe, here, must submit
totally to the injustice of Other. Like Abraham, awe must give to Other
the right to demand the irrational (and hence completely unjust) sacri¬
fice of its own offspring. Total submission requires at least the
acceptance of the possibility of total injustice. For us, what Kierke¬
gaard's suffering shows is man's deep need for justice.
When we turn to our "sociological" version of awe, we see that
for Garfinkel there is no question of comparing speech to source in
terms of adequacy. Here again we have the task of going beyond a mere
designation, this time of Garfinkel as "sociological". Again, we will
pursue this end by inquiring into "sociological" awe's notion of author¬
ship. A clue is provided (as it was with Kierkegaard) by considering
the kind of artifice it involves. Whereas Kierkegaard, in order to
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speak (in the face of the inadequacy of speech) required a heroism of
faith, Garfinkel will use the artifice of technique. This is because
it is self-exegesis itself which is an awesome achievement of obscure
but "obstinate" technique or procedure. We recall Garfinkel's comment:
"For Kant the moral order "within" was an awesome mystery; for socio-
30
logists the moral order "without" is a technical mystery".
Garfinkel, then, does not compare speech to source in terms of
adequacy, since it is speech (self-exegesis) itself that is awesome.
Notice here that Garfinkel's idea of speech is self-exegesis (or
intelligibility): we will need to address this issue shortly. For
now, the point is that Garfinkel does not treat convention as inade¬
quate - on the contrary, he defends its adequacy against the slights
of positivism - but instead naturalizes convention itself as the object
of awe. As we have seen, however, convention "naturalizes" itself -
but in the very different sense of taking itself for granted. Con¬
vention (in the sense of self-exegesis) imagines that its speeches
and actions are given or natural to it. Although they could be other¬
wise, this would be unnatural. This belief encourages self-exegesis
to take itself for granted. Yet there are those who would attack
self-exegesis because everyday speech is not "naturalistic" enough.
Positivism says that nature does not speak through the mouth¬
piece of mundane activities because, unknown to self-exegesis, other
motives distort its naturalism. These motives - subjective desire,
preference, and so on - belong unanimously to the post-natural world
of human "interpretation". While human desires are naturalistic,
interpretation (in its tendency to deny this through idealization)
often is not. A special kind of interpretation, or rather, an elimina-
W> Garfinkel, 1967 p.35.
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tion of interpretation, is necessary in order to let nature speak.
31
This elimination of interpretation is positivism.
Garfinkel defends self-exegesis against those who would attack
it. What inspires him to do this is his idea that self-exegesis tends
to underestimate itself. It undervalues itself in that it treats it¬
self as a mere phenomenon rather than as an achievement. Here, what
is strange is that although Garfinkel says that convention is not
merely a natural phenomenon, this leads to the very awe of it that,
as it were, naturalizes it again. Our problem now is: how can we
resolve this strangeness into a more telling grasp of "sociological"
awe?
For Garfinkel, what is awesome is not nature per se, but rather,
given the opaqueness and oracularity of nature, that speech is possible
at all. The member lives in the midst of meaningless nature, and makes
utterances that are always indexical: yet he speaks meaningfully. The
point here is not the celebration of the symbol, but rather, the
specificity of the symbol. The member always construes his speech,
and enforces other's self-same construal of his speech, as being recog¬
nizable. It is specifically about something, and what that something
is is enforceabla , As Garfinkel puts it:
"Persons require properties of discourse
as conditions under which they are themselves
entitled and entitle others to claim that they
know what they are talking about, and that what
they are saying is understandable and ought to
be understood". 32
For Garfinkel, as for Kierkegaard, there is a split between
nature and artfulness (convention). In a very important sense, Garfinkel
agrees with the positivist that self-exegesis is often not naturalist.
31• See McHugh, Raffel, Foss and Blum, 1974, Gh.3^
32. Garfinkel, 196?, pp.41-42, my emphasis.
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In fact, Garfinkel radicalizes this insight "by extending it to all
speech - including the positivist's. The positivist's speech, far
from replicating nature, is only intelligible within the conventionally
organized set of procedures that make up its life-world, its set of
relevances, and so on. Yet man's artfulness is no longer, as it was
for Kierkegaard, inadequate: on the contrary, the exact opposite is
the case. What is awesome is that, in the face of nature's decisive
inability to speak, despite the mere permissiveness of nature (that
which precedes convention), everyday life in all its enforceability
has emerged and stands before us as our genuine phenomenon for inquiry.
Garfinkel's defence of self-exegesis from the positivist arises because
he considers the positivist either impossible or redundant. If the
positivist claims to replicate nature, Garfinkel will reply that this
is impossible: for the positivist speaks, and there is a split between
speech (our common life-world) and nature. And if the positivist
claims to at least speak systematically, Garfinkel will reply that
this is redundant, for self-exegesis is already awesomely artful,
procedural, and organized.
Garfinkel's denial of (the need for) the positivist can be
grasped as a claim that a special, unusually rigorous, exegesis, is not
required. We do not need a separate, in the sense of an exceptionally
insightful or rigorous, speech. The reason for this is simple and yet
utterly fundamental: it is because self-exegesis already makes per¬
fectly visible whatever we/it needs to grasp. There is no possible
remedy for the multitude of ad hoc methods and procedures through
which self-exegesis documents itself. Much more importantly: there
is absolutely no need for one.
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For us, the weight of Garfinkel rests in his claim, in effect,
that no special procedures for the achievement of justice are either
possible or necessary: because self-exegesis already meets the re-
33
quirements of justice. As has already been implied, this makes for
a certain uneasiness or ambivalence on Garfinkel's own part about the
status of his own speech. Clearly, it is not self-exegesis: it could
not itself be understood by any reader as enforceable in any member's
conversation. Does this render it nonsensical? Is Garfinkel merely
an instance of the failure to comply?
In some sense, we would have to simply accept this. Yet Garfin¬
kel is much more than such a failure. For his failure, it is very clear
to us, has been self-generated: none more than Garfinkel has sought to
convince us of the very enforceability whose limits he is forced to over¬
step in order precisely to do so. If Garfinkel, in this sense, martyrs
himself, it is no longer because of the paltriness of a justice he can¬
not subscribe to, but for the very opposite reason. He does it for
the sake of a justice he very much believes in, and for the sake of
instructing us of it: the justice of self-exegesis or convention.
The ambivalence of Garfinkel is his notion that it is necessary
to martyr himself in order to do justice to self-exegesis - that is,
34in order to do justice to justice . Somehow, it is impossible to
do justice to justice, that is, it is impossible for justice to speak
about itself. The reason for this is crucial: justice cannot speak
about itself any more than exegesis can. It is of the nature of exe¬
gesis that it makes objects visible. It provides for us a tangible
world of known and recognized shapes, through discourse. The notion
33- Usage for my claim is provided by Garfinkel, 196?, Ch.4: "Some
rules of correct decision making that jurors respect".
34. This idea recalls Kierkegaard's problem of "faith in faith",
or heroism.
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of self-exegesis, then, does not mean self-expression (or accounting
and providing for the self in a reflective way) "but instead, as we
have seen, the presentation of self as a naturalistic phenomenon.
Self-exegesis makes assurances but does not reflect upon itself.
Garfinkel's ambivalence concerns the possibility of temperance.
If temperance, as we have seen, involves the consummation of Desire,
we have also shown its resourceful inheritance that uses the conven¬
tional but is not merely co-terminous with it. Temperance is resource¬
ful but not simply self-exegetic. Yet Garfinkel shows, in his response
to the "uninteresting" essential reflexivity of accounts, his ambiva¬
lence towards temperance. As we have seen (p.210, n.27, above), members
are "uninterested" in giving accounts of the routine grounds of their
own practical actions. Exegetic justice is uninterested in speaking
about itself. Our problem is to formulate a response to this.
Garfinkel responds as follows:
"To say (members) are "not interested" in the study
of practical actions is not to complain, nor to
point to an opportunity they miss, nor is it a dis¬
closure of error, nor is it an ironic comment". 35
Garfinkel's unwillingness to ironize convention here shows us his
notion of justice as necessarily exegetic. Yet exegetic justice is
essentially the fruit of intemperance. Garfinkel's doubt, then, is
directed at the possibility of temperance. Garfinkel is suggesting
that temperance is impossible, and that as a result, the only justice
is exegetic justice. The risk of irony towards convention remains
for him a risk not worth taking. For us, what Garfinkel's ambivalence
shows is man's deep need for irony.
35- Garfinkel, 1967, p.8. Also cited in Blum and McHugh, Self-
Reflection in the Arts and Sciences, on whom the discussion
draws considerably at this point.
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The need for enthusiasm has thus been strengthened to the need
for justice. Our task, in formulating a response to exegetic justice,
is to draw upon the temperance whose notion we developed earlier, to
provide for an irony and a conclusiveness in justice that will educate




FROM ABSTRACT TO SPIRITED NECESSITY
1. Conclusiveness and the problem of temperance and nature.
"Machiavelli's arguments, for example, were
substantial enough for their subject, yet they
were quite easy to contest; and his opponents
have left their own just as open to confutation.
In that kind of argument there will always be
matter for answers and rejoinders, double,triple
and quadruple, and for that endless fabric of
debates which our lawyers drag out to the utter¬
most in the making of their pleas: "We are beaten,
and rain as many blows on the enemy" (Horace);
for our arguments have little foundation except
that of experience, and the variety of human events
furnishes us with infinite examples of every pos¬
sible kind".
MONTAIGNE, On Presumption,
Essays, Book 2, 1?.
A danger for theorizing, Montaigne can be taken to suggest, is
that it might lack foundation. Its argument might move this way or
that, in a way that is "substantial enough for its subject", yet which¬
ever way it moves, it might have been otherwise. There is enough rea¬
son at all times to argue for this or for that: of two opposite courses
of action, each probably has as many reasons to support it as the
other^. The only foundation for reasons and arguments, it seems, is
experience: yet experience seems to be incapable of providing a stan¬
dard, since it is unlimited and infinite in its possibilities. Even
within my own experience there are many contradictory examples, and
between my own and that of others, the differences seem greater still.
Montaigne's problem is ours too in that we wish at the conclu¬
sion of our work to take the opportunity to reflect upon the necessity
of the particular engagement it displays. Any work is accountable to
the question: how is this work necessary (as an instance of its Desire)
rather than arbitrary or indifferent? How does the writer show his
1. See Montaigne, "On the Uncertainty of our Judgement", Essays,
Book 1, 47. In Montaigne, 1958•
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commitment to producing a work that is necessary to the expression
of his desire? For without this necessity, we would he bequeathed a
work whose arguments are "quite easy to contest", and whose examples
are randomly selected from the infinity of "every possible kind". The
work would invite, instead of collaborative reflection on the questions
it bears upon, mere rejoinders, "double, triple and quadruple". Perhaps
the greatest rejoinder a work could invite is the direct objection: all
of this work might as well have been otherwise, for ultimately it pro¬
vides only for indifference to its having chosen the way it did. The
rejoinder would say: this work generates indifference because it is
itself indifferent to the choices it made.
Our reflection, then, must turn towards a notion of the ideal
speaker as a conclusive speaker. A conclusive speaker is one who
orients comfortably towards the notion that his speech is a recommen¬
dation or potential influence. The conclusive speaker puts into effect
the recommendable character of the truth he has attained. What is un-
shakably true for our ideal speaker is the need for worth as the need
that has greatest priority. To become conclusive is, for him, to be
moved by what is unshakable: to be animated to speak: by what is nec¬
essary for him. To become conclusive is to re-present what is necessary
for him - his unshakable conviction - in what he says and does. The
conclusive speaker brings into harmony motion and the unshakable by
moving in a way that re-presents the necessity of what is unshakable.
His spirit - the absolute necessity of what is unshakable for him -
generates his particular practices and lives through his particular
movements. Abstract necessity sees itself as bestowing life upon
practices as if these already existed, somehow, in an otherwise inani¬
mate and unspirited way. It seeks practices to which it retrospec-
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tively tries to give the "kiss of life". Spirited necessity however
acts on its grasp of the unshakable and its motions are generated
from within this grasp and answer to it.
The ideal speaker we are developing is one for whom what is
unshakable is his need to answer to the demand for worth. This need
to answer is the need to be conclusive, that is, the need to bring
motion and the unshakable need it answers to (the need for worth) into
harmony. To bring motion and the unshakable into harmony is to become
a speaker whose movements form and organize a true response to what
is needed. Our ideal speaker knows what he needs and expresses what
he needs in the composure of his speech. His speech expresses his
Desire. Now we want to ask: what virtue does Desire need to truly
compose it?
Desire wants the harmony of motion and the unshakable, and so
the speaker asks: what do I need in order to compose the harmony of
motion and the unshakable? This is the question we see as lying at
the heart of The Charmides. In the conversation, Socrates is instruc¬
ting the two cousins who need to learn to integrate their motions
(their speeches and acts) with what is integral or unshakable for them.
Socrates is instructing them in the virtue that is appropriate for
this development. As we have already seen, they speak throughout
the dialogue about the nature of sophrosyne, or temperance.
Critias tends to be intemperate in that, throughout the dialogue,
he is very uncentred and vacillating. On several occasions he attempts
to completely change track and start again on a new footing. He seems
clever rather than spirited because there is a disunity between his
movements and whatever it is that is unshakable for him (his true
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interest). Part of the problem, of course, is that his vacillation
makes it hard to see just what his true interest actually is. What is
unshakable for him is inarticulate (it has not developed articulation,
and hence has remained immature) and so what he does articulate does
not address or express his centre. His speech displays an interest
in intelligence or being clever, yet this interest is shakable in that
Critias is not deeply convinced of it.
Critias is not convinced of his interest in intelligence because
deeply, intelligence itself does not answer to the requirements of an
unshakable father than a shakable) interest. Intelligence is incapable
of being transformed from a preference into a conviction, because a
conviction requires spirit. That is, a conviction must partake of a
necessity that answers to real needs rather than ego's preference.
Conviction involves matters crucial and central to spirit, rather than
merely calculable or rationalizable ones. So it is impossible to be
unshakably convinced of the priority of intelligence (though of course
it is possible, as Critias does, to believe in it) tecause sheer intel¬
ligence is unspirited. The necessity sought by intelligence in its
accounts is (merely) logical rather than deep. The logic of intelli¬
gence is instrumental and given to the pursuit of individualism in
the manner of Critias. For us, the most■intelligent attitude in this
sense is the liberal utilitarianism1on which modern individualism is
premised. The utilitarian community is ruled by calculation, consis¬
tency, and relationships between discrete elements. It is intemperate
in the very way Critias is: its motion is uncentred on anything un¬
shakable. The utilitarian community is unspirited because it abstracts
from the whole, the unshakable conviction that would enable it to move
rather than vacillate.
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Gritias is intemperate in that his interest in motion is not
centred on an unshakable conviction. His interest is not genuinely
spirited. Hence he vacillates. Because his movement does not express
anything deep for him, because it does not resolve anything for him,,
he repeatedly wants to begin again. Gritias does not temper his
motion with a true necessity: instead he merely controls it (or
struggles to keep it from getting out of hand) through the necessities
of logic and intelligence. Critias needs to recover the spirit that
animates him by becoming temperate.
But what of Charmides? In what way is consideration of temper¬
ance necessary for him? A stiking difference between Charmides and
Critias is that whereas Gritias' intemperance is the first thing we
notice about him, whether or not Charmides is temperate is the hardest
thing of all to determine. Gharmides at least seems to be closer to
temperance than Gritias is: this surfaces in the way Socrates ques¬
tions him, early in their conversation. Socrates requests of Gharmides:
"Please, therefore, to inform me whether you
admit the truth of what Gritias has been saying;-
have you or have you not this quality of soph-
rosyne ?" (158c)
The doubt about the answer to this question is genuine in a way that
it could not be for Critias. To anticipate a little: Socrates' direct
question raises the problem - what answer would be justified? What is
the just answer to this question? A centrally important matter here is
that the temperate man is entitled to answer the question differently
from the intemperate man yet it is the intemperate man who will be more
inclined to say "Yes, certainly, I have this quality of temperance".
This puts the temperate roan (or the man who genuinely aspires to tem¬
perance) into a quandary - even after he has got over the temptation
to agonize about the question "Am I or am I not temperate?" The speaker
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who wants to "be temperate overcomes this destructive preoccupation by
seeking to answer as if he were temperate: he is interested in answer¬
ing as the temperate man would answer. Yet here is the quandary: how
would the temperate man answer?
Is Charmides' answer temperate? Socrates tells us that in
response to the question,
"Charmides blushed, and the blush heightened
his beauty, for modesty is becoming in youth;
he then made the graceful reply that he really
could not at once answer, either yes or no, to
the question which I had asked: For, said he,
if I affirm that I am not temperate, that would
be a strange thing for me to say against myself,
and also I should give the lie to Critias, and
to many others who (according to him) think that
I am temperate: but, on the other hand, if I
say that I am, I shall have to praise myself,
which would be ill manners; and therefore I do
not know how to answer you". (l58c-d)
This reply shows us Plato at his most evocative and telling, for it
reveals to us a marvellously touching and poignant portrait of Charmides
the youth. In these words we ourselves feel, without seeing Charmides,
all of the effects of his beauty. We ourselves, like Socrates, on
experiencing these words, take the flame and might no longer be able
to contain ourselves. Charmides' response re-presents beauty and
youthfulness: it is as Socrates remarks, graceful. Yet is it temperate?
Or better: has temperance (whether or not Charmides himself is temperate)
justified itself in these words of Charmides? Has temperance done it¬
self justice: has it realized a true expression of itself, in a way
that is neither boastful nor retiring but - just? This is temperance's
quandary: how to live in harmony with justice. To answer "yes" to the
question seems to make one indistinguishable from the intemperate man
(because it seems boastful): yet to answer "no" is a way of estranging
oneself (as Charmides in effect puts it) because it orients to conceal-
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ing rather than expressing the self. Temperance's quandary is that
no matter which of the two replies it gives, it fails to become just
(to justify itself). To be just, now, is to move in a spirited way,
that is, in a way that truly responds to the unshakable conviction
that one's movemait centres on. Neither "yes" nor "no" achieve justice
because boasting ("yes") orients to a preference for the self whereas
retiring ("no") forgets the self's need to move (to express itself).
Why is temperance in a quandary - of all things, in relation to one
of the other virtues, justice? Don't the virtues naturally harmonize
well together? Gould it be that temperance is in a quandary about
justice because - an arresting thought - it is actually tempted by
injustice?
At any rate it is clear that Charmides is made of very differ¬
ent stuff from Gritias. Whereas Critias is meddlesome and boastful,
Gharmides shows in his reply that he is modest and graceful. Where
Gritias is always trying out new guises but reveals in the way he
does this a lack of depth, Gharmides' reticence seems to suggest a
centre, inarticulate to be sure, but deserving of respect and perhaps
affection. That is, Charmides' reticence is somehow engendered by
what is unshakable in him, whereas Gritias' garrulousness seems to
deliberately evade the question of his true need. Charmides seems
to be willing to suffer himself (this is perhaps a better reading of
his headache) whereas Gritias merely runs away from himself. Charmides
suffers his inability to speak for himself, as the idiom puts it: he
is one of those who, we imagine, is silenced by boisterous company.
Yet even in the presence of responsive and sympathetic listeners,
Gharmides has difficulty: Socrates at one point tells us that "at
first he hesitated, and was not very willing to answer" (l59b). We
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imagine that even when alone, Charmid.es has difficulty in "speaking
for himself", in articulating for himself what he is. He encounters
his nature as unfathomable and mysterious.
Nature, indeed, has endowed Charmides with beauty, grace and
modesty. All who encounter him find him marvellous. How does Char¬
mides orient to his natural grace? Before replying, he blushes: that
is, when he reflects upon himself, he is affected by himself. Even
when the one who attends to Charmides is himself, that one is overcome
by something (he blushes). He blushes rather than marvels because his
modesty prevents him from marvelling at himself. So Charmides is a
speaker who has difficulty in orienting towards himself: he is embar¬
rassed by the practice of objectifying himself (e.g. for the sake of
reflection). His modesty is making it difficult for him to reflect
on his own temperance: he is too embarrassed to think. In response
to Socrates' question "what is temperance?" Charmides finds it diffi¬
cult to get started at all. In contrast to Critias, who begins again
whenever he encounters difficulties, Charmides dreads having to make
a new start. Critias uses his new beginnings to evade and cover over
his embarrassment at failing to develop: Charmides on the other hand
is usually prevented by his embarrassment from embarking on self-
expression at all.
What is the problem here? The answer is suggested by Socrates'
remark in response to Charmides' blush and graceful reply: he says,
"that is a natural reply, Charmides" (l58d). Not only is Charmides
fortunately endowed by nature: even his speech is natural. His speech
replicates the good fortune, the easy grace and charm, that he already
possesses: even in his very discomfort, Charmides can't help being
charming, it seems.
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Charmid.es is an example of what we call "a natural" . One who
is fortunately endowed by nature, with beauty, charm or talent, is
tempted to merely feel indebted to nature. Not yet having realized the
difference between the fortuitous character of nature's endowment and
the decisive character of true generosity, the natural is one who
imagines that nature has been generous to him and hence deserves
homage and gratitude. In this respect, Charmides is utterly different
from the naturalism of self-exegesis. Whereas self-exegesis views
itself as typical and unexceptional, Charmides sees himself as excep¬
tionally endowed. His awareness of the awe he generates in others
tempts him into including himself within what awes him. (This also
differentiates him from Kierkegaard or Garfinkel). Charmides experien¬
ces himself, not in the manner of self-exegesis, as a being whose nature
becomes immediately visible, but on the contrary as one whose gifts
have been bestowed by the enigmatic. Essentially, Charmides sees
himself as a kind of savant, a chosen one: that is, a participant in
enigma.
Nature comes to be seen by the natural as the source of unshak¬
able conviction: "I am what I am through the friendly gift of nature".
The natural sees himself as needing to welcome the "friendly gift" by
"remaining" with himself, remaining as he is, friendly to nature. The
natural suffers the unshakable conviction that the source of what he
is, the source of what is good, is nature. He suffers this conviction
because it is an immobile conviction rather than a strongly unshakable
one.
To say Charmides' conviction is immobile rather than unshakable
is to say that it instructs him to reject motion rather than integrate
it. The fortunate endowment of nature bestowed upon Charmides is pre-
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cisely his greatest temptation: it is the very thing that threatens
to corrupt him most. Charmid.es experiences nature as immediately at
one, perfectly integrated, without violence or ugliness - because
these characteristics (in the human forms of grace and charm) are his
nature. Charmides' gratitude to nature for its gifts convinces him
that he ought to be like nature - or better, to remain like nature
(since he begins with it). Indeed Charmides is tempted by the thought
that there is virtue in being like nature. This is precisely his notion
of what temperance consists of. For Charmides, temperance as gratitude
to nature is virtuous. So at present he feels justified, although
embarrassed, at finding difficulty in saying either whether he is
temperate or what temperance is. He is embarrassed, but not ashamed
of his difficulty, because he is aware of his difficulty (his embar¬
rassment, his blush) as precisely another instance of "being natural",
or in his eyes, being temperate. Charmides confuses natural (immediate)
harmony for temperance. To be embarrassed is natural, for it is nature's
response to being asked to articulate itself. Nature is always embar¬
rassedat the idea of articulating itself, because articulation of the
self threatens harmony and grace by differentiating the self in re¬
presentation. The speaker who explicitly reveals himself by, for
example, expressing his own opinions, is not being natural because he
is opening up a gap between the immediate and the reflected (between
the self and speech). To express an opinion, even more strongly to
express a conviction, is no longer to be immersed in the natural, no
longer to be merely graceful and charming. Part of Charmides' problem ,
of course, is that his example of articulation is provided by Critias -
who is the antithesis of grace and charm: this seduces Charmides by
default into his affirmation of nature. For Charmides, to be temperate
is to be like nature: temperance is the acceptance of nature's beneficence.
As we see, this acceptance is essentially passive.
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Hence, after his initial natural and graceful reply, Charmides
is persuaded to say what he thinks temperance is. His formulation is
revealing: he says that temperance is,
"doing all things orderly and quietly, for
example walking in the streets,and talking,
and indeed doing everying in that way".
(He continues by collecting:) "In a word, I
should answer that, in my opinion, sophrosyne
is a kind of quietness". (159b).
Gharmides affirms the gentleness of a benefic ent nature by calling
the quiet charm through which he pays it homage temperance. Temperance
is the same as natural harmony.
We said that temperance is the harmony between motion and un¬
shakable conviction: that is, the speaker is temperate who makes his
speech expressive of what he is deeply convinced of (expressive of
his true need). Yet this expressiveness or harmony is not merely
natural since natural motion is merely identical with what nature is.
Nature does not itself generate its movements through a source or spirit,
but merely repeats what it is through its motion. For example, the
seasons are the cyclical movement of nature: the seasons are part
of what nature .is. It is only possible to think of ' seasons' as orien¬
ted in any way by positing an oriented being who stands behind them,
i.e. God, who then by implication is taken to have planned them. It
becomes necessary to think of God here because nature itself cannot
assume the mantle, namely orientedness, for which we have decided we
need a bearer. Again, in terms of the earlier part of this essay, anger
as mere physiology belongs to the realm of nature. And as long as it
does so, it remains unoriented: thus anger (as a human experience) is
an example of man's need for a strong relation to nature. Anger showed
us that man's relation to nature needs to be used rather than transcended
as his very way of overcoming the risk of being consumed by sheer nature
(sheer physiology).
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Our work began with the risk of anger and sought to develop the
end or value of that risk: at present we are encountering an alter¬
native risk that seems very different but is only fortuitously so,
namely the total absence or impossibility of anger. For this is the
alternative represented by Gharmides, the recipient of nature's gifts-
of all that is harmonious in nature. So his commitment to gentleness
and charm, while seemingly different from the commitment to rage, is
the same in that it is a commitment to what is given, to endowment,
to physiology. Charmides tends to treat the stuff of which he is made
(beauty, grace and harmony) as self-sufficient: he treats natural en¬
dowment as if it provided a worthy standard about which to be convin¬
ced. What he is saying in effect is that his natural harmony is
already (without the need for work) temperate: hence he is passively
rather than actively virtuous. In constructing a version of temperance
that shows no need for inquiry, Gharmides shows that really he means
natural harmony: really he is seduced by his own endowment. Gharmides'
difficulties in answering Socrates' questions are the fruits of his
tendency to avoid the "disturbances" or violence of conversation, dia¬
logue and inquiry. We have sought to show that this tendency is both
exemplified and fostered by Gharmides' reticently-given fornulations:
not only by the manner in which they are given, but also by their con¬
tent. Thus we find that Charmides has not justified temperance since
he has not been able to say what it is. He has neglected the need to
justify temperance's claim to worth by articulating in discourse its
essential nature: i.e. by returning to temperance what it is entitled
to, the praise of its worth. Gharmides has been unjust to temperance:
the temperance he has praised is but a pale version (i.e. natural har¬
mony rather than genuine harmony) of what temperance truly is.
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We are beginning to see that temperance's temptation to be un¬
just is rooted in its tendency to equate itself with natural harmony.
Temperance as a "kind of quietness" is the mere appearance rather than
the reality of temperance: through its "quietness" it seeks to preserve
the beauty and charm of natural harmony. The seductiveness of natural
harmony is that it appears to be temperate. Natural harmony is not the
opposite of temperance (it is not intemperance): rather, it is the
appearance of temperance without the reality.
But why does natural harmony not genuinely measure up to what
it appears to be? It is certainly not indifferent to temperance (for
it wants to be temperate, as we see with Charmides), nor, as we have
also seen, is it the opposite of temperance (it is not opposed to the
advent and development of temperance). What then prevents this deve¬
lopment: why does the apparently temperate remain different from the
truly temperate? Because it is indifferent to justice. Indeed, tem¬
perance itself, as we suggested, remains tempted by injustice in that
it tends to emerge, initially, from a kind of injustice. The youth,
for example, who has a "natural" temperance in him, will develop a
certain composure and calmness of soul if he obeys its voice. Yet
this will often involve a kind of self-indulgence. He will probably
spend a gread deal of time in his own company, in reverie, turning over
his feelings and impressions and seeking insight from them. If justice,
as we suggested in Chapter Three, requires a concern for what is best
for everybody, then the "reveries of the solitary walker" to which an
incipient temperance may lead, will be built upon a basis of injustice.
Mere harmony is not just harmony in that it precedes (or rather
pre-empts) motion. Thus the natural harmony of Charmides is not a
harmony of motion and the unshakable, the harmony of being moved by one's
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genuine convictions: rather it is a harmony that is static, that
protects its origin (the endowment). To say this differently: Charmides
imagines that he is freed from the need to give an account of himself,
to embody himself within his practices. As a result, he remains amor¬
phous and opaque rather than vivid and substantial. Even to himself,
the substance of what he is remains mystical and intangible. Beauty
and charm themselves generate the awe and the mystique that surround
them by evading the activity of developing and expressing the thoughts
and passions they conceal. The seductiveness of beauty and charm, then,
is that although they appear to be built on revelation, they actually
tend to conceal more than they reveal. They reveal appearances but
they conceal what is genuinely substantial, the passion of an interest.
Above all, as we see so tellingly now with Gharmides, natural harmony
conceals the genuinely substantial from itself , and hence does not
develop any weight. Natural harmony remains vague, opaque and weight¬
less: herein is its indifference to justice. Justice enjoys the move¬
ment of self-development through self-expression because it can differ¬
entiate between sheer motion (empty words) and motion that is the expres¬
sion of conviction. Self-expression is the motion of speech as the
expression of conviction, and whenever self-expression shows itself
between men, men are drawn together by developing their grasp of the
convictions they need. This is a preliminary formulation of the spiri¬
ted community, one we seek to develop and conclude as the substantial
finale of our essay. Our problem, then, is: what is self-expression?
Or, to put this differently, and in terms that anticipate the develop¬
ment of our discussion: what is it to name oneself expressively - and
hence to be spirited?
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2. Naming; and community.
To name oneself expressively: to be spirited: to contribute
to the life of the spirited community: we want to develop the reso¬
nances between all of these ideas. Gritias and Charmides represent
two extreme versions of naming the self. Charmides' hesitancy and
reticence reflect the difficulty he experiences in trying to name
himself. This difficulty is generated by his adherence to the harmony
of nature in its quiescence: for the one thing that nature does not
do is reflect upon or name itself. To the natural, who lives in an
immediate, unreflective, unity with himself, the notion of objectify¬
ing oneself, or even the virtues that one participates in, is a strange
one. For this notion is contrary to nature: for the natural, it cap¬
tures all this is unnatural or anti-natural in the majority of men.
The natural remains vague and ethereal because he refuses to name him¬
self. Thus for the natural, speech is not a medium of reflection, but
merely another part of nature. The natural rejects the vigorous and
active dimension of speech in favour of a version of speech as a re¬
capitulation of nature. If speech is part of nature, then the one who
is natural (who belongs within nature) is immune from objectification.
Now we are in a position to understand Charmides' reluctance (to name
himself) as a kind of resistance: a resistance to the "unnatural", or
the activity of naming in a self-reflective way. The natural tends to
use speech to endow names, in the manner of Adam, rather than to reflect:
that is, develop and express the name. The natural, as the "first man",
the man who lives immersed in nature, resists the temptation to inter¬
fere with nature, by treating the names he gives to things as endow¬
ments, that is, as further instances of nature. We think here of
2
Rousseau . And for Cratylus, in Plato's dialogue, if the word used of
2. See Rousseau, Essay on the Origin of Languages, 1966.
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something is not its natural name, then it is not a name at all .
Charmid.es would not only agree with this hut would go further in intui¬
tively (naturally) attributing to himself the knowledge of natural
names. For Charmides, the word "temperance" names what temperance
is, because it is the word that suggests to him an intuition of what
he is. By nature, Charmides is a phenomenologist, versed in the art
of pre-reflectively intuiting (i.e. knowing by nature) what he is.
Knowledge and reality coincide - immediately in natural harmony. Words
are thus made to serve the function of calling forth inner intuitions
that the subject (and only the subject) knows are adequate to what the
words reference. Naming , then, is the external stimulus for the
activity of intuitively knowing oneself (being "temperate"), but in
itself has no deeper significance. Naming does not express, but
rather intones the truth for the knowing subject. Notice, then, Char¬
mides ' response when Socrates, having suggested that if temperance
abides in him, he must have "some intimation of her nature and qualities",
goes on to recommend: "You know your native language, and therefore you
must be able also to express your opinion" (159a). Charmides can agree
without reservation that he must have "some intimation" of temperance
because it concurs with his notion of intuitive (natural) self-under-
standing. But his response to Socrates' suggestion that he will be
able to give expression to this intimation is a reluctant one which
shows us the trouble it gives him. "Perhaps", he unenthusiastically
replies, and so reveals his doubt that his competence in Greek makes
available any resources for developing the "natural" name. To put this
more strongly: what Charmides doubts is the need for this development.
Why does Charmides secretly want to resist Socrates at this point?
Because Socrates is suggesting that speech does not belong to the realm
y. See Plato, Cratylus,431e -432d
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of nature (as Charmid.es wants it to) but instead enables the speaker,
through his knowledge of his native language, to express and develop
his opinion. The knowledge that is native, or natural, or familiar,
while it is a valuable beginning or basis for work, enables work to be
done, rather than re-capitulating that work, as Charmides would have
it. Knowing one's native language, far from providing genuine know¬
ledge on its own account, by intimating to us the natural names of
things, is in need of development - a development that begins through
"expressing your opinion Here the unreflective character of Char¬
mides' naturalism shows itself: Charmides' attitude to language is
intuitionist and solipsistic rather than conversational or develop¬
mental. Like some poets, Charmides treats the words of speech as
encapsulating within themselves the essences of the things they name -
e.g. "temperance". He treats naming as encapsulating or endowing, in
a one-to-one transfer from speech to object, rather than expressing
or developing, in a one-to-many-to-one-again movement from the idea
to speech. The idea is implicitly one, but it is grapsed not through
the inner activity of intuition (for this is indifferent to justice)
but rather through the dialogue with the manyness of opinion. It is
this motion that Charmides resists.
Immediate self-evident intuition is indifferent to justice
because it is predicated on its own invisibility. We can develop our
grasp of this connection by attending to the famous story of Gyges as
it is recounted by Glaucon in The Republic. Gyges finds a golden
ring which he subsequently discovers has the power to make him invisible.
The ability to act while remaining invisible gives Gyges the power to
follow his impulses and pursue his personal gain. Gyges succumbs to
the temptation of the ring, the temptation of injustice and tyranny:
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"After this discovery (of the ring's powers) he
contrived to be one of the messengers sent to the
court. There he seduced the queen and with her
help murdered the king and seized the throne".
(Republic, 360a-b)
Gyges becomes a tyrant because, being unable to resist tyranny's temp¬
tations, the resources of invisibility offer him the means to enact
them. Aristotle shows us the significance of the tyrant's invisibility
in his description of the methods by which a tyrant maintains power.
First he ensures that the people of the city are visible to him (through
the use of spies and the forbidding of secrecy among his subjects):
secondly he makes himself invisible to the people by acting the part of
an honest ruler. For the tyrant, Aristotle remarks, "it is necessary to
appear to the subjects to be not a tyrannical ruler but a steward and
4
royal governor".
Charmides' hiddenness tends towards the tyrannic because it is
founded on his imagined and untested virtue. Charmides, although he
will not say that he is temperate, sees nothing wrong with imagining
to himself that he is temperate. Indeed, Charmides imagines that the
temperate man is the man who does not flaunt himself (the man who
resists saying that he is temperate) and hence Charmides takes his
obscurity as actual evidence of his temperance. Withdrawal from con-
4^ Aristotle, Politics, 1314 b 42. Quoted in M.Shell (1978) whose
account of the Gyges story first suggested to me the connection
between visibility and justice. Injustice wants to promote a
kind of blindness, so injustice tends to cohabit with obscurity,
mystique, and reticence. Of course, Charmides as yet (as mere
reticence) lacks the activism necessary for the birth of the
tyrant: but Critias, his guardian, does not, Critias and Char¬
mides are a dangerous combination, the combination of justice
segregated from temperance and temperance segregated from justice.
They show us that here, at least, the marriage of two excesses
produces an excess (tyranny) that is worse than either. My con¬
clusion is an attempt to show justice and temperance belonging
together in a stronger way than the mere marriage-contract of
two sundered (and essentially unvirtuous) opposites. They must
belong together by belonging within what is greater: spirit or
the Good as for-itself.
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versation in the form of resistance to self-expression provides Char-
mides with occasion for self-congratulation. Charmides thinks that the
obscurity of his own nature (that which he intuits rather than expresses)
entitles him to the idea of his own excellence. The way to maintain the
excellence "already in" one's soul is to protect it modestly - and hence
to resist embodying in one's speech the desire for what truly animates
it. Charmides is blind (and his invisibility renders others blind) to
the need for his speech to test and extend him. This is the implicit
(and still undeveloped) arrogance of his equation of temperance with
natural harmony. Here is Charmides' proneness to the temptation of
Gyges. Charmides does not exemplify, like Critias, the abstraction
and emptiness of sheer intelligence, but rather the vagueness and
opaqueness of sheer naturalism.
Natural harmony construes virtue as inaction. That inactivity
could foster and breed tyrannic tendencies seems at first to be a
strange idea. Yet, in that, as we have seen, the tyrant's actions are
designed to conceal rather than reveal what he is, inactivity - even
the inactivity of natural beauty - in its character as concealment,
turns out to have a surprising kinship with him. Inactivity is attrac¬
ted to tyrannic types of action because they provide what inactivity
is looking for: a type of life that will allow it to protect what it
is by nature. Our usage here of "tyrannic actions" is not simply re¬
stricted to the actions of those who happen to be tyrants: for us,
those actions and speeches that disguise rather than reveal the speaker
are prone to the temptations of tyranny. Quietness and modesty, the
passive virtues of Charmides, in that they conceal the speaker, are
prone to the same temptations: and this is their kinship with the
activism of self-definition and sheer intelligence.
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Natural harmony turns out to "be akin to disguise "because it
cannot imagine the strong sense of re-presentation. The activity of
re-presenting the self requires the irony of the speaker: naturalism
however, weakens speech into a supposedly literal rendition of its ob¬
ject. For naturalism, speech is supposed to attach the natural name
to the object: speech endows what belongs to the object by nature
and thus repeats the endowment of nature. Concretely, then, naturalism
speaks: to say it weakens speech does not mean that it rejects speech
altogether, for it does not lapse into sheer silence. Yet its notion
of speech as literal naming generates brevity and terseness as its
speaking practices. In a way, naturalism is always threatening silence
in the sense that it will become silent whenever others become "too
garrulous", "too insistent", "too opinionated", or in any other way
other than natural. The natural often feels overwhelmed by hubris:
even his own hubris overwhelms him and puts him into selfless ecstasy
(or perhaps plain drunkenness).
The ironist is free of the oppressive headache of hubris'
threat, since he is not imprisoned by a literal notion of speech: yet
his speech re-presents rather than disguises or obscures its topic.
We will seek to develop this by examining Charmides' problem as the
problem of names, and in particular as the problem of the speaker's
relation to his own name. First of all, we need to realize that a name
is more than simply the label that convention attaches to a particular
object or person. Deeply, that is, one's name is more than merely one's
proper name, John, Peter, and so on. Yet these proper names are not
insignificant: they are not mere empty conventions pinned on to objects
as indifferently as numbers on babies in a maternity ward. For a start,
we know these names have their lives within particular traditions,
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religious, national and so on. And the act of giving a child a name
has always been associated with ritual celebration, for it is also the
act of initiating a new member into the community. This celebratory
act does not intend to treat the child as a passive recipient of a
label, but on the contrary ritually expresses the community's demand
that the child will orient to being a good member. Celebration expres¬
ses the community's notion that this is a good demand. Hence (because
the named one is not merely a passive recipient) arises the possibility
of being re-named, either by entering a new community (e.g. the religious
convert or the new initiate of a religious or political group) or by
achieving some recognized eminence within one (e.g. the special "heroic"
name or nickname for which fighting groups of all kinds are especially
well-known).
Much of the significance of the stories of the Old Testament is
woven in and around the names of their participants: for these names
are not at all arbitrary, but actually contribute much of the meaning
of the stories in which they are embedded. Moderns like to imagine
they have freed themselves of this tyranny of names, but now we can
remind ourselves that names direct us to what we need: a strong re¬
lation to community and tradition. We will resist the modern temp¬
tation to dismiss names by treating them as a matter of indifference,
as merely conventional labels that serve only to distinguish items
from each other and classify species and genera. Instead, we are
asking, what is the ideal speaker's relationship to his name? His
name, as we have said, is more than merely his proper name, although
the latter can remind him of his name. How we can say that one's
name is one's inheritance, it is everything that places a particular
person in a community, as an actor within it. A name specifies or
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particularizes an actor within a community, yet it does not segregate
the actor from the community - even when it names him as "strange", for
even here the estrangement remains particular to the community as well
as to the individual "bearer. What is central with names is that they
particularize and identify the community as well as the individual -
which is what makes it possible for many individuals to bear the same
name, and for the same name to get passed on from generation to gener¬
ation-'. The community regenerates its need for this particular name,
and thus renews itself as this particular community. So there is a
strong sense of endowment or inheritance that goes hand in hand with
the idea of the name. A name is an endowment: it is the speaker's
beginning or origin that is never an absolute or universal origin.
It is bequeathed upon the speaker, like the discussion of justice in
The Republic, rather than merely willed by the speaker. The speaker
does not decide his own name (as an imputed ideal beginning) but rather
needs to resolve his relation to his name.
Thus Gharmides' name is "temperance": for this is the name
that behasbeen bequeathed with. It is Gharmides' endowment. So when
Socrates asks him whether he truly possesses this quality of temperance,
he is not so much asking "Do you live up to your name? " as inviting
Gharmides to reveal his relation to his own name. A speaker lives
his name by developing his enjoyment of his name - rather than seeing
"living up to" either as an onerous task, or as an effortless fulfil¬
lment . The first of these extremes see s the name as entirely external
5. Thomas Mann, in his retelling of the Biblical story in his Joseph
and his Brothers (1978), writes in the notion that over countless
generations, there were in fact many Abrahams, Isaacs, and Jacobs.
This suggests to us that a "generation" is the agency that re¬
generates the community's names.
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to oneself, or as something that one merely successfully attaches to
oneself. It is the name of reputation, "making a name for oneself",
in the manner of Gritias. Gritias manipulates his name in order to
manipulate the community: his intemperance is his desire to define
his own name in order to define his relationship (of tyranny) to the
community. The one who imagines he can completely define the community
and his relation to it through his name (viz. for Critias, "the intel¬
ligent one"), is the tyrant. On the other hand, the second of the two
extremes sees the name as entirely internal to oneself, as something
that is automatically identical to oneself. This is the refusal to
orient to the community's interest in the name - it treats the name
as if it could "be something completely private. And because, as we
have seen, names are deeply communal as well as individual in their
interest, the merely private name never really becomes a name at
all. Charmides, because of the privacy of his "name", suffers the
pain of not really having a name, of not really being recognizable in
the community, and of not being able to recognize himself for others.
Hence, whereas Critias has tendencies towards tyranny because of his
it «i
deliberations, Gharmides is the accidental tyrant par excellence. The
very immunity of Gharmides' name from the community, or better, from
the community-rooted opportunity for conversation, tends to awe the
community and render the name even more private. And again, the figure
who derives a kind of after-the-event validation for his name through
the awe it generates - i.e. through its intense privacy - is the tyrant.
Awe encourages the tyrant to segregate his name from the community and
to place his name before the community rather than within it. The tyrant
places himself before the assembly, metaphorically as well as concretely,
as the privately appropriated image of the ideal. The tyrant traps his
name within the realm of privacy: that is, he segregates his name from
conversation.
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Charmides traps and is trapped "by his name, "temperance". His
name is imprisoned within himself and is prevented from participating
in the enjoyment of conversation. This means that Charmides himself
does not enjoy conversation. The extent of his participation in con¬
versation is limited by the overriding need to protect the privacy of
his name. Gharmides relates to his name in this way because of the
content of that name, a content which equates temperance with natural
harmony. Charmides has accepted the name "temperance", or more fully,
"temperance understood as natural harmony". This is not an enjoyable
name because of its immobility: it inhibits rather than develops
conversation. It fosters a notion of an already appropriated inheri¬
tance that is consequently in need of protection. Gharmides construes
his name as something he must possess rather than something he must
use (and so truly own, i.e. make his own) and so he treats any motion
as a threat.
Socrates is famous, renowned, notorious, and infamous, for what
he does. He is all of these things because different interlocutors
are responding to Socrates' conversation and the reports they hear of
it. Yet whichever kind of interlocutor he is conversing with, Socrates
wants to do what is necessary. What is necessary for him is to express
his name in a way that takes account of his interlocutor i.e. in a way
that does not merely protect it from his interlocutor. Socrates is
spirited rather than patriotic (or, of course, indifferent) towards
his name. The one who is protective towards his name can only enjoy
being what he is among others who are like himself - and even then,
he is often preoccupied with "the others", who only happen to be absent.
In the presence of "the others", he protects his name through withdrawal,
aloofness, or aggressive insult. He does these things in order to "pro¬
tect his integrity".
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Protecting the integrity of one's name is a temptation that we
cannot merely dismiss as if only others suffered it: rather, it is a
temptation intrinsic to the activity of inquiry. This is because a
concern for integrity is not a misguided concern, but rather a concern
that needs to be understood. Integrity resonates with wholeness and
unity: a sense of integrity is a sense of the worthiness of what is
whole or one. And since temperance is the harmony - achieved rather
than natural - of the parts of the soul, temperance can only be deve¬
loped through a sense of the worth of this unity. Temperance needs
a sense of integrity. Yet the temptation of integrity is that it might
seem to need protecting: it might seem fragile rather than robust,
precious rather than valuable.
Socrates' temperance is his knowledge that although he is not
wholly integrated into a unity, yet he needs to involve the whole of
himself in his speeches and actions. Integrity in the strong sense
is robust because it involves the speaker heart and soul in what he
does: and it is valuable because it enables that speaker to develop
temperance (the realization that, although wholly involved, he is a
part). Now we can grasp that integrity does not protect the speaker,
but develops him: it does not detach him, but involves him. Integrity
is not something a speaker has, for the protection of which he detaches
himself: it is something he wants, for the development of which he
involves (all of) himself.
Socrates shows his (desire for) integrity by involving the whole
of himself in conversation. He does not merely protect his name, but
rather enjoys it ironically. We can see this tellingly at the beginning
of the conversation with Gritias and Charmides. As we saw earlier, Gritias
suddenly re-names Socrates as a doctor. "Call Charmides", he says, "and
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tell him that I want him to come and see a physician about the illness
of which he spoke to me the day before yesterday". Having sent for
Charmides, he turns to Socrates and says:
"(Charmides) has been complaining lately
of having a headache when he rises in the
morning: now why should you not make him
believe that you know a cure for the head¬
ache?" (155b)
Socrates resists the temptation to protect his name (as a
philosopher) by merely repudiating the new name that Gritias bequeathes
upon him. He does not merely discriminate between the philosopher and
the doctor by making a comparison unfavourable to the latter. Instead
he accepts the name of doctor since this acceptance will provide one
more occasion for the ironic use of his name. Socrates uses his name
ironically in order to activate inquiry. That is, Socrates uses his
name - since he involves all of himself in his conversation - and this
use is also a development of his name. In this instance, Socrates
develops the resonance between philosophy and medicine, and so develops
the notion of what philosophy is. Socrates must show Charmides that
philosophy is like medicine in that it heals the soul through the
"charm of fair words". Yet he must also show that philosophy differs
from medicine in that its practice is good for its own sake and not
merely for its consequences. Although philosophy has good consequen¬
ces - e.g. the "charm of fair words" will cure Gharmides' headache,
which is really a disorder of his spirit - we desire to engage in
philosophy for its own sake. We seek temperance not in order merely
to ward off the sufferings of intemperance but because we love temper¬
ance for its own sake. Truly temperate actions are those that have
laid the ghosts that have haunted the actor. They are motivated by
the actor"s spirit rather than as mere therapies to the unrest and
disquiet of intemperance. Socrates' refusal to dictate the charm to
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Charmid.es is designed to remember the difference between true temper¬
ance and therapy.
Although philosophy is therapeutic, truly spirited philosophy
is not motivated by the search for therapy. As Socrates might put it
to Charmides: The charm of fair words will cure your headache, but
that is not their real point. This shows us the risk of the "doctor"
analogy for Socrates. Since Charmides is suffering spiritually, he
needs a "charm" of some kind: hence the analogy should not be merely
rejected. Yet since true spirit loves what it enacts, it would do
injustice to philosophy to limit it merely to therapy. It would be
unjust because it would forget philosophy1s spirit. So the spirited
philosopher is one who is prepared to take his good health for granted,
to take it as given. He neither congratulates himself for it (for
then he becomes an athlete) nor does he continually or on principle
doubt it (for then he becomes a patient). The spirited philosopher
takes for granted that conditions, while they may have caused and con¬
tinue to cause pain, have not damaged his health. Here again is the
sturdiness of temperance: the robustness of spirit is its capacity
to sustain and renew itself in the midst of pain and suffering. Spirit
distinguishes between the pain engendered by conditions (i.e. what is
merely irritating) and the suffering that is made possible because
what we love must be embodied in conditions and practices. Spirit
knows that it must suffer the loss of conditions and practices it
loves. Spirit mourns every loss but regrets nothing: this is the
robustness and health of spirit.
It would be very wrong, then, to say that Charmides suffers from
a sickness of spirit that needs to be "put straight". Instead, his
spirit is undeveloped, or rather, spirit has not (yet) expressed itself
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through Gharmides. So Socrates the charmer is on one level a therapist
who cures the headache: but on a deeper level he is a snake-charmer
who entices Gharmides' spirit to express itself. The image of the snake-
charmer reminds us of one of the essential features of charm: it brings
out the best in people, (it even brings out the best of the potentially
poisonous snake: its ability to dance!) Putting charm into things is
a way of reminding others that the best life is the life that is enjoyed.
The philosopher will be charming not in order to conduct therapy but to
bring out the spiritedness (the enjoyable nature) of the life of reflec¬
tion.
The speaker who seeks to protect his name is incapable of charm.
Strangely enough Gharmides does not know what genuine charm is since
he equates the 'fcharm" that Socrates reputedly knows with therapy.
Therapy (or medicine) will simply restore Gharmides to his natural
state - by curing his headache. So Charmides is showing his protective
attitude towards his name when he requests of Socrates: "Then I will
write out the charm from your dictation". (156a). Because Gharmides
treats his name as natural (endowed by nature), he seeks to protect
its integrity by passively accepting those speeches that will restore
it. Charmides "writes from dictation" because he is a restorer. That
speech is good in the eyes of Gharmides which restores the endowments
of nature. For Charmides the ideal speaker is the doctor or therapist:
the one who would respond to his request by dictating the truth to him.
Instead of doing this, Socrates charms Charmides by joking: "With my
consent or without my consent?" (156a). Socrates makes Charmides laugh.
Charmides' desperate desire for a cure is making him passive:
he wants the very minimum of activity, the mere dictation of the charm,
in order to cure or restore himself. Instead, Socrates enlivens Char-
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mid.es: he brings Charmides' spirit to greater life. Socrates is trying
to show Gharmides that he needs to live spiritedly rather than seek
therapy. Dormant within Gharmides is the desire for spiritedness.
In enlivening Gharmides, Socrates discovers something very important:
making others more spirited is good for one's own spirits. Unlike
nursing or doctoring, it is not a mere drain of resources, an exhausting
demand that would tax a saint. In making him laugh, Socrates makes
Charmides actually notice for the first time who he is actually talking
to. Laughingly, Gharmides says, "with your consent", and addresses
Socrates by name. Now we are beginning to see that it is spirit that
qualifies a speaker for conversation: spirit makes us genuinely inter¬
ested in conversation by making us interested in our interlocutor's
name. Gharmides' laugh and his calling Socrates by his name both dis¬
play the same thing: the stirring of his spirit.
Spirit makes us genuinely interested in conversation because
spirit moves us. Spirit is the mobile energy of development: it is
the opposite of the monolithic or the sluggish. Mohammed Ali reminds
us of the spirit it takes to transform mere weight into full powers.
Ali could outfight his opponents not because he was heavier, or even
stronger, but because his movements were faster and perfectly integrated
with his weight and strength. What is required is (the development of)
the power to move the weight one bears. Otherwise - if one's weight
(of opinion, or of endowment) exceeds the mobility of one's spirit -
one becomes ponderous (as Gritias does) or languid (as Charmides does).
Spirit moves us to listen and to speak, to "enter the spirit of the
conversation" by being willing to develop it in our own particular way.
The spirited conversationalist neither dictates nor is dictated to,
neither names nor is named by, the conversation, but rather brings his
name and the conversation to bear on each other. True spirit brings
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inheritance (the endowments of nature and place) into the motion of
speech: this is spirit's dialectic. This "bringing to bear is what
we have been calling charm: now, since it has emerged as the charm of
dialectic^, we will call it by its strongest name - irony.
The charm of the ironist does not mean he is merely interac¬
tional, responding to others but not expressing an interest. Instead,
talking to Charmides (or Keno, of Alcibiades) is one more way for
Socrates to express his interest in what is good for its own sake. As
we have said, temperance and justice are good for their own sakes,
yet the relationship between them is not "naturally harmonious" -
even though the notion of temperance seems to suggest, perhaps, that
it should be. The harmony needs work: hence the problem of re-
achieving it is not one-sidedly a consequence of human frailty and
weakness (though this is part of it) but is also written into the
nature of temperance itself and the nature of justice itself. This is
the spirited philosopher's interest: not to restrict himself to
therapy (the human weakness side of the problem) but rather to bring
o.Socrates remarks to Charmides that the cure of the soul....
"has to be effected by the use of certain charms, and these charms
are fair words" (157a). Socrates has just said that "all good
and evil, whether in the body or in the whole man, originates....
in the soul" (l56e): hence the need to attend to the soul. The
ideal speaker knows that the relationship between good and evil
ought not, and need not, be worried about: it ought not be a
preoccupation that consumes him. Worry would be called for if
the good could not be pursued for its own sake (because we love
it) but only for negative reasons, to ward off evil, to merely
combat degeneration, and so on. See above, Chapter 2- This
marks the difference between therapy and philosophy: whereas
therapy is driven by its struggle with the evils that afflict
bodies and minds, philosophy is moved by the pursuit of what
is good for its own sake that animates spirit.
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out the strongest possible version of the difficulty at hand. The
strong difficulty is akin to the difficulty of the guardians in The
Republics how to be both fierce (to strangers) and friendly (to citi¬
zens) at once? For this, more than therapy is required, but instead,
the right kind of education. Only spirited philosophy can show us
what the guardians need.
Now at last the philosopher's problem is revealing itself to us.
The philosopher's problem is the self-same problem as Critias' and
Charmides' problem: the need to achieve a strong (non-natural) harmony
of temperance and justice in the soul. This is why Socrates and Critias
and Charmides participate together in conversation: Socrates wants to
teach the others, not in the sense of lecturing to them, or of impart¬
ing his knowledge to them, but of inviting them to truly realize that
they share "his" problem. For this is what neither of them realize
at present. To put this another way: Socrates will resist merely
doing therapy on Critias and Charmides (by resolving their problems
for them) but instead will turn the souls of each of them towards an
encounter with the problem that gives rise to their "personal" problems:
the problem of justice and temperance. We saw in the previous chapter
how Socrates resists creating false empathy with Charmides (" let
Charmides talk for a change"). Now we see the deep reason why he will
also resist agreeing with Critias' definitions, even though they sound
Socratic. It is to bring out the strong problem, the problem that
always goes beyond the personality of the speaker, although it surfaces
in conversation in these particular ways. Socrates resists agreeing
with Critias in order to recover the depth of the problem concealed
by Critias' desire for agreement.
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3. Spirit and integration.
In The Charmides, Socrates is tempted by each of his interlocu¬
tors in turn. Gritias is probably the only speaker in Plato who utters
Socratic-sounding formulations and yet is vigorously refuted by Socrates
7himself. Socrates resists agreeing with utterances that sound friendly.
Gritias, in fact, is very keen for Socrates to agree with him: indeed
every new formulation he comes up with seems almost designed especially
to elicit Socrates' agreement. Yet Socrates resists. For example, he
asks Gritias if the latter means to say that "he who does good is tem¬
perate". When Gritias replies "yes, and you, friend, would agree"
Socrates retorts:
"No matter whether I should or not; just now,
not what I think, but what you are saying, is
the point at issue". (l63e).
Initially, Socrates seems quarrelsome here: why make such a laboured
point of witholding agreement when surely Gritias is justified in
thinking that Socrates would, if truth were known, agree?
Socrates resists for the very reason that Gritias is eternally
justifying himself. Gritias needs to learn that far from needing more
justification, more intelligence, and more rigour, he needs something
greater. Critias must learn to ask: what does justice need in order
to be perfect? Perfect justice is not the same as eternal justifica-
We have seen (at page 135 above) that Socrates risks indulging
Critias by conceding arguments concerning possibility for the
sake of the discussion. But this is never allowed to compro¬
mise his need to refute Gritias (even though Gritias sounds
Socratic). When Socrates concedes possibility to Critias, he
tells him openly that it is merely a concession - in order
ultimately, as we have seen, to elicit what is Desirable.
Anyhow, if we give a little more consideration to Socrates'
refutation, we soon realize that it too risks indulgence in
this instance. In this discussion, however, our attention
is centred not on indulgence (which as we have seen is temper¬
ance's risk) but on that which is higher than refutation, that
end to which refutation is aimed - justice.
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tion but rather justice that is in perfect harmony with temperance.
Strong or perfect justice needs to give to temperance its inspiration
and to take from temperance its sense of the unshakable. This is the
strong problem that is the real ground of Critias' "personal" problem.
Gritias is not merely an idiosyncrasy. Critias dramatizes in a "per¬
sonal" way one particular failure that is always likely to occur when¬
ever communities seek to regulate themselves: hence Gritias' excess
is perennial. It is the excess of justice without limit, or more
specifically, justice uninfluenced by the depth and reserve of tem¬
perance. Justice uninfluenced is unable to do its business, which is
to inspire sophrosyne (tempted by nature) out of its slumber: instead
it produces mimics, repeaters of its dictates. Socrates might have
given his agreement, and then tested Critias' understanding of what
is agreed upon: this is the practice he often follows elsewhere. Here
this would indulge Critias: it would invite him to display his exper¬
tise in justifying himself. Instead, Socrates wants to teach Gritias
by turning him towards what truly limits him: the deep and the valuable.
Gritias is not merely an idiosyncrasy because he depicts what
unlimited justice looks like in practice. Justice uninfluenced by
the concern for worth tends to forget the need for the suggestiveness
of speech. In fact, because justice wants to be firm, it is tempted
to become fastidious: because it wants to be definite, it is tempted
to become definitive. Justice's very desire to regulate the community,
to avoid being nebulous or impressionistic, might lead it to neglect
the concern for worth. The crucial problem is that once justice starts
becoming definitive at the expense of depth, it tends to imagine that
the remaining ambiguities require it to persist in the same direction.
As we have seen, the final, and (in an unusually significant sense)
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"logical" outcome of this process is the legal or governmental docu¬
ment, designed and written in order to achieve complete intelligibility
and absence of ambiguity.
We have already examined Critias as a definer. Defining sets
Critias' intelligence in motion. Wow we can see that defining is one
relationship to names. To be a definer is to imagine names as subject
to the will. For example, Gritias can will (define) the distinction
between making and doing. Critias1 relation to his own name conforms
to the same pattern. As Socrates remarks, Critias became embarrassed
because "he had a reputation to maintain" (l69c): and earlier we saw
that Socrates' praise of Charmides as being of the same house (name)
as Critias elicited from the latter one of his greatest boasts. Critias
wants to make a name for himself.
The definer is one who believes in the sovereignty of the will.
We saw in Chapter Three that Critias turns Desire into volition or
wish. Now we can develop this idea by saying: defining is the activity
that brings about this transformation. To exert one's will now means:
to define. Critias exerts his will by defining himself (i.e. making
a name for himself). His notion of what he is hinges around his
capacity to define, comprehensively and unambiguously, the subject at
hand. Critias imagines that intelligence developed without limit
generates sophrosyne. For there is no limit to what the will can sub¬
ject. Intemperance for Critias would mean lack of control or weakness
of will. This can be overcome by subjecting to the will the will it¬
self. Temperance, in the eyes of sheer intelligence, is the will
willing itself, the definition that defines itself. The paradigm of
the definition is the "knowledge that knows itself" - or as Critias
himself puts it: "Wisdom alone is the science of other sciences and of
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itself" (l66c, my emphasis). Again, at this point, Gritias accuses
Socrates of refuting the argument even though he really "agrees". And.
again, Socrates resists his invitation, although it seems he could hear
Gritias as saying something like: wisdom counsels itself wisely he-
cause it knows itself. We find Socrates saying something like this
himself in The Republic (428b). Why, then, does Socrates resist? Why
in fact, is it necessary for him to do so?
Whereas Charmides' temperance is its appearance rather than
its reality, Gritias' version is its abstraction rather than its real¬
ization. Gritias wants the virtues to be definite: in a word he wants
the virtuous man to be identifiable■ At its deepest level, this desire
is the desire for justice. In order to do justice to ourselves and
each other in our speeches and actions, we need to develop and express
the notions through which to identify ourselves. Yet justice without
limit (without the sense of depth or worth) becomes rationalistic and
definitive.
Socrates wants to teach Gritias the spirit of temperance.
Genuine temperance is animated by spirit because it remembers that what
it sees is other than itself. Just as sight sees what is other than
itself, knowledge knows what is other than itself. Yet, knowledge
grasps what is other than itself by befriending it. (This movement
beyond the mere reminder of Otherness,we saw earlier, in our opening
chapters, is the movement of justice.^) The spirited guard dog, Socrates
jokes in The Republic, is philosophical because it is friendly towards
what is known (3?6a-b). The risk for the temperate or philosophical
nature, the one who grasps the otherness of what is known, is the loss
of soirit. THIS IS NONE OTHER THAN THE RISK THAT HAS BEEN ALWAYS AT
THE HEART OF OUR DISSERTATION: THE RISK OF NEGATIVITY. Loss of spirit
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is the rule of negativity: and the philosopher's irony "becomes nega¬
tive when the embryonic temperance with which he begins is not deve¬
loped.
We can think here of the example of friendship itself. Although
the practice of friendship is grounded in the nature of friendship
itself (which is beyond particular examples of friendship), we truly
grasp it only by enacting it in -practice. To know friendship requires
the befriending of it by allowing oneself and another to become friends.
Friendship is really the best teacher of justice. It gives us the
knowledge required to become just. Friendship teaches us that even
if we lost all our friends at sea we would not lose friendship. Our
depth of suffering would express our grasp of friendship: it would be
spirited, not tragic. Spirit mourns every loss but regrets nothing.
Spirit delights in everything it comes to know because it comes to
know by (re)-discovering friendship. The merely temperate philosopher
is tempted, because re-discovery is involved, not to bother! He is
tempted to slumber because he says to himself, "I know this already".
And the Critiases he meets, who always will the truths they "know",
he allows to pain him ana tempt him to slumber all the more, waking up
occasionally to rail against them, then falling asleep exhausted once
more. Now friendship is teaching us that re-discovery is always par¬
ticular and embodied: it is always discovery. The freshness is not a
fiction or illusion, as negativity would have it, but is a strong re¬
quirement. It is necessary so as to truly befriend and truly know
anything: to grasp it from within.
Spirit is perfect because it is perfectly just towards parti¬
cularity. It is perfectly just towards particularity because it grasps
how particularity is a strong requirement.
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Particularity is stronger than circumstance because it depends
for its very genesis on the activity of spirit. Spirit is free of
the dilemma of aloofness versus subjection to circumstance: its
activism engages the circumstantial, but is always more than circum¬
stantial.
Spirit, then, is not negative towards particularity as Gharmides
is. Spirit does not treat what it knows as merely natural, as an
endowment, with which it is familiar from the beginning, and hence,
as not requiring particularization. The spirited speaker befriends
rather than familiarizes. Hence he has no reason to protect himself,
as Gharmides does, from a strange or "unnatural" world: a world out¬
side the family of his own natural gifts and graces. The spirited
speaker does not merely stay with the place he began in, and repudiate
all that does not belong to it: he is not parochial. Instead he
seeks to grasp the depth or the spirit of what is truly particular to
his place. He is more truly at home in his place than the parochial
type, because he is interested in doing justice to his place rather
than protecting it. Doing justice involves giving an account of it
that brings out the best of its particularity. Spirit is perfectly
just towards particularity. Spirit is genuinely rather than abstractly
just.
Nor is spirit merely intelligent and definitive towards par¬
ticularity, as Gritias is. Spirit does not treat what it knows as
merely conventional (i.e. as subject to instrumentalism). Spirit knows
itself to be deeper than the convention, although it requires various
conventions in order to express itself. Spirit's depth, its interest
in what is good for its own sake, tempers its justice so that the
latter does not get reduced to a utilitarian "convention" or a mere
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code of ethics. Justice is more than a method - for method without
depth is intemperate towards particularity by reducing it to con¬
trollable circumstance. The exegetic legal document is intemperate
towards the depth of speech by seeking to reduce it to troublesome
(but controllable i.e. circumstantial) ambiguity. The spirited
speaker needs the temperance of developing his true place rather
than simply moving around in an opportune way and using the endless
distinctions that are always available. He is not cosmopolitan.
Instead he seeks to remain temperate no matter where he goes: the
real motion he seeks to generate is that of deepening the conversation
by expressing its spirit. He moves more genuinely than the cosmopolitan
type, because his motion is temperate (oriented to depth) rather than
opportune or definitive. Being temperate requires re-calling deep
needs in the midst of the motion of conversation. Spirit is temperate
in that its justice is oriented to depth. Spirit is genuinely rather
than apparently temperate.
Socrates has been tempted, first to treat temperance as some¬
thing natural (that is, to forget justice) and then to treat justice
as a matter for formal and all-embracing definition ( that is, to
forget temperance). As we have seen, unlimited temperance and un¬
limited justice, when simply present together, tend to bring out the
worst in each other. Charmides' naturalism invites him to become
a passive recipient, and Critias' definitiveness invites him to dic¬
tate. Gritias tends to take the credit for what he thinks he has
made of Charmides, and Charmides tends to imagine that both Critias
and himself know a great deal more than they do. Charmides, in other
words, naively attributes to Critias the power to name according to
nature, while Critias foolishly attributes to Charmides the property
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of being constituted by the name he gives him. Gharmides makes Gritias
think tyranny is possible, and Gritias makes Charmides think it is
desirable. That is, Gharmides suggests to Gritias the possibility
of constituting reality by naming (defining), whereas Critias enables
Charmides to hide in the abstractness and vagueness of the "natural"
name. Critias, Socrates says, speaks about temperance in riddles.
Critias is the classic manipulator of riddles: he is the corrupt
oracle who abuses the naivete of others. Gharmides is the serious
oracle who hides himself in the vague and hence invites the foolishness
of others who risk their necks by making themselves visible. Gharmides
(vaguely) thinks he can save himself by making Gritias his ally: his
own naivete (or "receptiveness") will not only be protected but, will
even be confirmed and encouraged. Critias (instrumentally) thinks he
can further himself by making Gharmides his ally: for Gharmides will
expose the foolishness of others. Gritias will be helped by this
g
exposure to define others .
Justice: irony and the name.
Socrates resists the restriction of the literal version of
medicine by being playful with the metaphor it offers him. His play
invites us to reflect on the nature of therapy and philosophy. Yet
spirit is stronger either than resistance (Charmide^) or formal invi¬
tation (Critias): it is inspirational. Spirit "rubs off". The story
of the holy Spirit decending on the Apostles in tongues of flame is a
metaphor for the notion of spirit breathing life into those it touches.
Spirit is needed to influence others. Now we need to ask: far from
merely resisting: Critias and formally inviting Charmides how does
8. This is precisely the use he tries to make of Charmides to
expose Socrates and define him (as physician).
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Socrates begin to influence them? How would Socrates' influence have
turned Charmides and Critias away from tyranny towards ideal speech?
Socrates influences "by showing that spirit rather than defini¬
tion or vagueness resolves the problem of necessity.
Charmides is vague because he mistakes natural harmony for tem¬
perance. The natural has a sense of what is necessary but it .is an
inner apprehension rather than a speech. What is necessary is what
is ordained, or better, bequeathed, by nature. Since the natural
feels that he himself is "close to nature", he also feels, as a result,
that he has a grasp of what is necessary to him. Seemingly without
effort, he lives in tune with his own centre. This is how the natural
can appear to be so temperate: hence the estimate of Charmides*
friends is not an obviously unwarranted one. Yet natural harmony
speaks vaguely - because nature gives its endowment before speech and
therefore strongly antecedent to it. For the natural, speech does not
9make a strong difference. Hence the hardest thing of all for the
natural is to identify himself, to show himself to others and to
himself. He is in-himself but not for-himself. The difficulty is
that because, as a prepossessed and already integrated subject, he
imagines himself to be so close to nature as to be identical with it,
he cannot distinguish or differentiate a .topic of conversation out of
the already seamless whole. Since he "is" this natural whole, to
distinguish something within it would require the violation of nature:
the natural would become foolish by losing his composure. For the
natural, the fool is the one who displays the hubris of discoursing
about a part within the whole, a "concern". The natural sees particu-
larization as the foolish concern of hubris, man's loss of touch with
9- Recall our analysis of awe in the previous chapter.
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nature. What Charmides needs to learn is the strong necessity of tem¬
perance, as the necessity of risking foolishness.
What is folly? It is part of the endowment of nature and up¬
bringing. Spirit's relationship towards folly is part of its irony
towards endowment. The risk of nature and upbringing is that we
could be merely sympathetic towards them, as Gharmides is, or on the
other hand, merely critical of them, as Critias is. Mere sympathy
and mere criticism both orient to a notion of the perfect endowment.
Spirit says that the folly of our nature and our upbringing can be
befriended and enjoyed - rather than sympathized with or criticised.
What is always deeper than the folly of our endowment is our need for
a spirited relation to it.
We will develop this by considering spirit's activism with
particular reference to the characters of our dialogue. Spirit, we
have said, mourns every loss but regrets nothing. By the same token
spirit enjoys each of its achievements, but lets go of them when it
needs to. Spirit is neither indifferent to the outcomes of practices
such that the act in itself becomes everything, nor is it consumed by
outcomes in a way that would turn action into a mere means to an end.
We want to conclude our essay by formulating this relationship of
spirit to motion. We require the motion of spirit to display itself
as just and as temperate.
Now justice towards particularity requires being ironic towards
one's name. One's name is always particular, issuing a call and pro¬
viding an inspiration at the same time. Listening to its inspiration
is the risk of folly that strongly needs to be taken in order to genuinely
undertake the work of answering to its call. The name needs to be
generated as something inspirational, friendly, or lovable, as well as
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something demanding or testing. This is what Charmides forgets. The
name of temperance, which Critias treats as a definition of Gharmides
(and thus as a sheer demand), Gharmides himself wants to treat as a
birthright rather than a friend. He is lulled rather than inspired by
it, comforted rather than excited. Charmides shelters from the sheer
demand of the definition in the refuge of nature: the repressed
demand re-surfaces as a headache, because naturalism evades rather
than transforms what is external to it.
Gharmides is an example of the rejection of enthusiasm evinced
by a patriarchal demand. The patriarch treats the Name as if it were
external or Other to the offspring who must learn to bear the weight
of its demand. In this way the patriarch alienates his offspring, and
thus alienates himself from the fertility through which he generated
them. The patriarch is interested in the Name more than his own offs¬
pring - his offspring are only so many ways of passing down the Name.
Offspring are necessary to him, but only in a secondary way - not as
good in themselves, but merely as bearers of the Name. The patriarch's
impulse to speak thus originates in a pre-possession (his Name) rather
than in spirit (irony towards one's name). It is this that renders
his speech terminological and definitive. The patriarch imagines that
he wills his own name, and wills the endowment of that name upon his
offspring (his speeches and actions). Gharmides, the "offspring",
secretly knows that he is not the product of will: instead he imagines
that he is the child of nature. Sweet, thoughtless, purposeless, and
all-embracing nature has given birth to Gharmides, its child. This
alternative is as unironic towards the name as the one on whose
rejection it is grounded. It is reverent rather than sanctimonious
towards its name. It is natural assurance rather than self-righteousness.
269
The one who never moves from being an offspring - since nature is a
progenitor who ties her offspring to her - never develops an interest
in generating offspring of his own.
Where the patriarch is definitive,naturalism is vague. Its
\agueness stands, now, for its disinterest in offspring. Where defini-
tiveness depicts a patriarchal relationship to "the Name", vagueness
depicts the naturalistic relation. The patriarch alienates his off¬
spring by treating them as secondary to their Name: the naturalist,
on the other hand, abandons his offspring to namelessness. His speech
is vague. His offspring are nondescript and somehow not of this world:
they suffer the strangeness of the foundling. The foundling finds
it hard to develop into anything particular if he spends his energy
trying to find the original parents he knows he has lost: whereas
the legitimate heir (the patriarch's offspring) finds it hard to
develop into a lively participant if he spends all his energy trying
to evade the nominal parents he is burdened with. Both the foundling
and the legitimate heir need to transform their condition by developing
the irony of the name.
Critias and Charmides find it hard to befriend because they
are more like the repetitive circle of rationalism and vagueness.
Gritias wants to treat Charmides as the legitimate heir of the repu¬
table Name, the inheritor of the definitions he endows (the temperate
one, and so on). Charmides, as becomes apparent during the dialogue,
realizes more and more how much he wants to evade this headache by
submerging the name in nature - that is, by forgetting the difference
a name makes, forgetting how it could actually inspire or move speech.
Charmides is in flight from his would-be parent Critias. He will avoid
inflicting the Name in turn on his offspring by a simple enough device:
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he will abandon them at birth. His horror of patriarchy makes him
generate foundlings (vague speeches). When the offspring or speech
discovers its own vagueness (its dim origins) it will seek instead
for the Name of its source - it will give birth to the desire for
the definition. We can imagine Critias now as Charmides' offspring
trying to define who Gharmides is. Gritias hears in Gharmides' obs¬
curity an echo of his unknown parent. Gritias the foundling is in
quest of his mythical parent, "Gharmides". The relationship between
them presents a spectacle like that of two dogs chasing each other's
tails around in a circle. In their tendency to simply make each other
react, they push each other further away from the spirit of the mean,
the spirit of integrated temperance and justice.
We can ask now: what has his conversation with Socrates shown
Gritias? One thing it shows him (and this is what is truly conclusive
about it) is that try as he might he cannot possess everything. Soc¬
rates demonstrates that there is a difference between the "science of
sciences" that Gritias supposes is temperance, and the science of human
advantage (the knowledge of good and evil). The science of sciences,
whatever it means, and supposing it to be possible, would produce omni-
competence: only the knowledge of good and evil will ensure that
things are done beneficially or to human advantage. Gritias makes
one last attempt to incorporate the science of human advantage within
(his version of) sophrosyne. He protests:
"Why will not sophrosyne be of advantage?
For, however much we assume that sophrosyne
is a science of sciences, and has a sway over
other sciences, surely she will have this par¬
ticular science of the good under her control,
and in this way will benefit us?" (17bd-e)
Socrates reminds him that just as they had earlier agreed that medicine
and not sophrosyne gives health, so the science of good and evil and not
2?1
sophrosyne gives advantage. Finally, Socrates concludes with one of
the aporiae for which the early dialogues are renowned. He asks,
"How then can sophrosyne be advantageous,
when it produces no advantage?" "Apparently
it cannot, Socrates",(175a) Critias replies.
Now we can see the aporia for more than most commentators would have
it: it is an invitation to Gritias to show temperance. Gritias must
learn to transform his desire to possess everything into the Desire
for what is truly beneficial. He must accept that the "science of
sciences", even granting its existence, would not incorporate the
science of human advantage. Gritias must reflect upon the Desirability
of the science of human advantage as against the mere intelligence of
the "science of sciences". His unresistant "apparently it cannot,
Socrates", is his acceptance of this work. Critias is beginning to
learn temperance. He has experienced the Desire to be influenced by
his offspring.
Somehow, Charmides also seems to desire an influence. He stays
close to Gritias instead of merely running away from him. What does
this tell us about Charmides' interest in Gritias, and how could we
transform or develop that interest so as to make the two friends?
From Critias, Charmides gets the liveliness of difference of the
speaker. Even definitions provide topics or usages for speech. So
Gharmides shows an incipient, though as yet merely potential, desire
for conversation. The problem with the Gharmides - Gritias relation¬
ship is that it short-circuits Gharmides' embryonic desire by vicar¬
iously satisfying it. The slippery one has little difficulty evading
the attempt to be pinned down: somehow he actually lives off this
because it invites him to begin a career in evasion. In this sense,
the place for the "man without qualities" to be is the bureaucracy, and
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indeed, he is , in truth, a product of it. So if the strength of
Gharmides' desire for Critias is his desire for conversation,the prob¬
lem is that this strength is obscured by the weakness of taking refuge
in abstract definition. Our question is: what would develop the
strength of Charmides* desire (for Critias) and enable it to be deve¬
loped?
Gharmides must learn to become conclusive by re-orienting him¬
self towards particularity. The rationalist partiarch and the vague
naturalist each have a weak relation to particularity. The patriarch
subordinates and subdues it under the aegis of the Name. He knows just
how he wants it to be in advance. The unhappiness of the patriarch
is the imperfection of the example: the patriarch is always poten¬
tially like Henry the Eighth in that he is unwilling to work on any
relationship but would sooner kill it and begin again. This reminds
us of the way that Gritias is always trying to "withdraw his previous
admissions" and start over. The patriarch is jealous and judgemental
rather than fertile and imaginative towards particularity because he
abstracts the example for the sake of the Name it signifies. At the
opposite extreme, the vague naturalist, in reaction against the
oppressing of the example, eschews interest in particularity altoget¬
her. A discourse without examples, he reasons, will not be patriar¬
chal. To be sure: yet it becomes impossible to develop a sense of
what the discourse is. Here, in fact, is the way of negativity - in
reaction to the weak or abstract grasp of necessity.
Enjoying particularity, then, requires being neither indif¬
ferent nor judgemental towards the name, but rather being imaginative
or ironic towards it. To develop the good example for something
requires re-presenting the one who is a worthy bearer of its name:
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one who would enjoy being ironic towards the name it gives him. One
who enjoys the spiritedness of being named is the conclusive speaker.
Spirit is the progenitor re-collected by the conclusive speaker in
his speech. When spirit becomes one's progenitor, this generates the
necessity of offspring.
In Chapter Three, we addressed the question of why Socrates
turns the conversation away from Charmides and instead addresses
himself to Critias. We saw that by doing this Socrates was being just
by doing what was best for everybody. Now we can take up this remar¬
kable transition in the dialogue and ask another question of it. For
at this point, we notice that a change seems to come over Charmides
in the final remarks he makes prior to his quitting the conversation .
So we want to ask: what is the nature of Charmides' response at this
stage, and what has he yet to learn by listening to Socrates converse
with Critias?
The character of Socrates' conversation undergoes decisive
transformation at the point where Charmides imports into the discus¬
sion Critias' definition of temperance. Up to now, Charmides has
merely been showing the difficulty we expect the natural type to find
in expressing his opinion. Now almost the first thing Charmides has
said to Socrates is that he wishes to "write out the charm from (his)
dictation". (156a). This demonstrates the temptation towards passivity
of natural harmony or modesty. And Charmides' mere reliance on Critias'
("or some other philosopher's") definition shows that he has succumbed
to this temptation. Natural harmony is liable to corrupt the desire
for conversation by turning it into a kind of passive acquiescence in
"the truth". The truth is treated abstractly, such that it can be
transformed into a quietism that harmonizes with nature's endowment.
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And note how Gritias' definition can be made to do this. Whereas he
interprets "doing your own business" in a self-centred aid manipulative
way, Charmides can equally take it in a quiet and privatized sense.
Socrates' remark that whoever framed the definition was obviously
speaking in a riddle is addressed to what is happening here. Passive
acquiescence in "the truth" necessarily transforms the truth itself
into something passive and without vigour. One tendency that is
paramount is for it to assume both its own and others' understanding
of whatever merely appears to be comprehensive. Just as natural har¬
mony is the appearance of temperance, so it tends to pacify compre¬
hension into an abstract or mystical unity that transcends speech.
Natural harmony is attracted to whatever sounds unified and all-
embracing and repelled by difference.
This is the assumption that Charmides has been making all along:
that both he and Gritias have been "doing their own business" in their
grasp of the definition. Just at the moment when Critias, as we saw,
glimpses the possibility that Charmides has not been doing Critias'
business, Charmides, to equally comic effect, begins to see that
Critias doesn't even know what his business is. At first, Charmides
doesn't get this point: he resists Socrates' identification of the
definition with Critias by asking "what matter from whom I heard this?"
(l6lc). In a way, of course, Charmides is right: it doesn't matter
who said it, but what does matter is the use he makes of it. More
deeply, though, we see here Charmides' universalistic indifference to
the example. He is completely oblivious to the kind of relationship
he has with Critias, and of the need for the relationship to re-present
the "temperance" of the definition.
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Socrates wants to educate Charmides by bringing home to him
the very real possibility that what sounds comprehensive and wise
often means very little. The person who speaks may not actually
understand what he is saying: the result will be abstractness. Now
to educde Charmides at this point, Socrates needs to provoke him.
After he brings out the obscure and riddle-like character of the
definition, he starts inciting Charmides. "Was he a fool who told you?"
(l62b), he asks him. Charmides is experiencing a revelation which is
really amazing him, and he shows the mixture of disturbance and vica¬
rious pleasure he feels by speaking in the past tense: "Nay, I cer¬
tainly thought him a very wise man" (lo2b, my emphasis). The particularity
of his relationship with Critias is permeating every part of Charmides'
body and soul. For the first time he is realizing that he has been
allowing himself to be duped: and his temptation is to smirk at the
faker he now takes Critias to be. The risk of course is that Socrates
could become a substitute for Critias, because he is the one who has
taken the scales from Charmides' eyes. Charmides still has much to
learn from the ensuing conversation, even though he will not contri¬
bute to it - Socrates will need to remember this, even though he must
surely find it hard to blame Charmides for what he does next. Asked
if he can tell Socrates the meaning of the definition, he replies,
"Indeed, I cannot; and I should not wonder
if the man himself who used this phrase did
not understand what he meant".
Whereupon, Socrates tells us,"he laughed slyly, and looked at Critias".
(162b).
Charmides starts to stir up Critias, telling him he has been
refuted. What he has discovered is that he can orient to the effect
he has on others: he can provoke a response rather than merely gene-
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rate an effect. Charmid.es is learning that he is capable of being an
active participant in the development of the conversation. What he
has yet to learn is that he needs to be an active participant.
What Charmides needs is necessary and essential to him, so it
must be sought for vigorously by him. At the outset, Charmides thought
he needed the charm Socrates could supposedly dictate to him. So he
does need it, but in a stronger way than he thought. By listening
to Socrates' conversation with Critias, Charmides learns that the
charm is not a guarantee but more like Desire. What really charms
us is Desire (in ourselves or in another). What is really charming
is our grasp of the spirited necessity in our Desire. Our Desire is
a Desire for what is necessary to us, yet the necessity is deeper than
mere necessity, conditions of survival, or sheer constraint. Our enjoy¬
ment (our experience of charm) is our learning that the necessity we
Desire is oriented to worth. It is good to desire offspring, because
they particularize what is necessary for us.
Socrates, after his supposedly unsuccessful attempt to disco¬
ver what temperance is in his conversation with Critias, turns again
to Charmides, and says he is grieved that the charm has turned out
to be so useless. Charmides tells him that, on the contrary, he wishes
to be charmed by Socrates daily, since if neither Socrates nor Critias
know what temperance is, he certainly does not. Critias encourages
him, and they talk privately for a short time, until Socrates asks:
"You sirs, what are you conspiring about?" (176c). Again, Socrates
is provoking Charmides. Conspiring could resonate with what Critias
and Charmides have long been engaged in. Socrates is playfully yet
seriously asking them to give an account of their conspiracy and by
so doing to turn it into something other than a tyranny. A conspiracy
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that gives an. account of itself is perhaps, a just conspiracy: the
only truly just conspiracy is friendship. That it is Charrnides who
answers rather than his erstwhile spokesman Critias shows that his
natural assurance is being invigorated by the desire to justify.
Charmides takes up Socrates provocation and presents a fait accompli:
"We are not conspiring, we have conspired already". Finally, when
Socrates remarks that, in the mood of violence, he is irresistible,
he admonishes: "Do not you resist me, then" (176c).
All of this could sound like incipient tyranny, and indeed this
would be one possible reading. However, for us, a stronger reading
would begin with Socrates' reply to Charmides' admonition. Socrates
says "I shall not resist you, then" (176c). Socrates will not resist
Charmides desire, since it is the desire to pursue the conversation:
but somebody else might resist. The somebody else in question is the
one who all along has been resisting the desire to converse: Charmides
himself. For it has been Charmides, with his attachment to nature,
who has established his relationship to Critias on the basis of fore¬
stalling conversation for the pretence of sophrosyne. So what we are
shown in Charmides' remarks is not incipient tyranny, but on the con¬
trary, incipient conversation, incipient justice: the beginnings of
spirit. Charmides is beginning to want offspring.
278
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Aeschylus, The Bumenides, in Aeschylus, 1977.
Aeschylus, The Oresteia, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1977.
Aristotle, The Politics. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1962.
J.Austen, Pride and Prejudice, London: Dent and Sons, 1978.
A.Blum, Theorizing, London: Heinemann Educational Books, 197^.
A.Blum, Socrates The Original and its Images, London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul, 1978.
A.Blum and P.McHugh,eds, Friends, Enemies and Strangers. New Jersey:
Ahlex Publishing Corporation, 1979.
A.Blum and P.McHugh, Self-Reflection in the Arts and Sciences to be
published by Routledge and Kegan Paul,London.
R.Bretall,ed., A Kierkegaard Anthology, New Jersey: Princeton Univer¬
sity Press, 19^6.
A.Camus, The Rebel, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1962.
Chambers's Twentieth Century Dictionary, London: Chambers, 1901.
P.Conrad, "Introduction" to Austen, 1978.
W.Davies, "Introduction" to Hopkins, 1979*
R.Fagles and W.B.Stanford, "Introduction" to Aeschylus, 1977*
H.Garfinkel, "A Conception of and Experiments with "Trust" as a
Condition of Stable Concerted Actions", in
O.J.Harvey, ed., 1963*
H.Garfinkel, Studies in Ethnomethodology, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall,
1967.
O.J.Harvey, ed., Motivation and Social Interaction, New York: The
Ronald Press Company, 1963.
G,W.F.Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, trans. J.Baillie, London:
George Allen and Unwin, 19^9•
G.M.Hopkins, The Major Poems, London: Dent and Sons,1979*
I.Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, London, Dent and Sons, 193^•
3.Karatheodoris, 'Logos: An Analysis of the Social Achievement of
Rationality", in Blum and KcKugh, eds.. 1979-
279
S.Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1968.
S.Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1941.
S.Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments in part in Bretall ed., 1946.
S.Kierkegaard, Purity of Heart is to Will One Thing, in part in
Bretall ed., 1946.
S.Kierkegaard, Two Edifying Discourses, in part in Bretall ed., 1946.
P.McHugh, S.Raffel, D.Foss and A.Blum, On the Beginning of Social
Inquiry, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974.
T.Mann, Joseph and His Brothers, Harinondsworth: Penguin Books, 1978.
K.Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte in Marx and Engels,
19o3;:
K.Marx and F.Sngels, Selected Works in One Volume, London: Lawrence
and Wishart, 1968.
M.de Montaigne, Essays, Harinondsworth: Penguin Books, 1958.
F.Nietzsche, The Use and Abuse of History, Indianapolis: Bobbs -
Merrill Educational Publishing, 1949-
S.O*Casey, The Shadow of a Gunman, in 0'Casey, 1957-
S.0'Casey, Three Plays, London: Macmillan, St. Martin's Press, 1957-
Plato, The Apology, in Plato, 1970, Vol 1.
Plato. The Charmides, in Plato, 1970, Vol 2.
Plato, The Cratylus, in Plato, 1970, Vol 3•
Plato, The Crito, in Plato, 1970, Vol 1.
Plato, The Meno, trans. W.K.C.Guthrie, Harinondsworth: Penguin Books,
1956.
Plato, The Republic, trans. F.M.Cornford,London: Oxford University
Press, 1941.
Plato, The Symposium, in Plato, 1970, Vol 2.
Plato, The Dialogues, trans. B.Jowett, London: Sphere Books,1970
(four volumes).
S.Raffel, Matters of Fact, London; Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979-
J.J.Rousseau, Essay on the Origin of Languages, New York: Frederick
Ungar Publishing Co., 1966.
280
J.P.Sartre, "The Singular Universal", in Thompson ed., 1972.
E.Schegloff and H.Sacks, "Opening Up Closings", in Turner ed., 197^«
M.Shell, The Economy of Literature. Ealtimore: Johns Hopkins Univer¬
sity Press, 1978.
G.Simmel, "Sociability", in Simmel, 1971•
G.Simmel, On Individuality and Social Forms, ed. D.Levine, Chicago!
University of Chicago Press, 1971-
L.Strauss, The City and Man, Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 197^-
J.Thompson ed., Kierkegaard, A Collection of Critical Essays, New
York: Doubleday, 1972.
Thucydides, The Pelononnesian War, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books,195^-
R.Turner ed., Bthnomethodology, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 197^-
P.Wheelwright, Heraclitus. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1959•
W.Wordsworth, Poetry and Prose Selections, ed. I.Evans, London, Kethuen
and Co., 1935*
F.Yates, The Art of Memory, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1969.
